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AbstractFinance is often considered a constraining or compelling force in war. This article examines an alternative role of finance in war, asserting that investors can inform states about adversarial intentions and resolve under certain conditions. This signaling mechanism can reduce information asymmetry between states and decrease the probability of conflict. In the context of these theoretical expectations, I examine the case of Austria and the Rothschild Bank in the nineteenth century. I find that instead of being a constraining force on Austrian foreign policy, the Rothschilds helped inform Austria and other European powers during interstate crises. The information provided by the Rothschilds helped Europe avert war in several cases during the nineteenth century.

With access to inexpensive credit, states can finance wars without overburdening their constituents, and face relatively small short-term costs compared to states with poor credit access. As a result of these economic benefits, states with lower credit costs will be more likely to win their wars, ceteris paribus. However, lower borrowing costs provide states domestic political benefits, which I argue are more important for democracies than nondemocracies. Since expensive credit forces states to rely on its citizens for revenue, governments that are more sensitive to their citizens' preferences are at a disadvantage. In sum, I argue that democracies are more sensitive to credit costs than authoritarian regimes. To test this theory, this article analyzes a data set of wars using logistic regressions and matching techniques, and examines the case of the Chaco War. The results demonstrate that the costs of borrowing have a substantial effect on war outcomes, and that these costs are more important for democracies than nondemocracies. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

With access to inexpensive credit, states can finance wars without overburdening their constituents, and face relatively small short-term costs compared to states with poor credit access. As a result of these economic benefits, states with lower credit costs will be more likely to win their wars, ceteris paribus. However, lower borrowing costs provide states domestic political benefits, which I argue are more important for democracies than nondemocracies. Since expensive credit forces states to rely on its citizens for revenue, governments that are more sensitive to their citizens' preferences are at a disadvantage. In sum, I argue that democracies are more sensitive to credit costs than authoritarian regimes. To test this theory, this article analyzes a data set of wars using logistic regressions and matching techniques, and examines the case of the Chaco War. The results demonstrate that the costs of borrowing have a substantial effect on war outcomes, and that these costs are more important for democracies than nondemocracies.

Do women leaders enact more hawkish foreign policies? Some research argues women leaders are more likely to adopt aggressive and masculine characteristics to obtain national office. As a result, women leaders should exhibit more hawkish behavior than men. In this study we re-examine the relationship between the women leaders and foreign policy by focusing on military spending behavior. We argue that conventional empirical methods, such as linear regression, are ill-suited to examine data on women leaders and military spending. These methods are sensitive to outliers and small sample sizes: two characteristics of women leadership. To address these issues, we use the synthetic control method to estimate the military spending behavior of women leaders. By creating unique synthetic counterfactuals for three prominent women leaders – Thatcher, Gandhi, and Meir – we analyze what would have happened if a particular state had a male leader. Generalizing beyond these cases, we also conduct a multiple treatment test that examines the effect of women leadership jointly across multiple countries and time periods. We find that women leaders do not spend more on the military than men. We analyze plausible explanations of these null results and discuss their implications.

Do alliances allow states to share defense burdens and reduce military spending? Despite expectations that alliances should lead to decreased military spending, the empirical record offers mixed findings. We argue that not all alliances are reliable; thus, only allies that receive signals of reassurance will rely on the external security of allies and subsequently reduce their military spending. Compared to states that do not receive additional signals, these reassured allies will have greater confidence that an ally will come to their aid. As a result, third-party aggressors are deterred and the demand for military spending will decrease. We test this argument with an analysis of US signals of support, alliance commitments, and military spending. We find that American alliances without additional signals of support have a negligible effect on military spending. Yet, we observe that alliances are negatively associated with military spending when signals of support are present. Additional tests indicate that alliance commitments, coupled with strong US signals, are also associated with lower military spending in the rivals of US allies. Our results potentially help explain the mixed evidence in the arms-versus-allies and burden-sharing literatures and further demonstrate that extra-alliance signals play an important role in the practice of International Relations.

