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A long-dominant reading of American politics holds that public policy in the United States is easily captured by special interest groups. Countering this view, Adam Sheingate traces the development of government intervention in agriculture from its nineteenth-century origins to contemporary struggles over farm subsidies. His considered conclusion is that American institutions have not given agricultural interest groups any particular advantages in the policy process, in part because opposing lobbies also enjoy access to policymakers. In fact, the high degree of conflict and pluralism maintained by American institutions made possible substantial retrenchment of the agricultural welfare state during the 1980s and 1990s. In Japan and France--two countries with markedly different institutional characters than the United States--powerful agricultural interests and a historically close relationship between farmers, bureaucrats, and politicians continue to preclude a roll-back of farm subsidies.This well-crafted study not only puts a new spin on agricultural policy, but also makes a strong case for the broader claim that the relatively decentralized American political system is actually less prone to capture and rule by subgovernments than the more centralized political systems found in France and Japan. Sheingate's historical, comparative approach also demonstrates, in a widely useful way, how past institutional developments shape current policies and options

Political races in the United States rely heavily on highly paid political consultants who carefully curate the images of politicians, advise candidates on polling and analytics, and shape voters' perceptions through marketing and advertising techniques. More than half of the $6 billion spent in the 2012 election went to consultants who controlled virtually every aspect of the campaigns, from polling, fundraising, and media to more novel techniques of social media and micro-targeting. These consultants play a central role in political campaigns-determining not only how the public sees politicians, but also how politicians see the public. In Building a Business of Politics, author Adam Sheingate traces the history of political consultants from its origins in the publicity experts and pollsters of the 1920s and 1930s to the strategists and media specialists of the 1970s who transformed political campaigns into a highly profitable business. Today, consultants command a hefty fee from politicians as they turn campaign cash from special interest groups and wealthy donors into advertisements, polls, and direct mail solicitations characteristic of modern campaigns. The implications of this system on the state of American democracy are significant: the rise of the permanent campaign brings with it the rise of a permanent campaign industry. A professional political class stands between the voters and those who claim to represent them, influencing messages on both sides. Sheingate not only shows how political consultants have reshaped politics, though; he also covers recent developments like the commercialization of digital campaign tools and the consolidation of the political consulting industry into global media conglomerates. Building a Business of Politics is both a definitive account of the consulting profession and a powerful reinterpretation of how political professionals reshaped American democracy in the modern era.--

Political races in the United States rely heavily on highly paid political consultants who carefully curate the images of politicians, advise candidates on polling and analytics, and shape voters' perceptions through marketing and advertising techniques. More than half of the $6 billion spent in the 2012 election went to consultants who controlled virtually every aspect of the campaigns, from polling, fundraising, and media to more novel techniques of social media and micro-targeting. These consultants play a central role in political campaigns-determining not only how the public sees politicians, but also how politicians see the public. In Building a Business of Politics, author Adam Sheingate traces the history of political consultants from its origins in the publicity experts and pollsters of the 1920s and 1930s to the strategists and media specialists of the 1970s who transformed political campaigns into a highly profitable business. Today, consultants command a hefty fee from politicians as they turn campaign cash from special interest groups and wealthy donors into advertisements, polls, and direct mail solicitations characteristic of modern campaigns. The implications of this system on the state of American democracy are significant: the rise of the permanent campaign brings with it the rise of a permanent campaign industry. A professional political class stands between the voters and those who claim to represent them, influencing messages on both sides. Sheingate not only shows how political consultants have reshaped politics, though; he also covers recent developments like the commercialization of digital campaign tools and the consolidation of the political consulting industry into global media conglomerates. Building a Business of Politics is both a definitive account of the consulting profession and a powerful reinterpretation of how political professionals reshaped American democracy in the modern era.--

The Rhetorical Presidency places great importance on the transformative power of political ideas. For Tulis, Progressive ideas informed the rhetorical practices of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson-practices that reconstituted the American presidency. They did so, in part, by trading on the ambiguous nature of the concept of 'publicity'-which at once evoked liberal ideals of public deliberation and transparency, and modern practices of manipulative communication. In turn, the new practices of publicity revolutionized not only the American presidency, but American politics as a whole. Adapted from the source document.

