"Stalin and War, 1918-1953 is the first book to examine the patterns of radicalized internal violence that characterized the Stalinist regime across the whole of the dictator's rule, and it is one of the only works to connect patterns of internal violence to the dictator's perceptions of war and foreign threat. This book will be of interest to professional scholars of Soviet history, twentieth-century history, and World War II history, and it is approachable enough to be appreciated by general readers"--
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Introduction: Stalinism and the Industrial State -- I. THE STATE(S) OF THE ECONOMY IN THE LATE 1920s -- 1. Unruly Bureaucracies, Fragmented Markets -- 2. Wheeling and Dealing in Soviet Industry -- 3. Rabkrin and the Militarized Campaign Economy -- II. THE STRUGGLE FOR A NEW STATE, 1928-1930 -- 4. What Kind of State? -- 5. The Politics of Modernization -- III. WORKING IN THE MADHOUSE, 1930-1934 -- 6. Daily Work in the Apparat -- 7. Purge and Patronage -- 8. The Pathologies of Modernization -- Conclusion: Socialism, Dictatorship, and Despotism in Stalin's Russia -- Glossary -- Bibliography -- Index
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"This is one of the first books to emphasize the importance of social order repression by Stalin's Soviet regime in contrast to the traditional emphasis of historians on political repression. Based on extensive examination of new archival materials David R. Shearer finds that most repression during the Stalinist dictatorship of the 1930s was against marginal social groups such as petty criminals, deviant youth, sectarians, and the unemployed and unproductive." "It was because Soviet leaders regarded social disorder as more of a danger to the state than political opposition that they instituted a new form of class war to defend themselves against this perceived threat. Shearer details the workings of informant networks, police registration systems, and widespread police cleansing campaigns and surveillance systems used to monitor and control the population."--Jacket.
David R. Shearer, La criminalité et le désordre social dans la Russie de Stalin. Traditionnellement les historiens considèrent le milieu des années 30 comme une période de stabilisation et d'adaptation. L'ère de la Grande Retraite aurait suivi la période révolu- tionnaire du début des années 30 et précédé la soudaine vague de violence provoquée par l'État pendant les années 1937 et 1938. À l'aide de rapports de la police, du NKVD et d'autres sources, cet article conteste une telle interprétation basée sur ce découpage par périodes. Loin d'être une ère de stabilisation, le milieu de années 30 connut une agitation sociale constante qui s'exprima non pas par une opposition organisée et déclarée au régime mais par des milliers de petits (et parfois de grands) actes de désobéissance et même de violence dirigés contre la propriété de l'État et les représentants du pouvoir soviétique. L'article fait une distinction entre la politique de purge menée contre les élites de l'État et du parti et les opérations de masse, connues sous le nom de « Grande Terreur » qui débutèrent pendant l'été 1937. Après une analyse du schéma des crimes et des actes de maintien de l'ordre au cours de toute cette décennie, l'article montre que la prétendue Grande Terreur ne s'est pas abattue brusquement sur la société soviétique après une période de paix sociale relative. On comprend mieux les opérations de masse de 1937 et 1938 si on les voit comme le point culminant d'une décennie d'efforts, souvent vains, à imposer l'autorité soviétique sur une population turbulente.
David R. Shearer, The language and politics of socialist rationalization. Study of the socialist rationalization movement reveals the complexity of political and social conflict in Soviet industry during the late 1920's and early 1930's. Struggles over policy and hegemony, as expressed in debates over appropriate forms of socialist rationalization, did not cut along easily discernible social or political lines. Official rhetoric legitimated class conflict, but masked far more complex forms of social war within factories and state industrial bureaucracies. Thus, this paper argues that the Stalinist attack against the industrial apparatus in 1929 and 1930 should not be seen mainly in ideological terms, or in terms of party control vs. professional autonomy. Many engineering and administrative groups supported Stalinist policies precisely because those policies offered the prospect of expanding professional activity and authority. The Stalinist leadership, itself divided politically, endorsed contradictory notions of socialist rationalization in its attack against NEP economic policies. The regime's productivity policies developed in an ad-hoc and contradictory manner, simultaneously embracing and encouraging technocratic, syndicalist, and radical populist tendencies. Contradictions in policy initiatives were never resolved, nor were conflicts among competing social and occupational groups that shaped the regime's policies. Violent social conflict became institutionalized in the ongoing struggles over policy and hegemony inside factories and throughout the state apparatus.
