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AbstractIn this paper I present a pluralist view of truth of a special kind: correspondence-pluralism. Correspondence-pluralism is the view that to fulfill its function in knowledge, truth requires correspondence principles rather than mere coherence, pragmatist, or deflationist principles. But these correspondence principles do not need to be the naive principles of traditional correspondence: copy, mirror image, direct isomorphism. Furthermore, these correspondence principles may vary, in certain disciplined ways, from one field of knowledge to another. This combination of correspondence and pluralism enables us to set high standards of truth for all fields of knowledge while allowing sufficient flexibility to adjust these principles to the special conditions of different fields. In so doing, it provides us with new tools for addressing old as well as new questions about truth: Is there correspondence-truth in mathematics? In ethics? Correspondence with what? What patterns of correspondence? The paper is divided into four parts: (I) Why correspondence? What kind of correspondence? (II) Why pluralism? What kind of pluralism? (III) Applications: mathematics and ethics. (IV) Avoidance of criticisms of other types of truth-pluralism.