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This volume focuses on social perception, the processing of information about people. This issue has always been central to social psychology, but this book brings together literatures that in large part have been separated by the nature of the social target that is involved. Historically, research on person perception developed quite independently from research involving perceptions of groups. Whereas the former research generally focused on the cognitive processes involved in forming impressions of individuals, research on group perception examined the content of stereotypes and the conditions under which they are used in social judgment. There was been little overlap in the theories and methods of these subfields, and different researchers were central in each. The chapters in this book highlight research and theorizing about social perception, exploring the processes involved in social perception from persons to groups. Some chapters describe work that was originally developed in person perception but is being extended to understanding groups. Other chapters illustrate how some processes studied in the domain of stereotyping also affect perceptions of individual persons. Finally, other chapters focus on variables that affect perceptions and judgments of both individuals and groups, proving opportunities for greater recognition of the common set of factors that are central to all types of social perception. This groundbreaking book highlights the research contributions of David L. Hamilton, whose research has played a central role in uniting these previously independent areas of research. It provides essential reading for upper-level courses on social cognition or social perception and could also serve as an auxiliary text in courses on interpersonal perception/relations and courses on stereotyping/intergroup relations.

This volume provides an authoritative synthesis of a dynamic, influential area of psychological research. Leading investigators address all aspects of dual-process theories: their core assumptions, conceptual foundations, and applications to a wide range of social phenomena. In 38 chapters, the volume addresses the pivotal role of automatic and controlled processes in attitudes and evaluation; social perception; thinking and reasoning; self-regulation; and the interplay of affect, cognition, and motivation. Current empirical and methodological developments are described. Critiques of the duali

Abstract. In increasingly diverse societies, discrimination against social groups and their members continues to be a public and political concern. Research has addressed three basic cognitive processes that precede discrimination: categorization, stereotype/prejudice activation, and stereotype/prejudice application, suggesting that these processes occur in an automatic fashion. However, there are multiple components of automaticity, including unawareness, efficiency, unintentionality, and uncontrollability. Most of the previous research implies that these components of automaticity converge with respect to cognitive antecedents of discrimination. Here, we review evidence on the distinct components of automaticity in order to assess whether (a) categorization, (b) stereotype/prejudice activation, and (c) stereotype/prejudice application occur (1) without awareness, (2) efficiently, and (3) goal-independently. We highlight evidence indicating convergence or divergence of the automaticity components during each of the processing stages. This analysis provides readers with an up-to-date review that helps to evaluate whether a multi-component approach to automaticity is of additional benefit in aggregating knowledge about the cognitive antecedents of discrimination. We discuss open issues and avenues for future research.

We propose that hypodescent-the assignment of mixed-race individuals to a minority group-is an emergent feature of basic cognitive processes of learning and categorization. According to attention theory, minority groups are learned by attending to the features that distinguish them from previously learned majority groups. Selective attention creates a strong association between minority groups and their distinctive features, producing a tendency to see individuals who possess a mixture of majority- and minority-group traits as minority-group members. Two experiments on face categorization, using both naturally occurring and manipulated minority groups, support this view, suggesting that hypodescent need not be the product of racist or political motivations, but can be sufficiently explained by an individual's learning history.

We examine how passive 'face time' (i.e. the amount of time one is passively observed, without interaction) affects how one is perceived at work. Findings from a qualitative study of professional office workers suggest that passive face time exists in two forms: 1) being seen at work during normal business hours — or expected face time, and 2) being seen at work outside of normal business hours — or extracurricular face time. These two forms of passive face time appear to lead observers to make trait inferences (i.e. they lead observers to perceive employees as either 'dependable' or 'committed', depending on the form of passive face time). Findings from an experimental study confirm our qualitative findings and suggest that trait inferences are made spontaneously (i.e. without intent or knowledge of doing so).We discuss the implications of our findings for theories of person perception and the practice of performance appraisal.

This research examines the mechanisms underlying group-based differences in implicit attitudes and malleability of implicit attitudes resulting from exposure to exemplars. We tested whether these effects are due to differences in activated associations or to the regulation of those associations. In Study 1, Black participants exhibited less pro-White bias and activation of pro-White and anti-Black associations compared with White participants. In Study 2, exposure to positive Black and negative White exemplars produced lower pro-White bias and less activation of biased associations. These findings indicate that group-based differences in implicit attitudes and exemplar exposure effects reflect variability in and malleability of automatic associations. Implications for understanding the role of contact on intergroup attitudes are discussed.