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AbstractThis paper studies the cost of limited commitment when a central bank commits to a price‐level target path but retains the discretion to re‐optimize it whenever the cost of honouring its commitment exceeds a tolerance threshold. Such discretion undermines the credibility of the price‐level target path and weakens its effectiveness to stabilize the economy. Endogenous target resets are more costly than exogenous target re‐optimizations and can give rise to multiple equilibria, including a low credibility equilibrium with frequent target resets and high volatility. Canadian data suggest that price‐level target resets could be quite frequent in practice.

The financial sector bailouts seen during the Great Recession generated substantial opposition and controversy. We assess the welfare benefits of government-funded emergency support to the financial sector, taking into account its effects on risk-taking incentives. In our quantitative general equilibrium model, the financial crisis probability depends on financial intermediaries' balance sheet choices, influenced by capital adequacy constraints and ex ante known emergency support provisions. These policy tools interact to make financial sector bailouts welfare improving when capital adequacy constraints are consistent with the current Basel III regulation, but potentially welfare decreasing with looser capital adequacy regulation existing before the Great Recession.

AbstractWe analyze the impact of interest rate policy on financial stability in an environment where banks can experience runs on their short‐term liabilities forcing them to sell assets at fire‐sale prices. Price adjustment frictions and a state‐dependent risk of financial crisis create the possibility of a policy tradeoff between price stability and financial stability. Focusing on Taylor rules with monetary policy possibly reacting to banks' short‐term liabilities, we find that the optimized policy uses the extra tool to support investment at the expense of higher inflation and output volatility.

Various papers have suggested that Price-Level targeting is a welfare improving policy relative to Inflation targeting. From a practical standpoint, this raises an important yet unanswered question: What is the optimal price index to target? This paper derives the optimal price level targeting index defined over the eight main components of the Consumer Price Index. It finds that such an index places a heavier weight, relative to the expenditure weight, on sectors with slow price adjustments. However, using the expenditure weights instead of the optimal ones results in very small welfare cost.

There appears to be a disconnect between the importance of the zero bound on nominal interest rates in the real-world and predictions from quantitative DSGE models. Recent economic events have reinforced the relevance of the zero bound for monetary policy whereas quantitative models suggest that the zero bound does not constrain (optimal) monetary policy. This paper attempts to shed some light on this disconnect by studying a broader range of shocks within a standard DSGE model. Without denying the possibility of other factors, we find that risk premium shocks are key to building quantitative models where the zero bound is relevant for monetary policy design. The risk premium mechanism operates by increasing the spread between the rates of return on private capital and risk-free government bonds. Other common shocks, such as aggregate productivity, investment-specific productivity, government spending and money demand shocks, are unable to push nominal bond rates close to zero as the same risk premium spread mechanism is not at play.

Abstract In both the canonical and many extended versions of the New Keynesian model, optimal monetary policy under commitment implies price‐level stationarity as long as expectations are rational. We show that this is no longer the case if the central bank and private agents make decisions before observing current shocks. The optimal amount of price‐level drift in response to unexpected innovations to inflation is quantitatively important. This result has important implications for monetary policy, including the design of the optimal loss function for the central bank if it cannot commit to its future policies.

This paper measures the welfare gains of switching from inflation-targeting to price-level targeting under imperfect credibility. Vestin (2006) shows that when the monetary authority cannot commit to future policy, price-level targeting yields higher welfare than inflation targeting. We revisit this issue by introducing imperfect credibility, which is modeled as gradual adjustment of the private sector's beliefs about the policy change. We find that gains from switching to pricelevel targeting, if any, are small.

Like the gold standard, price level targeting (PT) involves not letting past deviations of inflation be bygones; both regimes return the price level (or price of gold) to its target. The experience of suspension of the gold standard in World War I, resumption in the 1920s (for some countries at a different parity), and final abandonment is reviewed. It suggests that PT would likely operate with an escape clause that allowed rebasing of the price target in the face of large output declines. Using a calibrated general equilibrium model, we show that such an escape clause can produce multiple equilibria. For some parameterizations, there is a low credibility equilibrium (with high expectation of a reset) associated with high output volatility and frequent resets. These problems reduce the expectational advantage of PT over inflation targeting.

This paper measures the welfare gains of switching from inflation-targeting to price-level targeting under imperfect credibility. Vestin (2006) shows that when the monetary authority cannot commit to future policy, price-level targeting yields higher welfare than inflation targeting. We revisit this issue by introducing imperfect credibility, which is modeled as gradual adjustment of the private sector's beliefs about the policy change. We find that gains from switching to pricelevel targeting are small. A welfare loss occurs, if imperfect credibility is highly persistent.

This paper examines the role of monetary policy in an environment with aggregate risk and incomplete markets. In a two-period overlapping-generations model with aggregate uncertainty and nominal bonds, optimal monetary policy attains the ex-ante Pareto optimal allocation. This policy aims to stabilize the savings rate in the economy via the effect of expected inflation on real returns of nominal bonds. The equilibrium under optimal monetary policy is characterized by positive average inflation and a nonstationary price level. In an application a key finding is that optimal monetary policy combines features of inflation and price-level targeting.

A view advanced in the aftermath of the late-2000s financial crisis is that lower than optimal interest rates lead to excessive risk taking by financial intermediaries. We evaluate this view in a quantitative dynamic model where interest rate policy affects risk taking by changing the amount of safe bonds available as collateral for repo transactions. Given properly priced collateral, lower than optimal interest rates reduce risk taking. However, if intermediaries can augment their collateral by issuing assets whose risk is underestimated by rating agencies, lower than optimal interest rates contribute to excessive risk taking and amplify the severity of recessions.