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An unprecedented new international moral and legal rule forbids one state from hosting money stolen by the leaders of another state. The aim is to counter grand corruption or kleptocracy ("rule by thieves"), when leaders of poorer countries—such as Marcos in the Philippines, Mobutu in the Congo, and more recently those overthrown in revolutions in the Arab world and Ukraine—loot billions of dollars at the expense of their own citizens. This money tends to end up hosted in rich countries. These host states now have a duty to block, trace, freeze, and seize these illicit funds and hand them back to the countries from which they were stolen. In The Despot's Guide to Wealth Management, J. C. Sharman asks how this anti-kleptocracy regime came about, how well it is working, and how it could work better. Although there have been some real achievements, the international campaign against grand corruption has run into major obstacles. The vested interests of banks, lawyers, and even law enforcement often favor turning a blind eye to foreign corruption proceeds. Recovering and returning looted assets is a long, complicated, and expensive process.Sharman used a private investigator, participated in and observed anti-corruption policy, and conducted more than a hundred interviews with key players. He also draws on various journalistic exposés, whistle-blower accounts, and government investigations to inform his comparison of the anti-kleptocracy records of the United States, Britain, Switzerland, and Australia. Sharman calls for better policing, preventative measures, and use of gatekeepers like bankers, lawyers, and real estate agents. He also recommends giving nongovernmental organizations and for-profit firms more scope to independently investigate corruption and seize stolen assets

Intro -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction: Policy Diffusion and Anti-Money Laundering -- 1. Money Laundering and Anti-Money Laundering -- Part One: Does Anti-Money Laundering Policy Work? -- 2. An Indirect Test of Effectiveness -- 3. A Direct Test of Effectiveness -- Part Two: Why Has Anti-Money Laundering Policy Diffused? -- 4. Blacklisting -- 5. Socialization and Competition -- Conclusions: Implications for Scholarship and Policy -- Bibliography -- Index.

Intro -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- 1. Death, Taxes, and Tax Havens -- 2. Regulative Norms and Inappropriate Means -- 3. Hearts and Minds in the Global Arena -- 4. Reputation, Blacklisting, and the Tax Havens -- 5. The OECD Rhetorically Entrapped -- 6. Implications for Policy and Theory -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.

Abstract
Four centuries of precolonial diplomatic, economic, and military African–European relations have been neglected in international relations. Refuting common presumptions about European dominance, before, during, and after the heyday of the Atlantic slave trade, African rulers and merchants were generally in a position of equality or superiority in their relations with Europeans. Contrary to expectations that long-term interaction promotes homogenization via institutional diffusion from core to periphery, Africans generally eschewed European political, economic, and military models such as the Westphalian state, the corporation, and the salaried standing army. Instead, they utilized external opportunities in ways that reinforced evolving local differences, or adopted institutions from the Islamic world; Europeans in Africa were more likely to adopt African models than vice versa. That African polities held out against European dominance longer than larger, richer, and more militarily powerful Asian polities, and that stateless African societies held out longest of all, brings into question fundamental assumptions about survival under international anarchy.

Why is the British Virgin Islands a bigger source of foreign direct investment into China than the USA, the European Union and Japan combined? Why is there 10 times more investment from China in the Caymans Islands than there is in the USA? This paper argues that these flows represent the efforts of Chinese and foreign investors to reduce governance and measurement transaction costs. Investors avail themselves of efficient institutions in offshore centers that are absent locally. These institutional attractions include the ease of raising capital on foreign stock markets, access to reliable courts, and more flexible and sophisticated financial products. Existing explanations of these capital movements, characterizing them as criminal money or tax arbitrage, are insufficient. Evidence is drawn from government statistics, private legal advice and interviews in offshore financial centers. (Pac Rev/GIGA)

How can we tell whether rules that apply in theory actually do so in practice? Realists argue that the gap between what formal rules proscribe and their effectiveness may be particularly wide at the international level. Furthermore, dominant states may impose costly standards on others that they themselves choose not to implement. To test these propositions, the article assesses the effectiveness of international soft law standards prohibiting anonymous participation in the global financial system by seeking to break these standards. The findings indicate that the prohibition on anonymous corporations is relatively ineffective and is flouted much more in G7 countries than in tax havens. The article contributes to and extends the work of realist scholars in international political economy, both in their skepticism of formal rules and focus on the effects of power. Evidence is drawn from the author's solicitations and purchases of anonymous shell companies from 45 corporate service providers in 22 countries. Adapted from the source document.