When do private creditors versus debtor states accept a greater burden in resolving sovereign debt crises? In this study, we argue that distributive politics helps explain the "haircut"—or losses—private creditors take in debt restructuring cases. Despite the expected convergence of partisan policies in a globalized economy, we argue that right and left leaders extract different settlements in debt negotiations. Left governments, representing constituents most likely to be hurt from higher debt repayment, credibly demonstrate more bargaining power and extract greater concessions from creditors. Distributive politics, however, is an indeterminate factor in explaining states entrance into debt negotiations. We use recently released data on the outcome of sovereign debt restructuring cases between states and private creditors from 1975 to 2013 to test our expectations. Results from a double-hurdle model indicate that creditors receive a larger haircut when negotiating with left governments.

AbstractModels of distributive politics often assume that fixed budgets constrain the efforts of incumbents to retain power. Yet, significant variation exists in politicians' abilities to push distributive costs forward by funding current fiscal policy through sovereign borrowing. This article theorizes how and when variation in sovereign credit access influences the central goal of democratic incumbents: political survival. Credit allows incumbents to reward supporters without immediately extracting domestic revenue. Excessive borrowing, however, risks higher interest rates or possible market exclusion. Considering sovereign borrowing's benefits and costs, we argue that the marginal effect of credit access on political survival is greatest for those incumbents that require other parties to implement fiscal policy. An analysis of incumbent party tenure in seventy-one democracies from 1977–2007 demonstrates that affordable sovereign finance is associated with longer tenures under divided government but has no significant effect on survival under unified governments.

Sovereign borrowing is often used to cover the costs of war. This borrowing, coupled with war's economic disruptions, strains states' ability to honor debt promises. Contrary to conventional expectations, however, we find that default is not common after wars. To explain the relationship between war and sovereign default, this article lays out a selection effect argument: war participants are unlikely to default in the first place, while states likely to default are unable to acquire the financing necessary to fight a war. In sum, states that lack the financial means to adequately borrow avoid paths to war. After offering some examples of the selection mechanism at work, we present evidence that states unlikely to default will avoid entering the war sample. Our findings have implications for the inferences researchers make about war finance and war onset.

In this article, we contend that the current gender and conflict literature ignores the context of military decisions and thus underestimates the support of women for certain types of military interventions. We argue that the issues related to humanitarian crises are likely to provoke support from women. Consequently, as more women enter elected positions in state legislatures, the more likely a state will become involved in a humanitarian military intervention. To test our argument, we compile a data set of humanitarian military interventions and women legislators from 1946 to 2003. A series of estimation approaches and robustness tests support our assertion that more women legislators impact the likelihood that a state will become involved in a humanitarian military intervention. Our research has specific implications on the role of gender in conflict processes and more general implications on the connection between domestic political processes and foreign policy decision making.

This study explores the conditional influence of sovereign credit on leader survival. We specifically focus on credit's heterogeneous effect on leadership survival across regimes. We argue that non‐democratic leaders are more sensitive to credit access and cost than democratic leadership. We use event history analysis to test the conditional relationship between sovereign credit and leader tenure from 1981 to 2004. Examining both domestic and global determinants of credit access and costs, our findings are consistent with the assertion that non‐democratic leadership survival is linked to credit even when addressing issues of endogeneity.

In this article, we contend that the current gender and conflict literature ignores the context of military decisions and thus underestimates the support of women for certain types of military interventions. We argue that the issues related to humanitarian crises are likely to provoke support from women. Consequently, as more women enter elected positions in state legislatures, the more likely a state will become involved in a humanitarian military intervention. To test our argument, we compile a data set of humanitarian military interventions and women legislators from 1946 to 2003. A series of estimation approaches and robustness tests support our assertion that more women legislators impact the likelihood that a state will become involved in a humanitarian military intervention. Our research has specific implications on the role of gender in conflict processes and more general implications on the connection between domestic political processes and foreign policy decision making.