Suchergebnisse

Drawing on provincial-level time-series cross-section data for the period of 1978-2002, I test hypotheses on the determinants of Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CC) membership shares for incumbent officials from different provinces. I find that officials from more populous provinces tended to take up higher alternate CC membership shares, but lower full CC membership shares. While urbanization is negatively associated with provincial alternate CC membership shares, there is little support for the role of other economic variables. The constrained nature of alternate CC membership implies greater 'symbolic representation' for the more populous and rural provinces on the national level in this period. These findings, based on considerations of distinct categories of CC membership, do not corroborate arguments sweepingly attributing CC representation to either provincial economic resources or performance. (J Contemp China/GIGA)

One possible political determinant of macroeconomic instability scholars have explored at length is decentralization, but cross-national research measuring political decentralization in terms of constitutional federalism has produced mixed evidence regarding its effects on inflation. Conceptualizing political decentralization in terms of governing political party decentralization but acknowledging the challenges of cross-national data collection, the authors suggest the utility of a sub-national approach by studying one country under single-party rule. Drawing on provincial-level cross-section time-series data, they find that political decentralization measured as the inverse of central government political control, via the ruling party, over the different provincial governments is positively correlated with provincial inflation in China during 1978-97. The finding is robust to alternative specifications,expanded year coverage and Granger causality tests. (British Journal of Political Science/ FUB)

AbstractMuch political economy research examines how higher-level political representation of the constituent jurisdictions affects resource redistribution among the lower-level units in democracies, but little work has probed the redistributive consequences of regional political representation under dictatorship. This study investigates the effect of membership for provincial officials in the Politburo of the single-ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on fiscal resource flows between the central government and provincial governments in reform-era China. I find robust evidence that the provinces overseen by CCP Politburo members tended to remit more budgetary revenues to the center but did not receive larger central budgetary subsidies. This is consistent with a territorial logic of authoritarian power-sharing in single-party states, which suggests that the regionally selective presence at a collective ruling-party decision-making forum for subnational officials aims at tighter political control to help induce greater policy compliance from below.

Little comparative research has examined territorially motivated co-optation under single-party authoritarianism. I argue that national autocrats in single-party regimes also have incentives to co-opt and control the more economically resourceful but potentially more politically restive subnational regions under economic decentralization and globalization to ease resource extraction and prolong their national rule. In particular, they could take advantage of their personnel monopoly power over the regional government leadership to enlarge the presence of officials governing these regions at a collective decision-making forum within the ruling party, such as its Politburo, where the national autocrats prevail. Consistent with this logic, I find, in the case of China during 1978--2005, that larger, more export-oriented, and to a lesser extent, wealthier provinces--as well as provinces with higher urbanization, centrally administered municipalities, and ethnic minority regions--were on average more likely to be governed by sitting members of the Politburo of the sole governing Chinese Communist Party Central Committees. The findings highlight a hitherto neglected territorial dimension in efforts to explain the relative resilience of authoritarian single-party regimes. Adapted from the source document.

Prevailing economic theories predict that world market integration unleashes centrifugal forces from within and undermines domestic central political authority. Reversing the conventional bottom-up, demand-side approach, this article highlights the incentives of national-level political actors. It suggests that when institutionally empowered vis-a-vis the subnational units, the center will seek to enhance political control over regions thriving in the global market to extract revenues, remedy interregional disparity, and maintain central rule. Through analyzing pooled cross-sectional, time-series data for Chinese provinces during 1978 to 2002, it shows that the Chinese political center has manipulated its personnel monopoly power within the ruling Communist Party to exert a tighter grip over provincial party secretaries, the top officials in the provinces more exposed to the international market. Furthermore, provinces overseen by more controlled party secretaries actually received less favorable terms during fiscal contracting, implying their greater revenue submission to the center. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright 2007.]

What is the nature of central–provincial relations in China? How have they evolved during the era of reform and opening? How can we begin to measure and assess the dynamic changes empirically and consistently? This article tackles these questions by examining year-to-year changes in aggregate trends of provincial presence at the Communist Party Central Committee from 1978 to 2002. After first sketching its formal workings, it highlights how the centre is institutionally empowered to exert political leverage over the provinces at the Central Committee. Drawing upon a new dataset that differentiates among three types of Central Committee membership, it shows evidence of declining provincial shares in full Central Committee membership, a conventionally used indicator of provincial clout at the centre, but rising shares in its alternate membership and Politburo full membership. It concludes, on balance, that central political strength remains resilient in this period.