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In increasingly diverse societies, discrimination against social groups and their members continues to be a public and political concern. Research has addressed three basic cognitive processes that precede discrimination: categorization, stereotype/prejudice activation, and stereotype/prejudice application, suggesting that these processes occur in an automatic fashion. However, there are multiple components of automaticity, including unawareness, efficiency, unintentionality, and uncontrollability. Most of the previous research implies that these components of automaticity converge with respect to cognitive antecedents of discrimination. Here, we review evidence on the distinct components of automaticity in order to assess whether (a) categorization, (b) stereotype/prejudice activation, and (c) stereotype/prejudice application occur (1) without awareness, (2) efficiently, and (3) goal-independently. We highlight evidence indicating convergence or divergence of the automaticity components during each of the processing stages. This analysis provides readers with an up-to-date review that helps to evaluate whether a multi-component approach to automaticity is of additional benefit in aggregating knowledge about the cognitive antecedents of discrimination. We discuss open issues and avenues for future research.

We propose that hypodescent-the assignment of mixed-race individuals to a minority group-is an emergent feature of basic cognitive processes of learning and categorization. According to aWe propose that hypodescent-the assignment of mixed-race individuals to a minority group-is an emergent feature of basic cognitive processes of learning and categorization. According to andividuals who possess a mixture of majority- and minority-group traits as minority-group members. Two experiments on face categorization, using both naturally occurring and manipulated minority groups, support this view, suggesting that hypodescent need not be the product of racist or political motivations, but can be sufficiently explained by an individual's learning history. © The Author(S) 2011.

Attempts to suppress social stereotypes often lead to an increase in the accessibility of those stereotypes, thereby increasing stereotypic influences on subsequent social judgments. The present research sought to determine whether such suppression effects occur in relatively naturalistic situations. Participants in Experiment 1 wrote a story about a typical day in the life of an African-American target person after receiving one of two sets of instructions. Participants in the control condition were simply told to write whatever they wanted. Participants in the spontaneous suppression condition were informed that the study was being conducted by an African-American political group. The results indicated that participants in the spontaneous suppression condition wrote less Stereotypie stories than did those in the control condition. Participants in Experiment 2 first rated their attitudes toward African Americans under one of three conditions: a directed suppression condition, a spontaneous suppression condition, and a no suppression-control condition. In a subsequent task, participants formed an impression of a target person who behaved in an ambiguously hostile manner. The results indicated that participants in both the directed suppression and the spontaneous suppression conditions judged the target person to be significantly more hostile (i.e., stereotypic of African Americans) than did participants in the control condition. These results indicate that there are situational factors which motivate spontaneous stereotype-suppression attempts, leading to later increases in stereotype use.

Attempts to suppress social stereotypes often lead to an increase in the accessibility of those stereotypes, thereby increasing stereotypic influences on subsequent social judgments. The present research sought to determine whether such suppression effects occur in relatively naturalistic situations. Participants in Experiment 1 wrote a story about a typical day in the life of an African-American target person after receiving one of two sets of instructions. Participants in the control condition were simply told to write whatever they wanted. Participants in the spontaneous suppression condition were informed that the study was being conducted by an African-American political group. The results indicated that participants in the spontaneous suppression condition wrote less Stereotypie stories than did those in the control condition. Participants in Experiment 2 first rated their attitudes toward African Americans under one of three conditions: a directed suppression condition, a spontaneous suppression condition, and a no suppression-control condition. In a subsequent task, participants formed an impression of a target person who behaved in an ambiguously hostile manner. The results indicated that participants in both the directed suppression and the spontaneous suppression conditions judged the target person to be significantly more hostile (i.e., stereotypic of African Americans) than did participants in the control condition. These results indicate that there are situational factors which motivate spontaneous stereotype-suppression attempts, leading to later increases in stereotype use.

In a series of studies, Klein and Loftus and their colleagues found that people who made self-descriptiveness judgments about trait words were no faster than people who performed a control task to subsequently retrieve behavioral memories about the same traits (e.g., Klein, Loftus, & Burton, 1989; Klein & Loftus, 1990, 1993a, 1993c). Based, in part, on these findings, Klein and Loftus (1993a; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 1996) proposed that functionally independent memory systems underlie trait self-descriptiveness judgments and behavioral retrieval. The present studies had two purposes. First, we evaluate recent concerns about whether the control task used by Klein and Loftus provides the proper baseline against which to assess the absence of priming between trait judgments and behavioral retrieval (e.g., Brown, 1993; Keenan, 1993). Second, we present converging evidence from a powerful new technique, Dunn and Kirsner's (1988) method of reversed association, in support of Klein and Loftus's proposal that trait judgments and behavioral retrieval are mediated by functionally independent memory systems.

