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The article examines the development of three key components of the UK fuel and energy industry during the 1967 and 1973–1974 oil crises. The object of research was studied in the context of European energy policy, which in the 1960s–1970s was codified in a form of directives and was practically implemented by creating fuel reserves in case of a decrease in fuel supplies from the Middle East. The article focuses on the special place the UK held in the EEC, and specific policy that the country maintained to develop the national fuel and energy industry. All this is because the UK had an elaborate management system within the industry, possessed significant amount of energy resources and owned prospective fuel fields in the North Sea, discovered in the mid-1960s. During the researched period, the UK government implemented measures targeted at the reduction of the national coal mining industry, which failed to meet economic needs of the country. At the same time, the UK started the development of oil and gas fields in the North Sea, which gained momentum after the 1967 and 1973–1974 oil crises were over. The management structures of gas and coal industries served as an interface of the national energy industry. This enabled the government to consistently substitute coal with natural gas, while still allowing it to play a significant role in the economy. Oil exploration and production companies with a high degree of autonomy adopted an independent policy while working on domestic and foreign markets. However, they suffered the most during the 1973–1974 crisis, which led to a partial loss of the national fuel market, an increase in prices on resources, and a strain in their relations with the government. In conclusion, the author states that the developed fuel and energy industry, fuel fields' exploitation and validated management techniques allowed the UK to smooth out the effects of the 1967 and 1973–1974 crises and continue the modernization of the national fuel industry in the years to come.