Are the Effects of Monetary Policy Asymmetric? The Case of Taiwan
In: Journal of policy modeling: JPMOD ; a social science forum of world issues, Band 22, Heft 2, S. 197-218
ISSN: 0161-8938
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In: Journal of policy modeling: JPMOD ; a social science forum of world issues, Band 22, Heft 2, S. 197-218
ISSN: 0161-8938
In: Journal of policy modeling: JPMOD ; a social science forum of world issues, Band 22, Heft 2, S. 197-218
ISSN: 0161-8938
In: International journal of forecasting, Band 12, Heft 2, S. 269-282
ISSN: 0169-2070
In: Contemporary economic policy: a journal of Western Economic Association International, Band 30, Heft 1, S. 113-128
ISSN: 1465-7287
This study compares the performance of banks that are part of a financial holding company (FHC banks) with that of banks that are not (independent banks) using Taiwan data from 2002:Q1 to 2006:Q2. The comparisons are based on 14 performance ratios resulting from the concept of CAMEL (which is an acronym for Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management efficiency, Earnings ability, and Liquidity sufficiency). To ensure that becoming part of an FHC is a random process, we used four matching methods to select the controlled banks so that the characteristic variables of banks in the two groups are statistically indifferent. By using the data before matching, it was found that FHC banks significantly defeat independent banks, regardless of their performance ratios. Conversely, when the sample was used after the matching, the results changed dramatically. Although FHC banks still beat the independent banks in terms of capital adequacy, asset quality, and liquidity sufficiency, FHC banks and independent banks are found to have equal profitability and management efficiency. Earlier studies that do not consider the endogeneity problem tend to overestimate the joining effect.(JELC21, G21)
In: Pacific Economic Review, Band 25, Heft 4, S. 539-573
SSRN
SSRN
SSRN
Working paper
In: The quarterly review of economics and finance, Band 74, S. 308-327
ISSN: 1062-9769
In: Pacific economic review, Band 25, Heft 4, S. 539-573
ISSN: 1468-0106
AbstractThis study examines the effects of connections and economic performance on the promotion of Chinese city mayors. Our study differs from the published literature in four respects. First, this study covers a comprehensive data set, including 1,422 mayors from 284 prefecture‐level cities. The use of a large data set helps resolve mixed results of past studies. Second, we use a broader range of top leaders. Third, we apply a more comprehensive definition of connections than earlier studies. Finally, we examine the effects of the policy shift of the 11th 5‐year plan on promotion of mayors. Our results reveal that the performance of a city mayor assisted his/her promotion to party secretary before 2006 but not afterwards. However, a mayor's connection with five types of top leaders is helpful. Among the four types of connection, colleagueship is the most effective in expediting the promotion of mayors. Graduating from the same university and department is also helpful but to a lesser extent. Township connection is not useful.
In: The quarterly review of economics and finance, Band 56, S. 98-109
ISSN: 1062-9769
In: Hong Kong Institute for Monetary and Financial Research (HKIMR) Research Paper WP No. 30/2014
SSRN
In: The quarterly review of economics and finance, Band 50, Heft 4, S. 424-435
ISSN: 1062-9769
In: Emerging markets, finance and trade: EMFT, Band 46, Heft 5, S. 90-105
ISSN: 1558-0938
In: Corporate governance: an international review, Band 15, Heft 5, S. 999-1021
ISSN: 1467-8683
This paper studies the impacts of corporate governance on earnings management. We use firm‐level governance data, taken from Credit Lyonnais Security Asia (CLSA), of nine Asian countries, in addition to the country‐level governance data used in past studies. Our conclusion is as follows. First, firms with good corporate governance tend to conduct less earnings management. Second, there is a size effect for earnings smoothing, that is, large size firms are prone to conduct earnings smoothing, but good corporate governance can mitigate the effect on average. Third, there is a turning point for leverage effect, i.e. when the governance index is large, leverage effect exists, otherwise reverse leverage effect exists. It shows that a highly leveraged firm with poor governance is prone to be scrutinised closely and thus finds it harder to fool the market by manipulating earnings. Fourth, firms with higher growth (lower earnings yield) are prone to engage in earnings smoothing and earnings aggressiveness, but good corporate governance can mitigate the effect. Finally, firms in stronger anti‐director rights countries tend to exhibit stronger earnings smoothing. This counter‐intuitive result is different from Leuz et al. (2003).
In: International journal of forecasting, Band 22, Heft 2, S. 317-339
ISSN: 0169-2070