Suchergebnisse

The on-going global shift toward democratic government, vividly joined in recent years by the Arab World, is tempered by the many challenges of democratic transitions. The toppling of an autocratic leader does not automatically mean the rise of democracy. Elections do not guarantee the protection of civil liberties. And democratic leaders are not immune from the seductions of power and the incentives of dismantling democracy's institutional checks and balances. The costs to a society and the international community for democratic reversals are high in terms of civil liberties, human rights, human development and political instability. Strengthening international legal instruments including mechanisms to enhance accountability for violence against journalists and proscribe the subversion of democratic institutions as a crime against democracy can help overcome these conundrums.

"Dass wachsender Wohlstand, der im schützenden Rahmen autoritärer Herrschaft erwächst, der sicherste Weg zur Demokratie sei, ist eine beliebte, aber empirisch nicht gesicherte These. Bestätigt wird diese auch keineswegs durch das Beispiel autoritär geführter Länder wie China, deren Wirtschaftskraft zwar im Wachsen begriffen ist, deren Anfälligkeit für Krisen und Katastrophen wirtschaftlicher, humanitärer und umweltpolitischer Natur sich indes immer deutlicher zeigt. Natürlich sind auch Demokratisierungsprozesse nicht risikofrei, doch schaffen Offenheit, freier Zugang zu Informationen sowie eine ausgeprägte Debatten- und Analysekultur als Wesensmerkmale von Demokratie Vertrauen bei Investoren und somit Boden für wirtschaftliche Prosperität. Entwicklungsländer mit Demokratisierungswillen sollten höhere Hilfeleistungen erhalten als solche ohne diesen Willen, doch ist die Bereitschaft zur Demokratie bislang noch kein allgemeingültiges Kriterium zur Hilfevergabe weltweit. Es macht Mut, dass Demokratie seit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges auf dem Vormarsch ist. Die Frucht dieser Entwicklung sollte nicht gefährdet werden." (Autorenreferat)

Rising commodity prices in recent years have deepened awareness of the paradox of the resource curse – resource‐rich countries consistently facing high levels of poverty, corruption and instability. There is relatively less recognition of the autocratic roots underlying much of this curse, however. Resource‐rich autocracies, on average, are subject to lower levels of well‐being, higher volatility, a greater propensity for conflict and humanitarian crisis, and more corruption than resource‐rich countries on a democratic path. The resource curse persists because sharp inequalities of power limit opportunities for corrective action. Recognising the governance root to the natural resource curse dictates that remedial strategies for resource‐rich democratisers should differ from those for resource‐rich autocracies. In the latter, effective reform strategies must increase the cost of rent‐seeking by the privileged minority and improve the capacity for collective action among the disadvantaged majority. While resource‐rich autocracies do not rely on international assistance for budgetary support, they generally must tend to reputational and investment concerns. Accordingly, there is an important role for international actors – governmental, civil society organisations and the private sector – to play in reversing the resource curse.

"Security sector reform (SSR) and democratisation are closely linked in both theory and practice. The high levels of volatility that characterise democratisation processes, therefore, have direct implications for SSR strategy. We identify possible scenarios for SSR in the context of democratic reversals by focussing on two observations about this relationship: first, limited progress in SSR is still possible under conditions of democratic reversal; and second, certain systematic features characterise how SSR stalls as a result of democratic reversals. On the basis of these observations, we argue that a return to SSR following a democratic reversal holds specific challenges for reform and offer recommendations for how to frame SSR in such contexts as well as "second-chance" scenarios once the democratisation process resumes." (author's abstract)