SINCE 1974 CHANGES INSIDE ETHIOPIAN SOMALIA, AND DJI HAVE FOCUSED SUPERPOWER ATTENTION ON THE HORN OF AFRICA AND LEAD TO THE SUPERIMPOSITION OF SOVIET IDEOLOGY AND POWER. ONE RESULT HAS BEEN A SERIOUS GAP BETWEEN THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF THE AREA'S MARXIST MOVEMENT. THIS GAP WILL PROBABLY PERSIST AS NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL FORCES SHAPE THE FUTURE OF MARXISM IN THE REGION.
Objectives. The American trade policy instrument Section 301 authorizes the president to demand changes in foreign states' trade policies and to fortify these demands with threats of sanctions. I examine the economic and political factors that influence the selection of states as targets for Section 301 proceedings. Methods. I develop an argument connecting a state's regime type to the likelihood that it will be targeted under Section 301. Controlling for other relevant factors, democratic states are predicted to have a higher probability of being targeted. I test the hypothesis in a set of regression models on cross–sectional time series data with both targeting incidence and targeting frequency as dependent variables. Results. States with more open and competitive political systems are more likely to be targeted under Section 301. Of the included variables, only a state's regime type and the size of its trade relationship with the United States have consistently significant effects across alternative model specifications. Conclusions. Section 301 plays on the rivalry between protectionist and export–oriented interests by demanding reductions in trade barriers and backing them up with threats directed against export industries. Industries currently favored by protectionist policies have a higher chance of losing such a political contest in a political system more open to interest–group competition. The institutional form of political competition within a state affects the state's response to international pressure on trade policy.
The author presents a study on African American female managers and the glass-ceiling phenomenon. The article addresses the concerns of gender and racial biases of the researcher-participant interaction that could negatively or positively influence the research findings. The author presents five possible biases to consider when conducting similar studies on African American female managers by a White male researcher.
Objectives. The American trade policy instrument Section 301 authorizes the president to demand changes in foreign states' trade policies & to fortify these demands with threats of sanctions. I examine the economic & political factors that influence the selection of states as targets for Section 301 proceedings. Methods. I develop an argument connecting a state's regime type to the likelihood that it will be targeted under Section 301. Controlling for other relevant factors, democratic states are predicted to have a higher probability of being targeted. I test the hypothesis in a set of regression models on cross-sectional time series data with both targeting incidence & targeting frequency as dependent variables. Results. States with more open & competitive political systems are more likely to be targeted under Section 301. Of the included variables, only a state's regime type & the size of its trade relationship with the US have consistently significant effects across alternative model specifications. Conclusions. Section 301 plays on the rivalry between protectionist & export-oriented interests by demanding reductions in trade barriers & backing them up with threats directed against export industries. Industries currently favored by protectionist policies have a higher chance of losing such a political contest in a political system more open to interest-group competition. The institutional form of political competition within a state affects the state's response to international pressure on trade policy. 4 Tables, 38 References. Adapted from the source document.
Rawlsian fairness is motivated by two devices: the veil of ignorance that separates individuals from knowledge of their ultimate positions in society and the necessity of irrevocable consent. After making constitutional choices, individuals must live with the consequences of the distributive principles they have chosen; they cannot withdraw from society. Yet, in many problems of institutional choice, people can withdraw from cooperative arrangements after the allocation of benefits has been made. The relationship between fairness and stability in general problems of institutional choice is examined. In symmetric problems, fairness maximizes the stability of institutions. When one individual has a higher valued outside option, maximizing institutional stability requires assigning to that individual a correspondingly large share of the benefits of cooperation. An individual for whom the benefits of cooperation are more prone to risk must generally receive a larger share of the benefits of cooperation if institutional stability is to be maximized.
