Suchergebnisse

Among the instances of apparent illiberality in Plato's
Republic, one stands out as especially curious. Long before
making a forced return to the cave, and irrespective of the kinds of
compulsion operative in such a homecoming, the philosopher-king has been
compelled to apprehend the Good (Rep. VII.519c5-d2, 540a3-7). Why
should compulsion be necessary or appropriate in this situation? Schooled
intensively through the decades for an eventual grasping of the Good,
beginning already with precognitive training in music and art calculated
to equip the guardian with a natural affinity towards the good and
beautiful (Rep. III.401d3-402a4), the fully mature guardian might
be expected to leap towards the Good when it is first opportune. For the
Good is, according to Plato, the greatest thing to be learned
(megiston mathêma; Rep. VI.504e4-5, 505a2). Reflection on
these questions permits us to develop a richer appreciation of the forms
of necessitation and compulsion Plato envisages for his guardians, which
turn out to be primarily merely hypothetical instances of nomic
necessitation. It follows that many of Plato's appeals to compulsion are
neither coercive nor objectionably authoritarian.

Fifteen leading philosophers explore a set of themes from the pioneering work of Gail Fine and Terence Irwin in the history of philosophy. They discuss knowledge, rhetoric, freedom and practical reason, virtue and the good life, ethics and politics in Plato and Aristotle and beyond.