Suchergebnisse

The European Community has pledged respect for the cultural and linguistic diversity of its Member States and has recognized minority languages as an inherent constituent in this regard. This development reflects a broader trend within the Community towards grappling with less obvious aspects of supranational governance. Minority language groups turn optimistically to `Europe' in response. But, despite rhetorical promises, just what can the EC actually be expected to do in the realm of minority language protection, a politically sensitive and traditionally domestic concern? Arguments put forward to date focus primarily on philosophical, moral, economic, and political discourse. While these considerations are a vital aspect of the debate on minority languages and on linguistic diversity more generally, the question of legal basis remains largely unanswered. For the first time, this book traces comprehensively the existence of an appropriate legal basis for action undertaken by the EC in this domain, striving in particular to locate a pragmatic yet effective balance between legitimate possibility and acceptable limitations

Abstract
This paper examines the growing significance of the 'territory of the Union' in EU citizenship law and asks what it reveals about Union citizenship in the wider system of the EU legal order. In doing so, it builds on scholarship constructing the idea of 'personhood' in EU law by adding a complementary dimension of 'place-hood'. The analysis is premised on territory as a place within—but also beyond—which particular legal qualities are both produced by and reflect shared objectives or values. In that respect, the paper offers a comprehensive 'map' of Union territory as a legal construct, with the aim of uncovering what kind of legal place the territory of the Union constitutes as well as the extent to which it is dis-connectable from the territories of the Member States. It also considers how Union territory relates to what lies 'outside'. It will be shown that different narratives of Union territory have materialized in the case law of the Court of Justice. However, it is argued that these segregated lines of reasoning should be integrated, both to reflect and to progress a composite understanding of Union territory as a place in which concerns for Union citizens, for Member States, and for the system underpinning the EU legal order are more consistently acknowledged and more openly weighed.

This article argues that the autonomy of eu law conveys a set of rules and principles but also constitutes a principle of eu law on its own terms. Its features suggest a distinctive existential character, in light of its internal and external reach but, particularly, a quality of extremity that has come to define its implications. Reflecting on the nature of autonomy matters because of the closing down of space for compromise it produces and what is uncovered about the nature of eu primary law in consequence. The effects of autonomy have principally concerned the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, but the wider focus on autonomy of "Union decision-making" as a "core principle" of Brexit negotiations, for the eu part, reactivates a more generalised understanding of what the principle commands. That process also tests the extent to which an understanding of autonomy as an existential principle should be sustained.

This comment examines three recent judgments of the Court of Justice – Alimanovic, Garcia-Nieto, and Commission v. UK – that further develop the connection between lawful residence in a host state and EU equal treatment rights, a critical legal premise of the Dano judgment. It demonstrates that this line of case law blurs legal concepts and legal statuses – social assistance and social benefits, for example; also citizens looking for work, those who have worked previously but no longer do, and those who need to rely on Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 2004/38 to establish lawful residence in the host state. It aims overall to contribute to debates about quality of law; about the quality of EU citizenship and free movement law in a substantive sense; but also about how EU law is made, applied and revised.

This article demonstrates that there has been a generational shift towards the rising significance of conditions and limits, and a less explicit but discernible ascension of duties, in the application and interpretation of citizenship rights. Articles 20 and 21 TFEU provide for the restriction of rights by both primary and secondary law, but the extent to which this now occurs calls into question the existence, and not just the exercise, of the foundational primary rights. The article argues that there has been a hegemonic attribution of supremacy to secondary law that fails to engage the constitutional protocols epitomizing the Union legal order more generally.

This article argues that EU citizenship has not (yet?) evolved beyond a construction of market citizenship. The argument does not make a normative claim that EU citizenship is "destined", to paraphrase the Court of Justice, only and ever to remain a form of market citizenship. But drawing from both the nature of the EU as a polity and the material impact of its citizenship thus far, it suggests that market citizenship endures as at least one valid and credible way of capturing how EU citizenship has developed in reality. The particular qualities of the EU transnational market are explored so that the possibilities afforded by market citizenship are strongly contextualized. The intricate links between the EU and its Member States and the persisting significance of free movement rights are also discussed as defining characteristics of EU market citizenship. The growing impact of developments beyond free movement law is recognized to a certain extent, but this is not construed as an equally paced alchemic reaction in legal, social or political terms. The overall argument presented does not seek to dismiss or displace the wealth of normative thinking that conceptualizes EU citizenship (contested as it is) in both creative and challenging ways. Rather, the article reflects on the extent to which we are actually "there yet" in empirical terms.