Identity, memory and the Russian other -- Identity and foreign policy : a discourse-historical approach -- The historic construction of German, Polish and Finnish identities and their Russian other -- Confronting the Russian other : the Ukraine crisis -- The EU's discursive strife on Nord Stream -- The Russian other in the Syrian crisis and MENA geopolitics -- Conclusion : (dis)united we stand? : national discourses and the Russian other, 2014-2018.
"This book examines the relationship between national identity construction and current foreign policy discourses on Russia in selected European Union member states in 2014-2018. It shows that divergent national discourses on Russia derive from the different ways in which the country was constructed in national identity. The book develops an interpretive theoretical framework and argues that policy makers' agency can profoundly influence the contestation between different identity narratives. It includes case studies in policy areas that are of primary importance for EU-Russia relations, such as energy security (the Nord Stream 2 controversy), the Ukraine crisis, and Russia's military intervention in Syria. Focusing on EU member states that have traditionally taken different stances vis-à-vis Russia (Germany, Poland and Finland), it shows that at the peak of the Ukraine crisis national discourses converged towards a pragmatic, but critical narrative. As the Ukraine crisis subsided and new events took centre stage in foreign policy discussions (i.e. the Syrian civil war, international terrorism), long-standing and identity-based divergences partly re-emerged in the discourses of policy makers. This became particularly evident during the Nord Stream 2 controversy. Deep-rooted and different perceptions of the Russian Other in EU member states are still influential and lead to divergent national agendas for foreign policy towards Russia. This book will be of interest to students and scholars working in European and EU politics, Russian and Soviet politics, and International Relations"--
An energy crisis has unfolded in the European Union since the autumn of 2021. The crisis has worsened due to Russia's attack on Ukraine and climate change. The EU reacted by launching the REPowerEU agenda, which aims at cutting imports of Russian fossil fuels by diversifying trade partners, increasing energy efficiency, and accelerating the energy transition. But there are complications, especially European countries' quest for new and more polluting fossil fuel supplies in the short run, which contradicts the EU's green ambitions.
In: Integration: Vierteljahreszeitschrift des Instituts für Europäische Politik in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Arbeitskreis Europäische Integration, Band 46, Heft 1, S. 21-37
This article analyses European Union (EU) negotiations on the European Climate Law and the 2030 Climate Target Plan in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic. Adopting Ansell and Trondal's (2018) conceptualisation of turbulence, it argues that the pandemic intensified the environmental turbulence within which European policy makers had been operating following Brexit, the rule of law dispute with Poland and Hungary, and the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States. Organisational turbulence within EU institutions also affected the negotiations, particularly due to the reliance of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on the political support of East-Central European governments that are sceptical of ambitious climate action. Moreover, the Commission, the European Council and the Parliament have taken different positions on the 2030 climate target and on the governance to pursue subsequent targets. Turbulence of scale—reflecting the nature of the EU as a multi-level actor—became relevant too, as the EU found it difficult to agree on its 2030 climate target due to disputes between member states and European institutions. European decision makers responded to turbulence through major policy initiatives, such as the EU Recovery Plan, the Green Deal agenda, and making funds conditional to the respect of the rule of law. They also pursued intra-EU compromises that accommodated different positions—for instance, on the Climate Law. Nonetheless, turbulence continues to pose a formidable challenge to the progress of the EU's climate agenda.
This article analyses European Union (EU) negotiations on the European Climate Law and the 2030 Climate Target Plan in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic. Adopting Ansell and Trondal's (2018) conceptualisation of turbulence, it argues that the pandemic intensified the environmental turbulence within which European policy makers had been operating following Brexit, the rule of law dispute with Poland and Hungary, and the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States. Organisational turbulence within EU institutions also affected the negotiations, particularly due to the reliance of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on the political support of East-Central European governments that are sceptical of ambitious climate action. Moreover, the Commission, the European Council and the Parliament have taken different positions on the 2030 climate target and on the governance to pursue subsequent targets. Turbulence of scale—reflecting the nature of the EU as a multi-level actor—became relevant too, as the EU found it difficult to agree on its 2030 climate target due to disputes between member states and European institutions. European decision makers responded to turbulence through major policy initiatives, such as the EU Recovery Plan, the Green Deal agenda, and making funds conditional to the respect of the rule of law. They also pursued intra-EU compromises that accommodated different positions—for instance, on the Climate Law. Nonetheless, turbulence continues to pose a formidable challenge to the progress of the EU's climate agenda.
This article analyses European Union (EU) negotiations on the European Climate Law and the 2030 Climate Target Plan in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic. Adopting Ansell and Trondal's (2018) conceptualisation of turbulence, it argues that the pandemic intensified the environmental turbulence within which European policy makers had been operating following Brexit, the rule of law dispute with Poland and Hungary, and the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States. Organisational turbulence within EU institutions also affected the negotiations, particularly due to the reliance of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on the political support of East-Central European governments that are sceptical of ambitious climate action. Moreover, the Commission, the European Council and the Parliament have taken different positions on the 2030 climate target and on the governance to pursue subsequent targets. Turbulence of scale—reflecting the nature of the EU as a multi-level actor—became relevant too, as the EU found it difficult to agree on its 2030 climate target due to disputes between member states and European institutions. European decision makers responded to turbulence through major policy initiatives, such as the EU Recovery Plan, the Green Deal agenda, and making funds conditional to the respect of the rule of law. They also pursued intra-EU compromises that accommodated different positions—for instance, on the Climate Law. Nonetheless, turbulence continues to pose a formidable challenge to the progress of the EU's climate agenda.
In this article the main aspects of the European Green Deal proposed by the European Commission in December 2019 are analyzed, putting the Green Deal into the broader context of European Union (EU) climate governance in order to assess whether and how it advances the EU's climate agenda. Four broad and interrelated categories to evaluate the Green Deal are proposed. Its performance depends on whether it is and will remain a policy priority, despite the COVID-19 emergency and the ensuing economic crisis. Second, successful implementation depends on adequate financial endowment, including the shift of public funding from hydrocarbons to renewables and energy efficiency in post-pandemic economic programmes. The legal competence of EU institutions to coordinate and enforce the implementation of the Green Deal is also essential, as highlighted by ongoing discussions concerning governance to achieve zero net emissions by 2050. Furthermore, international cooperation with third partners on issues such as border carbon adjustment, technology transfers, and green industry will influence both the implementation of the Green Deal in the EU and the contribution of other major emitters to the climate agenda. The impact of the European Green Deal on EU-Russia relations is also investigated. In this respect, it is argued that the Green Deal poses a serious challenge to the traditional pattern of EU-Russia energy trade, which has been dominated by fossil fuels. However, the Green Deal also offers new avenues for cooperation and for a more sustainable EU-Russia energy relationship.
This Working Paper analyses the main aspects of the European Green Deal proposed by the European Commission in December 2019. It puts the Green Deal into the broader context of EU climate governance in order to assess whether and how it advances the EU's climate agenda. The paper proposes four broad and interrelated categories to evaluate the Green Deal. Its performance depends on whether it is and will remain a policy priority, despite the Covid-19 emergency and the ensuing economic crisis. Second, successful implementation depends on adequate financial endowment, including the shift of public funding from hydrocarbons to renewables and energy efficiency in post-pandemic economic programmes. The legal competence of EU institutions to coordinate and enforce the implementation of the Green Deal is also essential, as highlighted by ongoing discussions concerning the governance to achieve zero net emissions by 2050. Furthermore, international cooperation with third partners on issues such as border carbon adjustment, technology transfers and green industry will influence both the implementation of the Green Deal in the EU and the contribution of other major emitters to the climate agenda.