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Within the growing literature on China's international behaviour, China's Middle Eastern policy has been somewhat neglected and misinterpreted. It has been assumed that the Middle East played a rather marginal role in Chinese strategic calculations; yet at times the Chinese have been portrayed as a disruptive and subversive force in this area. This volume attempts to correct both views by providing a comprehensive analysis of China's Middle Eastern policy. It argues that the Chinese were indeed unable or unwilling to become involved in the Middle East, let alone to threaten it. However, in their view, this area has always been strategically important as a key battleground for the struggle between the superpowers, the outcome of which could have serious implications for the security of China as well as for the rest of the world

Abstract
Mostly unknown to the public, the Uyghurs, a Muslim minority of some 12 million in northwest China, have gained international prominence since the 2010s. Their Diaspora, headed by the World Uyghur Congress, has managed to convince the West that Beijing's persecution of their kin in Xinjiang amounts to "genocide", prompting condemnations, sanctions and boycotts on China. Not denying Chinese oppression of Uyghurs, I argue that the "genocide" claims are not only false but, moreover, counterproductive. Primarily motivated by an anti-China policy, whatever the findings of "investigation committees" and self-appointed "tribunals", they hardly care about the Uyghurs. Contrary to expectations, no Islamic countries have criticized China; all the condemnations come from Western countries, themselves stained by "real" genocides, incomparably more brutal than what allegedly happened in China. In retrospect, the Uyghurs may have won a virtual, short-term, Pyrrhic victory, but actually failed completely. A real victory should, and perhaps could, have been won quietly and directly, not loudly and offensively.

This paper provides a framework for China's gradual global integration. From historical exclusion, China became initially and partly incorporated to the world in the 1950s and 1960s while ignored by most of the countries. A quantitative breakthrough in the 1970s has led to a universal recognition, still formal and restricted throughout the 1980s and 1990s, making China a great power by the early twenty-first century. China's rise and gradual integration in the international community is interpreted here based on Marx's theory of ownership and Professor Charles Taylor's theory of recognition. Both regard status as a property which is an outcome not just of a unilateral individual claim but of multilateral social relations. Adapted to the international society, these theories underscore China's global integration. Therefore, China is now entitled to, and capable of, playing a more active and, moreover, leading global role, not just because of its unilateral claims and remarkable achievements, but also, and perhaps much more, because of its multilateral recognition—not in the formal diplomatic sense—of China's entitlement and capabilities of doing it. Also, in addition to joining, and occasionally heading, international organisations, China introduced its One Belt One Road initiative as a unique contribution of a model for the West, and especially for less-developed countries. While it is post-Mao China's domestic reform which attract most international attention and are regarded a revolutionary breakthrough with the past, the real and most innovative breakthrough is China's integration in the world. Domestic reforms were undertaken throughout Chinese history; international integration is new and unprecedented.

It is widely assumed that the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) plays a dominant role in handling internal security. Yet a comparative study shows that regular armed forces prefer to avoid becoming involved in domestic conflicts—and China's PLA is no exception. Concentrating on Uyghur unrest, the article shows that most of the burden of maintaining internal security in China falls on para-military troops, primarily on the People's Armed Police Force, the Xinjiang Production-Construction Corps and the Militia, and on non-military outfits, such as the Police and internal security units. Maintaining internal security absorbs an increasing share of China's defense budget, so much so that in recent years Beijing conceals the figures. (J Contemp China/GIGA)

East Asia and West Asia (the Middle East)2 are usually treated in the academic literature as two distinct and separate issues in Chinese foreign policy. Studies of China's policy in East Asia hardly mention the Middle East and studies of the Middle East hardly mention East Asia. In fact, these two regions are not simply interconnected in China's geopolitical outlook but provide clues to understanding Beijing's foreign policy toward each of them –they are interdependent. As such, they are connected vessels in the sense that the situation in one region affects, or even determines, China's policy in the other. This is evident in a number of perspectives: strategy, economics, energy, military and Islam. Mutual dependence is one of the features of contemporary international relations, after the end of the Cold War. While usually it is limited to one aspect or two (primarily economic and military), in the case of China and the Middle East, mutual regional dependence involve a number of levels. ; Las regiones de Asia Oriental y Asia Occidental (Oriente Medio) son normalmente tratadas en la literatura académica como dos asuntos separados y distintos dentro de la política exterior china. Los estudios acerca de la política de China en Asia Oriental apenas si mencionan Oriente Medio, mientras que los estudios de Oriente Medio apenas mencionan Asia Occidental. Pero de hecho ambas regiones no sólo están interconectadas en la visión geopolítica de China sino que proporcionan claves para entender la política exterior de Beijing hacia cada una de ellas –esto es, ambas regiones son interdependientes. Como tales, son vasos conectados en el sentido de que la situación en una afecta, e incluso determina, la política de China con respecto a la otra. Esto es evidente desde diversas perspectivas: estratégicas, económicas, energéticas, militares, e incluso con respecto al Islam. La mutua dependencia es una de las características de las relaciones internacionales contemporáneas desde el final de la Guerra Fría, y mientras normalmente está limitada a uno o dos aspectos (fundamentalmente económico y militar), en el caso de China y Oriente Medio, la mutua dependencia regional implica bastantes niveles.

Although studies on China's Middle East policy frequently separate Israel from the rest of the region, Beijing has always been aware of regional contradictions and tried to navigate between the two sides it perceived as interconnected. China's attempts to adopt a balanced relationship with both sides in the 1950s were later replaced by a zero-sum game policy in which Israel was totally excluded. Since the 1980s Beijing has resurrected its balanced Middle East policy. While still sticking to nonintervention in regional conflicts, the Chinese implicitly offer their own experience of using economic means to overcome sociopolitical tensions.