Suchergebnisse

The year 2019 marks the 30th anniversary of the Velvet Revolutions and the de facto start of comprehensive reforms in Central Europe and in the region as a whole. The change of social systems and the entry of the former Eastern European countries to the common European market had its impact on the global balance of power resulting in a shift to the unipolarity with its predominantly transatlantic values. Today, however, we may observe the emerging trend both towards a political vector change in the mentioned countries and a new, more balanced international order due to which Hungarians, Poles, Slovaks and Czechs, a century later upon formation of political Central Europe, are finally willing to play a more prominent role than they did before. It is not about the role of a buffer or barrier assigned to them by the powers upon the world wars, but the role that was historically played by this region before the world wars and revolutions. This phenomenon is interesting not only in terms of discovering the region specifics, the prospects for building new socio-economic and integration models, but may also be relevant for a comparative analysis and insight into the political and economic evolution in Russia.
Russia and Central Europe have had a period of social transformations, almost similar in duration, which goes back to the 1980s. Nevertheless, the countries differed in their goals and forms of transformations occurring in the early 1990s, although at the moment we are to address highly similar problems again. These countries are at different stages of their transformation process; however, they are rather similar in terms of the objectives to determine the future path to political, socio-economic, cultural and ideological development. The sense of incompleteness of the initiated transformations is prevalent both in Central Europe and in Russia. At the same time, there are doubts regarding the Western model of social policy. This process involves not only national development, but also regional interaction and international affairs, which matrix was destroyed 30 years ago, while the new one has not been created yet. Therefore, the Central European countries' experience can be of value both to analyse their internal reforms and models of regional interaction, as well as to build a new type of international relations in a bilateral, allied and global manner.

The article analyses the origins of the current differences between Brussels and the countries of Central Europe, which tend to deepen and require much effort in order to preserve the unity of the European Union. The contradictions were already evident at the time of the admission of the countries to the EU, that took place according to an accelerated scenario in conditional compliance of these countries with the Maastricht and Copenhagen criteria. The condition, which dealt directly with the issues of market expansion and adaptation of new countries to it, initially received more attention than the condition, which involved political and legal issues. The deepening of the political union of the EU took place already after the admission of new countries, for many of which the new depths of convergence turned out to be unacceptable. However, that meant provoking confrontation with Brussels. Over 20 years of coexistence, the EU members made necessary compromises, however, from the middle of the second decade of the 21st century, disagreements became substantial and Brussels, using the financial leverage of the EU, began to pressure defiant countries, primarily Hungary and Poland. The author comes to the conclusion that in the current difficult international situation, the sides will have to reach a certain compromise.

The article examines the scientific potential of Hungary and other Central European countries through the prism of international recognition of the achievements of the scientific and cultural elite of the region. The author comes to the conclusion that, in comparison with other European countries, immigrants from the region of the former Austria-Hungary made no less important contribution to world science than their neighbors on the continent. However, a distinctive feature is that few of them have achieved such significant recognition while living and working in their country. The fate of scientists and cultural figures turned out to be dependent on many factors, including primarily political, and to a considerable extent also economic, which forced scientists to leave the country in search of freedom of scientific search and literary creativity, financing of their research. Only a few were guided solely by the desire to work at the most famous universities, but in the end, their successes led them to the leading scientific unities of the world, which allowed them to claim such a high assessment of their work as the Nobel Prize.

In the article, the author attempts to analyze the features of the Hungarian approach to the conflict in Ukraine, which only partially meets the general concerns of Central European countries and does not fit into the logic of Brussels. The concern, as in the case of other Central European countries, is related to historical concerns about Russia, in the case of Hungary, bearing the burden of the «strangler of freedom», which Hungarians sought in the middle of the 19th and 20th centuries. However, Hungary also has its own concerns, which are related to the presence in Ukraine of a considerable Hungarian diaspora, which is at the same time the indigenous population of the Transcarpathian district. The presence of the Hungarian diaspora in the border region, in Vojvodina, if we recall the war in Yugoslavia, determined Hungary's position not only during the entire conflict, but was also accepted by NATO as a convincing explanation for Budapest's unwillingness to take part in its 1999 campaign. If we talk about contradictions with Brussels, then Viktor Orban's position can again be explained by two points, one of which at the first place is the desire for autonomy in decision-making within the framework of Euro-Atlantic integration. The second, but not the least important place is occupied by pragmatic relations with Russia, carried out through personal contacts between the two leaders. Between the last two motives there is an undeniable link akin to the origins of the Hungarian policy of «Opening to the East». Thus, the Hungarian approach to what is happening in the east is a rather complex combination of fears, aspirations and pragmatism.

