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AbstractThis paper offers a new account of Leo Strauss's critique of historicism inNatural Right and History. According to the general view of this critique, Strauss tries to show that historicism wrongly denies the possibility of knowledge of universal and unchangeable principles of right. I argue that this view only reflects Strauss's exoteric critique of historicism, and that, apart from it, he gives an esoteric critique. According to this esoteric critique, historicism ignores the necessity of prudence, in the sense of making "concrete decisions" which suspend universal and unchangeable principles of right. In this light, I also show that Strauss's critique of historicism depends on Carl Schmitt's concept of the "decision," but that Strauss simultaneously critiques Schmitt inNatural Right and History.

According to Leo Strauss, one of the primary purposes of the esotericism practiced by philosophers is the defense against persecution. This defense entails communicating the truth only to philosophers and concealing it from non-philosophers. For many commentators, this conception of esotericism has inegalitarian implications—for example, that the philosophers, who constitute a minority of people, are naturally capable of being told the truth, while the non-philosophers, who constitute a majority, are not. In this article, I argue that Strauss gives another account of esotericism that does not have inegalitarian implications. He gives this account in his discussion of Farabi's esotericism in the "Introduction" to Persecution and the Art of Writing. I also argue that Strauss presents this account esoterically. The "Introduction" reproduces text from an earlier article by Strauss, "Farabi's Plato," and Strauss makes certain changes, which point towards this other account. Finally, I explain why Strauss presents this other account esoterically.