WITH A VIEW TO ADVERSE JOB SEARCH BEHAVIOR AFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, THE PAPER USES A THEORETICAL MODEL TO DETERMINE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TIME SEQUENCE OF BENEFITS THAT MAXIMIZES THE EXPECTED UTILITY OF THE UNEMPLOYED, GIVEN THAT THEY ACT IN A SELF-INTERESTED WAY AND GIVEN THE TOTAL SIZE OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BUDGET.
Frontmatter -- SUMMARY OF CONTENTS -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Introduction -- I. PROPERTY LAW -- 2. Definition, Justification, and Emergence of Property Rights -- 3. Division of Property Rights -- 4. Acquisition and Transfer of Property -- 5. Conflict and Cooperation in the Use of Property: The Problem of Externalities -- 6. Public Property -- 7. Property Rights in Information -- II. ACCIDENT LAW -- 8. Liability and Deterrence: Basic Theory -- 9. Liability and Deterrence: Firms -- 10. Extensions of the Analysis of Deterrence -- 11. Liability, Risk-Bearing, and Insurance -- 12. Liability and Administrative Costs -- III. CONTRACT LAW -- 13. Overview of Contracts -- 14. Contract Formation -- 15. Production Contracts -- 16. Other Types of Contract -- IV. LITIGATION AND THE LEGAL PROCESS -- 17. Basic Theory of Litigation -- 18. Extensions of the Basic Theory -- 19. General Topics on the Legal Process -- V. PUBLIC LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL LAW -- 20. Deterrence with Monetary Sanctions -- 21. Deterrence with Nonmonetary Sanctions -- 22. Extensions of the Theory of Deterrence -- 23. Incapacitation, Rehabilitation, and Retribution -- 24. Criminal Law -- VI. GENERAL STRUCTURE OF THE LAW -- 25. The General Structure of the Law and Its Optimality -- VII. WELFARE ECONOMICS, MORALITY, AND THE LAW -- 26. Welfare Economics and Morality -- 27. Implications for the Analysis of Law -- 28. Income Distributional Equity and the Law -- 29. Concluding Observations -- References -- Author Index -- Subject Index
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"Although the corrective tax has long been viewed by economists as a theoretically desirable remedy for the problem of harmful externalities, its actual use has been limited, mainly to the domain of pollution. Liability, in contrast, has great importance in controlling harmful externalities. I compare the tax and liability here in theory and suggest that the conclusions help to explain the observed predominance of liability over taxation, except in the area of pollution. The following factors are emphasized in the analysis: inefficiency of incentives under taxes when, as would be typical, it would be impractical for the state to incorporate into taxes all of the variables that significantly affect expected harm; efficiency of incentives under strict liability, which requires only that actual harms be measured; efficiency of incentives to exercise precautions under the negligence rule; administrative cost advantages of liability deriving from its being applied only when harm occurs; and dilution of incentives under liability when suit would be unlikely or injurers would not be able to pay fully for harms caused"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
"Minimum asset and liability insurance requirements must often be met in order for parties to participate in potentially harmful activities. Such financial responsibility requirements may improve parties' decisions whether to engage in harmful activities and, if so, their efforts to reduce risk. However, the requirements may undesirably prevent some parties with low assets from engaging in activities. Liability insurance requirements tend to improve parties' incentives to reduce risk when insurers can observe levels of care, but dilute incentives to reduce risk when insurers cannot observe levels of care. In the latter case, compulsory liability insurance may be inferior to minimum asset requirements"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