The article examines the evolution both on a pan-European and regional scale of one of the most frequently mentioned associations of the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe in connection with the conflict in Ukraine – the «Bucharest Nine» (Bucharest Format). Comparing two militarized regional organizations – the Visegrad Battle Group (VBG) and the «Bucharest Nine», the author comes to the conclusion that the latter has actually replaced the Visegrad countries as a military structure in a specific geopolitical situation (in one region there cannot be two structures duplicating each other under the auspices of Poland), and the political activity of Trimorye. The «Nine» in a specific historical period is much more in line with the strategic goals of Poland than any other of the structures existing in the region, especially since it is developing against the backdrop of a general trend towards rapprochement between Central Europe and the Western Balkans. At the same time, there is also a «division of labor» between the «Visegrad Four» and the «Bucharest Nine». If the first structure took over, among others, the functions of the coordinator of the positions of Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic on the eve of the EU summits, then the second – the tasks of the regional coordinator of NATO. However, its functions do not yet include the establishment of specific military interaction, as in the case of the AFG. Its goals at this stage are rather military-political.

The article analyzes in comparison the chairmanship of the Visegrad Group of Slovakia and the Czech Republic, taking place against the background of Special Military Operation. They are also compared with the positions of Hungary and Poland on the «Ukrainian issue». The author draws attention to the fact that initially the Czech presidency was developed as if in continuation of the tasks of the Slovak. This fact further emphasizes the special nature of relations between the two countries, which exactly thirty years ago chose a sovereign path of development instead of a common federation of Czechs and Slovaks. Both programs, being worked out during different periods of escalation of the conflict in the east, place the security and military cooperation of the Quartet countries as one of the main priorities and at the same time take into account other priorities of the European Union related to economic and energy policy. Among other international priorities the countries of the Balkan region and the countries that are still open to cooperation within the framework of the Eastern Partnership stand out (in addition to Ukraine, these are primarily Moldova and Georgia). Both programs emphasize the special role of the Visegrad Foundation as a generator of ideas of Central European unity.

The Author analyses position of Hungary at the background of an active phase of Russian special military operation in Ukraine. The research is being based on facts as well as on the analyses of public speeches of leading Hungarian politics and publications of known national experts. Like in other Central European countries, Hungary has been worried by Russian propositions to bring back the system of European security to the contours of 1997. Still Victor Orban did not refuse from the visit to Moscow traditionally scheduled to February. In general, position of Hungary ion 2022 can be estimated as neutral to both sides of the conflict. Both special geopolitical situation of the country as well as quite successful pragmatic relations with Moscow. In describing the conflict as well as reaction to it, the author sticks to terminology used in political space of Hungary and Visegrad region.

In this article, the author analyzes the situation inside the Visegrad countries and the Visegrad group against the background of the rapid deterioration of the international situation and the unfolding military actions in Ukraine. The international crisis contributed to an increase in inflation in the countries, the growth of discontent among the population, which resulted almost everywhere in full-scale strikes and manifestations. Against this background, predictions about contradictions within the Visegrad Four – the oldest of the modern regional structures on the continent – and about its possible imminent collapse have intensified in the European press. Indeed, the long absence of meetings in the first half of the year and the demarches of the chairmen of the Czech Parliament gave ground to such conclusions, but politicians of another level – prime ministers and presidents – continued their meetings, joint consultations and exchange of views, that eventually helped them to clarify positions and contributed to the preservation of regional unity of the Visegrad countries. Especially important from this point of view was the November meeting of Prime Ministers Viktor Orban, Mateusz Morawiecki, Piotr Fiala and Eduard Heger in Kosice.

