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An Interpretation of American Conservative Thought: Political Issues, Conceptual Differences, and Attitudinal Disjunctions
In: American Conservatism, S. 55-139
The Third Concept of Liberty and the Politics of Identity
In: Partisan review: PR, Band 68, Heft 4, S. 536-561
ISSN: 0031-2525
Incomplete Routes to Moral Objectivity: Four Variants of Naturalism
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 18, Heft 2, S. 177-217
ISSN: 1471-6437
The search for moral objectivity has been constant throughout the history of philosophy, although interpretations of the nature and scope of objectivity have varied. One aim of the pursuit of moral objectivity has been the demonstration of what may be termed its epistemological thesis, that is, the claim that the truth of assertions of the goodness or rightness of moral acts is as legitimate, reliable, or valid as the truth of assertions involving other forms of human knowledge, such as common sense, practical expertise, science, or mathematics. Another aim of the quest for moral objectivity may be termed its pragmatic formulation; this refers to the development of a method or procedure that will mediate among conflicting moral views in order to realize a convergence or justified agreement about warranted or true moral conclusions. In the ethical theories of Aristotle, David Hume, and John Dewey, theories that represent three of the four variants of ethical naturalism (defined below) that are surveyed in this essay, the epistemological thesis and the pragmatic formulation are integrated or combined. The distinction between these two elements is significant for the present essay, however, since I want to show that linguistic naturalism, the fourth variant I shall examine, has provided a demonstration of the epistemological thesis about moral knowledge, even if the pragmatic formulation has not been successfully realized.
Moral Pluralism and Philanthropy
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 4, Heft 2, S. 93-112
ISSN: 1471-6437
The idea of moral pluralism generates a dilemma for the practice of philanthropy. Characteristically, the practice of philanthropy assumes unity, coherence, or convergence among the diverse virtues and moral aims that it pursues. In the philanthropic tradition, it is recognized that the goals of a particular philanthropy will vary. Yet, if these are sincere expressions of the philanthropic will, each represents some portion of the manifold activity of "doing good" according to particularized choice or style. The relevant analogy should be drawn to the slogan of "giving to the college of your choice" or to worship of the one god in your own way, where the plurality of expression is not only consistent with the residual value of education or of religion, but articulates the pragmatic way to realize the underlying values of a pluralistic society.Historically, this reflects the place of a unifying religious vision of the nature of the good or of a secular conception of a public philosophy which recognized the common good. Even etymologically, the love of mankind suggests a single passion that is directed beneficently to the shared values of mankind.The theory and practice of contemporary philanthropy is necessarily pluralistic, however, and it reflects the range of decisions by individuals with different interests and values in a pluralist, democratic society. The legitimized and recognized range of philanthropies in modern societies demonstrates divergent and even conflicting perceptions of the common good or the public interest.Thus, the range of philanthropies includes support for bird watching and for business opportunities of minorities, which may require some decisions on "comparable worth" and competitive allocation of resources.
SECULAR THEODICY AND HISTORICAL EVIDENCE
In: Holocaust and genocide studies, Band 1, Heft 2, S. 265-277
ISSN: 1476-7937
Contextualism, Pluralism, and Distributive Justice
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 172-195
ISSN: 1471-6437
THE INAPPLICABILITY THESISThere is a gap between the idea of distributive justice and the many factors that are morally relevant for decision making on economic issues. Only to a degree can this gap be attributed to the distance between "ideal reach" and "practical grasp," to the legitimate difference in detail between an abstractly delineated economic scenario and a concrete set of circumstances, and to the disparate idioms and metaphors of theoretical and practical discourse. Rather, the gap indicates a fundamental problem with the concept of distributive justice. The problem, that is here termed the "inapplicability thesis," is that even if distributive justice in abstract formulation were to be accepted as a value, its application in economic decision making is indeterminate.
Monistic Ideals, Plural Values, and the Limits of Philosophy
In: Capitalism & Society, Vol. 8, Issue 2, Article 2, 2013
SSRN
The United States and Israel
In: Current history: a journal of contemporary world affairs, Band 34, Heft 199, S. 158-165
ISSN: 1944-785X
The essential writings
In: Harper torchbooks 1926
Ethnic Identification among American Jews
In: Sociological analysis: SA ; a journal in the sociology of religion, Band 36, Heft 2, S. 172
ISSN: 2325-7873