This article explores how the congressional committee system shapes the dynamics of issue attention. Consisting of what is referred to as a congressional opportunity structure, it describes how committee jurisdictions provide an important institutional context for the attention paid to new issues in congressional hearings. This is illustrated through an examination of congressional attention to biotechnology over a 30‐year period. This article finds that committees with broader jurisdictions were more active in biotechnology than committees with a narrow policy remit. However, these institutional effects varied widely, even within a single policy domain. This variation suggests that issue attention depends on the degree of fit between issue characteristics and the congressional opportunity structure. More broadly, the findings here illustrate the virtues of public policy research in studies of Congress.

Biotechnology policy in the United States promotes the commercial development of genetically modified crops, yet adopts a precautionary approach when it comes to stem cells and cloning. In this article, the evolution of this bifurcated policy domain is traced. A detailed analysis of congressional hearings shows how distinctions between the products of biotechnology came to be reflected in the character of committees holding hearings, the attention to risks and benefits, and the pattern of interest-group activity in different biotechnology applications. It is argued that many of the differences that separate the United States and Europe in biotechnology reflect the way institutions reinforce past policy choices.

Explores the role of political entrepreneurship in achieving institutional change. Little attention has been given to what constitutes political entrepreneurial behavior or what structural characteristics of institutions aid or block entrepreneurial influence. Dynamic political action by entrepreneurs is linked to dynamic potentials inside the routine functioning of political institutions. Institutional politics hold uncertainties, complexities, & ambiguities that allow political innovation. US institutions can be simultaneously affected by entrepreneurial action since it crosses borders to expand jurisdictions or achieve monopolistic power. The concept of entry barriers is applied to the study of optimal conditions for political innovation, & a hypothesis concerning conditions that allowed extensive political innovation between 1890 & 1940 is examined. The work of several economists who offered some descriptions of the nature of entrepreneurship is reviewed, & three advantages of studying institutions & institutional change through a view of entrepreneurial innovation are presented. L. A. Hoffman

The case of agriculture in the United States and the European Union indicates that retrenchment opportunities wax and wane. In the first half of the 1990s, both the U.S. and the EU instituted significant farm policy reforms. But as the 1990s came to an end, subsidies in both countries increased as policymakers became less enthusiastic about reducing benefits for farmers. This variability highlights the shortcomings of current political science explanations of retrenchment: the literature has yet to explain why policy change occurs in some circumstances but not others. In this paper, I employ the concepts of issue definition and venue change in order to explain why the United States and the European Union fluctuate in their capacity to reduce farm subsidies. I argue that, in agriculture, retrenchment advocates must redefine the issue of subsidies in a manner that highlights the negative externalities associated with farm policy. Second, retrenchment advocates must also exploit opportunities for strategic venue change so that policy decisions in agriculture do not rest solely with those who benefit from the status quo. By adding the concepts of issue definition and venue change to studies of retrenchment, we gain a better understanding of the conditions that make policy change possible, as well as an account of the mechanism through which retrenchment takes place.

A comparison of the ascendance of the "agricultural welfare state" in the US, France, & Japan notes that, in contrast to the other two nations, US farmers were unable to organize a peak association, form corporatist links with the government, or become a favored constituency of either political party. French & Japanese farmers enjoy the advantages of a state-subsidized peak association & effective party links that have a positive impact on policy formation. Three elements of institutional development said to distinguish the US agricultural welfare state from the others are described as: federal/regional party competition; administrative fragmentation among competitive farm organizations; & conflicts among producers of different commodities. As a result, institutions in the US have failed to give policy advantages to agricultural interest groups; hampered development of clientele relations with the state; & controlled interest group access to the political process. A discussion of the theoretical implications suggests that US institutions convey demographic, economic, & political trends in ways that expedite policy changes & encourage retrenchment. 5 Tables, 1 Figure. J. Lindroth