Research by Klein and Loftus (e.g., Klein & Loftus, 1993a, 1993c) has suggested that the development of trait self-knowledge follows a particular sequence. When people have performed relatively few trait-relevant behaviors, their trait knowledge is represented episodically; but as their trait-relevant behaviors increase, they begin to abstract trait knowledge from behavioral episodes and represent it in semantic form. The present research updates this model by showing that even when trait-relevant experience is low, semantic knowledge of one's traits is available and it can serve as the basis for trait self-judgments.

The year 2020 marks the 25th anniversary of two seminal publications that have set the foundation for an exponentially growing body of research using implicit measures: Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, and Williams's (1995) work using evaluative priming to measure racial attitudes, and Greenwald and Banaji's (1995) review of implicit social cognition research that served as the basis for the development of the Implicit Association Test (IAT). The current article provides an overview of (1) two conceptual roots that continue to shape interpretations of implicit measures; (2) conflicting interpretations of the term implicit; (3) different kinds of dissociations between implicit and explicit measures; (4) theoretical developments inspired by these dissociations; and (5) research that used implicit measures to address domain-specific and applied questions. We conclude with a discussion of challenges and open questions that remain to be addressed, offering guidance for the next generation of research using implicit measures.

In attempting to inhibit their stereotypes, suppressors may direct greater attention toward the very behaviors whose influence they seek to avoid. In an empirical demonstration of this effect, some participants were instructed to suppress their use of stereotypes while forming impressions of an Asian woman who revealed stereotypical and nonstereotypical behaviors. Unlike a control group who merely formed impressions, these suppressors later recognized stereotypical behaviors significantly more accurately than nonstereotypical behaviors. Because memory was assessed with a recognition measure, these findings minimize the possibility that the results were due to differential reliance on stereotype-based retrieval cues by suppressors and non-suppressors. These findings have important implications for people's ability to successfully avoid stereotyping others.

Three experiments tested the hypothesis that judgments about a group formed by two paired categories would rely on stored instances of individual category members (i.e., exemplars) in some cases, but not in others. Specifically, judgments of a relatively unfamiliar compound category (e.g., male elementary schoolteachers) were expected to rely on exemplars, whereas alternative sources of information, particularly abstract stereotypes, would be available for making judgments of a more familiar category (e.g., female elementary schoolteachers). Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated support for these hypotheses. Experiment 3 ruled out the possibility that the differences in judgment strategy between the familiar and unfamiliar compound categories arose from the relative incompatibility of the two constituent categories (e.g., males and elementary schoolteachers), rather than familiarity. Implications for stereotype development and change are discussed.

During the 2016 election, Donald Trump castigated unauthorized immigrants as "murderers and rapists." During his presidency, he continued the use of this rhetoric, explicitly linking unauthorized migrants to threatening narratives. Here, we consider three questions: Did Donald Trump and his immigration positions serve as an "anxiety trigger" for Latina/os? Are individuals with contextually stigmatized attributes especially sensitive to Trump and his policy proposals? Is Spanish language itself, an attribute negatively stigmatized in the context of the immigration issue, sufficient to increase deportation anxiety? Utilizing survey experiments of Latina/os, we demonstrate that exposure to a Trump immigration cue is sufficient to increase anxiety about deportation. We also demonstrate that stigmatized attributes predict anxiety, but do not moderate the effect of the Trump cue. Lastly, we provide evidence that survey language affects anxiety among Latina/os. In Studies 1 (n = 736) and 2 (n = 1,040), we show that exposure to information about Trump's immigration agenda significantly increases reports about deportation anxiety. In Study 3 (n = 1,734), we show that the Trump exposure condition induces heightened anxiety but that Latina/o attributes (language proficiency and use, immigration status, assessed phenotype) and identity strength have an independent effect on deportation anxiety. In Study 4 (n = 775), we randomized bilingual respondents into Spanish or English language survey protocols and found that comparable bilinguals exposed to Spanish language report higher levels of anxiety compared to English-language survey takers.