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Gamal Abdel Nasser was arguably one of the most influential Arab leaders in history. As President of Egypt from 1956 to 1970, he could have achieved a peace agreement with Israel, yet he preferred to maintain his unique leadership role by affirming pan-Arab nationalism and championing the liberation of Palestinians, a common euphemism for the destruction of Israel. In that era of Cold War politics, Nasser brilliantly played both Moscow and Washington, DC, as well as the United Nations to maximize his bargaining position and sustain his rule without compromising his core beliefs of Arab unity and solidarity. Surprisingly, little analysis is found regarding Nasser's perspective on peace, both in public and private records, in the weeks and months immediately after the 1967 War. Nasser's Peace examines Nasser's post-war policy revealing a close examination of how a third-world country can rival world powers and how fluid the definition of "peace" can be. Drawing on recently declassified primary sources, Michael Sharnoff closely examines Nasser's post-war strategy, which he claims was a four-tiered diplomatic and media effort consisting of his public declarations, his private diplomatic consultations, the Egyptian media's propaganda machine, and Egyptian diplomatic efforts. Sharnoff reveals that Nasser manipulated each tier masterfully, providing the answers they desired to hear, rather than stating the truth: that he wished to maintain control of his dictatorship and of his foothold in the Arab world

"Gamal Abdel Nasser was arguably one of the most influential Arab leaders in history. As President of Egypt from 1956 to 1970, he could have achieved a peace agreement with Israel, yet he preferred to maintain his unique leadership role by affirming pan-Arab nationalism and championing the liberation of Palestine, a common euphemism for the destruction of Israel. In that era of Cold War politics, Nasser brilliantly played Moscow, Washington, and the United Nations to maximize his bargaining position and sustain his rule without compromising his core beliefs of Arab unity and solidarity. Surprisingly, little analysis is found regarding Nasser's public and private perspectives on peace in the weeks and months immediately after the 1967 War. Nasser's Peace is a close examination of how a developing country can rival world powers and how fluid the definition of "peace" can be. Drawing on recently declassified primary sources, Michael Sharnoff thoroughly inspects Nasser's post-war strategy, which he claims was a four-tiered diplomatic and media effort consisting of his public declarations, his private diplomatic consultations, the Egyptian media's propaganda machine, and Egyptian diplomatic efforts. Sharnoff reveals that Nasser manipulated each tier masterfully, providing the answers they desired to hear, rather than stating the truth: that he wished to maintain control of his dictatorship and of his foothold in the Arab world."--Provided by publisher

This article examines Jordanian postage stamp depiction of the West Bank as part of the Hashemite Kingdom from 1952 to 1985. The majority of maps of the West Bank are featured as part of Jordan, both during Jordanian rule of the West Bank (1948–1967) and after Israel conquered the land during the 1967 war. Sometimes the West Bank is delineated from Jordan to suggest a territorial dispute with Israel, while other times, the West Bank is shown as part of Palestine. The ambiguous representations of the West Bank as Jordanian territory, disputed territory, and Palestinian territory reinforce Hashemite sovereignty claims to the West Bank while also supporting Palestinian rights and acknowledging Jordanian rule of the West Bank was conditional upon settlement of the Palestinian issue. Finally, this analysis seeks to explain why stamps stopped showing the West Bank as part of Jordan in 1985, three years before the kingdom formally severed all legal and administrative ties to the land.