Suchergebnisse

The article considers the phenomenon of price behavior on markets of joint products. It is shown that conclusions about the nature of economic entities' behavior on this kind of markets could be inaccurate if their characteristics such as joint costs and correlation of demand conditions on markets mentioned are not taken into account. For this purpose a theoretical model, built according to basic microeconomic principles, is applied. It provides an opportunity to reveal - without further new institutional analysis - that the reason for price deviation from a competitive level does not always lie in actions restricting competition.

The article considers the particularities of the relations between companies in the markets of joint products in Russia. These particularities correspond, first, to the production technology, when one input through unit production process gives several products; second, to the consequences of the privatization of production facilities created during the Soviet Union period. The article offers a game theory model that shows how companies may use antitrust authority in their interaction strategies. This in addition to other reasons might explain the amount of cases on the abuse of dominant position where companies, which produce joint products, are involved.

The paper deals with the comparative analysis of discrete institutional alternatives operationalized by referring to institutional design on different levels of interaction between economic agents and their groups. Theoretical differences between an institutional set of economic exchanges and an institutional boundaryof exchanges has been accounted for, as well as the differences between compensating and eliminating the failures of institutional arrangements used to organize economic exchange. Three examples illustrating the proposed research approach are analyzed: contracting on large diameter pipes for PJSC "Gazprom" infrastructure projects; contracting in the area of commercial real estate renting with "currency component"; the choice of mechanisms of governance for companies on highly concentrated markets with significant double-sided switching cost.

Opportunities for cartels study within the context of comparative analysis of mechanisms of governance structural alternatives are shown. The correlation between cartels and horizontal agreements restricting competition is described. Characteristics of antitrust control regimes of horizontal agreements are identified. The Russian agenda for cartel deterrence is presented.

Discrete structural alternatives (DSA) of intellectual activity results creation, including specification and protection of intellectual property rights (IPR), are considered through the lens of balancing with competition protection. DSA within the framework of IPR system are studied taking into account differences in incentives depending on market structures where goods are produced with IPR use, on the one hand, and regimes of antitrust, on the other hand. Besides, the open access to results of intellectual activity within the system of prizes and public procurement are presented as DSA. Some recommendations on balancing two ways of economic policy taking into account the state of affairs in Russian antitrust and IPR protection are put forward.

The article shows the importance of respecting the Rule of Law for organization of economic exchanges in terms of the New Institutional Economics (NIE). A brief overview of traditions in the study of the Rule of Law as a phenomenon is presented, including the approach to the study of this principle within the NIE. The costs of rights guarantying and redress as well as types I and II errors regarding rules enforcement are demonstrated. The illustration of types I and II errors problems within the context of the Rule of Law principle implementation in the area of Russian antimonopoly legislation is proposed.

The article presents economic foundations of markets comparability within the context of competition evaluation on particular commodities markets. It contains approaches to interpretation and evaluation of norms on markets comparability in the Russian law "On competition protection", ways and scenarios of the "comparable markets" concept implementation for antimonopoly regulation purposes. The issues of distributing the burden of proving between antimonopoly agencies and economic entities within the context of presumptions implemented are considered as well.

The article is devoted to explaining economic background as well as evaluation of opportunities, risks and expected results for leniency program within the context of Russian antimonopoly law changes. It describes the main idea of the said program, the set of questions to be resolved in the process of designing and implementing the program of reducing punishment of cartel participants in exchange for cooperation with antimonopoly bodies.

The article aims to explain the role of credible commitments as a factor of widening voluntary economic exchanges boundaries from the transaction economics perspective. It considers grounds and ways of credible commitments creation; correlation of promises in contracts, credible threats, on the one hand, and credible commitments, on the other. The author shows the importance of pledge and also correlation of addressee of promises and pledgee from the perspective of credible commitments provision.

Various ways of state participation in the mechanisms of transaction management are considered in the article. Differences between compensation and elimination of the market failures are identified. Opportunities and risks of non-regulatory alternatives usage as a mean of market failure compensation are described. Based on classification of goods correlated to relative cost of their useful characteristics evaluation (search, experience, merit) questions of institutional alternatives in three areas (political, financial and commodity) are examined.