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Many post-colonial states use ethnically-based redistribution (EBR) programs to address economic inequalities between dominant minority communities and professedly autochthonous majority communities. Nevertheless, despite considerable efforts such programs have generally failed in terms of advancing the economic status of majorities. In this article I will suggest that EBRs in post-colonial states are not solely intended to ameliorate economic gaps, but rather are also a policy tool used by governing elites to advance a narrative of state ownership, and by extension a decidedly non-liberal notion of democratic citizenship. I explore this claim through an analysis of Malaysia and Fiji, two post-colonial states characterized by persistent asymmetric claims by ethnic majorities who claim legitimacy by virtue of indigenousness. The discussion will focus first on the formation, deployment, and persistence of claims of ethnic hierarchy by professedly indigenous groups. Second, attention will be paid to how such claims are linked to demands for ethnically based redistribution following a direct challenge to extant ethnic hierarchies. Finally, the policies will be assessed both in terms of their stated economic objectives and in terms of their ability to generate a broader sense of autochthonous identity.

An opportunity exists to assess the limitations in building long-term peace in post-conflict states, particularly given the extent to which negotiated settlements incorporate demands for democratic mechanisms. By assessing how post-conflict governments construct new majorities through policy tools as well as assessing how they are constrained by the structural realities of negotiated settlements, we gain some purchase on the reasons why some post-conflict state projects succeed while others fail. This has potentially transformative implications for our understanding of how social contracts, and their attendant issues of consent, dissent, and legitimacy, operate in the modern world and the ways they impact such critical discussions as democratic transition, post-conflict reconciliation, and nation-building. We use the case of post-apartheid South Africa to analyse how post-conflict states are limited in terms of forging social contracts among citizens and between citizens and governments. Of specific interest is the way that post-conflict social contracting compels nation-builders to eschew the uncertainties of viable electoral democracy in favour of dominant party regimes or electoral authoritarianism. We suggest that this tension is less a result of pecuniary interest on the part of nation-builders and more a consequence of the imperfections of the modern social contracting process. Adapted from the source document.