30 years have passed since the full-scale renewal of relations between Russia and the countries of Central (at that time Eastern) Europe. With an error of one year plus/minus, in 1991, 1992 and 1993, fundamentally new agreements on friendship and cooperation were signed, designed for a long-term perspective and the possibility of bringing relations to a new denominator. Unfortunately, the period of ideological renewal turned out to be short-lived, taking place against the background of the deterioration of economic relations until the mid-1990-ies and in the end, it ran into a wall of lack of strategic vision in rapidly changing international realities and a narrowing space of mutual understanding. Even the exceptional pragmatism of relations with which Russia emerged from Medvedev's presidency and after Putin's Munich speech did not save these relations from almost complete destruction, where the years superimposed on the Covid-19 epidemic turned out to be particularly catastrophic and the battle with the Sputnik vaccine was followed by very real hostilities.

The article analyzes the speech of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, delivered by him during the summer camp in Tushnadfüred on July 23, 2022. The speeches of the Hungarian Prime Minister at this event always have a great resonance in Hungary, but the speech of 2022 also caused a reaction throughout Europe, since most of it was devoted to the main problems of this part of the World. An important point should be considered that this was Viktor Orban's first evaluative and at the same time programmatic speech, opening a new cycle of his premiership (the fifth in the modern history of the country). According to the power of expression and the accents, the speech, as always, looked impressive. The fact that the Hungarian Prime Minister is an excellent speaker and knows how to place accents is an irrefutable fact. However, for the first time in history, it led to the resignation of one of the Prime Minister's confidants, a well-known Hungarian sociologist, who wrote in an open letter about her disagreement with the openly racist formulations, which, in her opinion, sounded. Let's try to understand why it happened as well as analyze Viktor Orban's attitude to the ongoing war in Ukraine, to which the lion's share of his speech has been devoted.

In the spring of 2022, elections of the country's President and the State Assembly were held in Hungary, as well as the process of forming a new government was launched. As in other parliamentary republics, the post of President in this situation seems rather ceremonial and not too significant, however, in the modern history of Hungary, the President has more than once played the role of the supreme arbiter and the real leader of the nation. This is due to the peculiarity of the Hungarian electoral system, when the term of office of the President is five years, and the State Assembly is 4 years, as a result of which the branches of government have repeatedly represented different political forces, allowing to resolve the main contradictions in the corridors of power without bringing discord to the streets. It also strengthened the democratic political system in the country, constantly reminding voters of freedom of choice, views, opinions. A special mark in the history of the country was left by the presidents of the first, most difficult years of transition, who had not only to cooperate with opponents from parliament. In their service, they managed to invest the creative potential, beliefs and principles achieved by some in writing, by others in science. The current President of Hungary, Katalin Novák, not yet possessing the above qualities, but being undoubtedly a comprehensively well-educated person, became the first woman in this post in Hungarian history, as well as the youngest president of the country. She expressed the main principles and tasks of her upcoming ministry at the highest state post in her ceremonial speech on May 14, focusing not only on long-term prospects, but also on the current international moment.

The Hungarian parliamentary elections of 2022 for the fifth time in the recent history of the country brought victory to the FIDESZ party, including the fourth with a constitutional majority of 2 /3 of parliamentary mandates. At the same time, during the current election campaign in Hungary, the system of preliminary election of a single candidate (by the type of primaries) among opposition parties and movements was tested for the first time. However, this did not save the multi-party coalition from another failure. Nevertheless, the recent elections have further strengthened the trend towards the formation in Hungary, as in a number of other Central European countries, of a two-party political system with a small layer of a «third force». The surprise of the elections was the passage to Parliament of the extreme nationalist party «Our Fatherland», which partially broke away from the Jobbik party after the 2018 elections. Now, within the walls of parliament, former right-wing radical party members will meet with the renewed Jobbik party, which performed in the last elections in a coalition with left-liberal forces. This campaign took place against a very unfavorable international background – the war in Ukraine and increased pressure on Hungary from Brussels and from neighboring states that do not agree with the aspirations of the Orban cabinet to prevent the use of Hungarian territory for military purposes. This circumstance made the task extremely difficult for Viktor Orban, the permanent leader of the FIDESZ party since its foundation, and at the same time played in favor of the opposition, as another reason for criticism of the foreign policy pursued by the Prime Minister, a significant element of which since 2011 has been the strengthening of pragmatic relations with Russia.