Suchergebnisse

Islamic Law and the Law of Armed Conflict: The Conflict in Pakistan demonstrates how international law can be applied in Muslim states in a way that is compatible with Islamic law. Within this broader framework of compatible application, Niaz A. Shah argues that the Islamic law of qital (i.e. armed conflict) and the law of armed conflict are compatible with each other and that the former can complement the latter at national and regional levels. Shah identifies grey areas in the Islamic law of qital and argues for their expansion and clarification. Shah also calls for new rules to be developed

Islamic Law and the Law of Armed Conflict: The Armed Conflict in Pakistan demonstrates how international law can be applied in Muslim states in a way that is compatible with Islamic law.

Abstract
On 5 August 2019, India unilaterally ended the autonomous status under Article 370 of the Indian constitution 1949. The state of Jammu and Kashmir (j&k) was established under the terms of the Instrument of Accession by the Ruler of j&k. To change the demographic composition of j&k, Article 35A of Indian constitution 1949 was also abolished and new domicile rules were introduced paving the way for non-Kashmiri Indians to settle permanently in j&k. Under the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act 2019, Kargil and Leh districts were cut from Jammu and recategorized as Union Territory of Ladakh and the state of j&k was relegated to a Union Territory directly governed by the central government. On 5 May 2022, a delimitation report was published giving more seats to Hindus compared to Muslims against the population criterion. This article argues that India had started re-colonisation of j&k since October 1947. Eliminating its autonomous status in August 2019 was not the starting but a tipping point of the re-colonisation. After decolonisation of British India in August 1947, major Indian states such as Hyderabad; Junagadh and j&k were given the option to join India or Pakistan. India saw this as a 'grave threat' to her organic unity and invaded Hyderabad on 13 September 1947; j&k on 27 October 1947 and Junagadh on 9 November 1947. It is argued that India secured accession from the Ruler of j&k under compelling circumstances and on the condition that a free and impartial plebiscite would be held to ascertain the wishes of Kashmiri people. Since 1947, the pledge of plebiscite did not materialise. As freedom from colonialism has become a jus cogens, it is argued that the United Nations (UN) and its members have erga omnes obligations to respect and support the right to self-determination of the Kashmiri people.

I argue that Islamic law treats ratified human rights treaties as part of the law of the land and as directly applicable in courts in Muslim states such as Pakistan where Sharia is the main source of law. The Islamic approach is the better and more effective approach for the enjoyment of human rights. Article 227(1) of the 1973 constitution of Pakistan demands Islamization of all existing laws and prohibits the enactment of laws incompatible with Islamic law. Pakistan has failed to Islamize its constitutional provisions on the ratification and status of ratified treaties and continues to practice the dualist doctrine inherited from the British colonial era. Pakistan has acceded to seven core human rights treaties, but they are not incorporated in the legal system of Pakistan. This has led to a legal culture where human rights treaties are seen as applicable on the international plane only. I make a case for the Islamization of the constitutional provisions in relation to human rights and other treaties and until the constitution is amended under Article 227(1), I propose an ad hoc framework for relying on unincorporated human rights treaties and customary international law based on the developed British dualist doctrine which will contribute to the enjoyment of human rights in Pakistan.

AbstractThe right to freedom of expression is a qualified right: it allows expression that might 'offend, shock or disturb' but prohibits 'insults', 'abusive attacks' and 'hate speech'. Applying the Convention test I argue that all cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad, which although might offend Muslims, are an acceptable form of expression in Western democracies except cartoon number two implying the Prophet Muhammad as a 'terrorist' which is 'insulting' and 'an abusive attack' on the Muslim community and Islam. In the post-9/11 circumstances, it may be viewed as a vehicle for instigating hatred against the Muslim community. By critiquing the inaction of Denmark and France, I argue that failure to prosecute Jyllands-Posten and Charlie Hebdo violates Articles 9(1) of the European Convention and the Danish Criminal Code and the French Freedom of Press Act 1881. Relying on ECtHR's jurisprudence, I argue that the values of the Convention and democracy aim to nurture a society based on tolerance, social peace, non-discrimination and broad-mindedness. The public space is a shared space and no single group – religious and non-religious – can monopolise nor intimidate it.

The right to freedom of expression is a qualified right: it allows expression that might 'offend, shock or disturb' but prohibits 'insults', 'abusive attacks' and 'hate speech'. Applying the Convention test I argue that all cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad, which although might offend Muslims, are an acceptable form of expression in Western democracies except cartoon number two implying the Prophet Muhammad as a 'terrorist' which is 'insulting' and 'an abusive attack' on the Muslim community and Islam. In the post-9/11 circumstances, it may be viewed as a vehicle for instigating hatred against the Muslim community. By critiquing the inaction of Denmark and France, I argue that failure to prosecute Jyllands-Posten and Charlie Hebdo violates Articles 9(1) of the European Convention and the Danish Criminal Code and the French Freedom of Press Act 1881. Relying on ECtHR's jurisprudence, I argue that the values of the Convention and democracy aim to nurture a society based on tolerance, social peace, non-discrimination and broad-mindedness. The public space is a shared space and no single group – religious and non-religious – can monopolise nor intimidate it.

This article analyses the military justice system of Pakistan to determine to what extent it is compatible with fair trial standards recognised by human rights law and the constitution of Pakistan. It sets out the fair trial tests and apply them to the military justice system of Pakistan. The analysis reveals that the military justice system blatantly violates fair trial standards: it is part of the Executive and is neither independent nor impartial. It runs as a detached parallel departmental justice system to the national justice system. The author also argues that the majority judgement in the 2015 Military Courts Case did not apply the correct legal tests and wrongly held that the military justice system meets the fair trial standards. It is per in curiam. The author offers recommendations for reforming the military justice system proposing that Pakistan might learn from the successful reformation of the British military justice system.

This article analyses the military justice system of Pakistan to determine to what extent it is compatible with fair trial standards recognised by human rights law and the constitution of Pakistan. It sets out the fair trial tests and apply them to the military justice system of Pakistan. The analysis reveals that the military justice system blatantly violates fair trial standards: it is part of the Executive and is neither independent nor impartial. It runs as a detached parallel departmental justice system to the national justice system. The author also argues that the majority judgement in the 2015 Military Courts Case did not apply the correct legal tests and wrongly held that the military justice system meets the fair trial standards. It is per in curiam. The author offers recommendations for reforming the military justice system proposing that Pakistan might learn from the successful reformation of the British military justice system.

This article focuses on the use of force under Islamic law, i.e., jus ad bellum. Islamic law allows the use of force in self-defence and in defence of those who are oppressed and unable to defend themselves. In contrast, the offensive theory of jihad is untenable. Muslim states follow the defensive theory of jihad. Islamic law also allows, under certain conditions, anticipatory self-defence. Only the head of a Muslim state (a ruler or caliph) is allowed to declare jihad. Most of the current so-called declarations of jihad have been issued by non-state actors, e.g. Al-Qaeda, who have no authority to declare jihad. These declarations thus have no validity under Islamic law and, indeed, Muslim states are fighting these armed groups. Islamic law imposes certain restrictions on the use of force in self-defence, i.e., military necessity, distinction, and proportionality. Accepting an offer of peace and humanity are also relevant conditions.