Suchergebnisse

Abstract
This study examines how individuals' trust levels and patience are affected by a tornado event. Affected and unaffected people were surveyed after a 2013 tornado in Moore, Oklahoma, that resulted in 24 fatalities. Findings suggest that those who self-identified as affected became more trusting in general as well as more trusting of police and fire authorities. Affected homeowners also exhibited less patience than their unaffected counterparts. The evaluation of differences in trust and patience enables us to learn about how underlying propensities to invest (or reinvest) in critical private and public infrastructure may be influenced by extreme events. Disasters alter trust levels and patience of affected residents, and documenting the direction and magnitude of these changes may help agencies involved in the recovery process.

AbstractThis paper examines the behavior in multilateral bargaining experiments with alternating offers and asymmetric information. In all experiments, a single buyer has up to ten bargaining periods to purchase one unit of a good from each of two sellers. Treatments vary based on who makes the first offer (buyer or sellers), timing (consistent buyer-offer/sellers-demand or alternating), and information (buyer's value and sellers' costs are known or come from a uniform distribution). We find that actual bargaining outcomes are virtually identical when offers alternate, regardless of which player makes the first offer. We find that alternating offers reduce bargaining delay slightly compared to treatments in which one side or the other makes repeated take-it-or-leave-it offers. Finally, we find that incomplete information increases bargaining delay and the likelihood of failed agreements.

The impact of the cardinal relationships among pecuniary payoffs, & of social history & reputation, on the choice of strategies in four one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma games is experimentally examined. The results suggest that normalized payoff values linked to "fear" & 'greed" are important as predictors of behavior in the PD games. Success in coordinating on the payoff dominant equilibrium in previous plays of coordination games also increases the probability of cooperative play in the PD games. The effect of past play is strongest when individuals are matched repeatedly with the same person in previous play, as contrasted to being matched randomly with another player. 6 Tables, 4 Figures, 22 References. Adapted from the source document.