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Polską pomoc rozwojową dla Republiki Mołdawii można określić mianem inwestycyjnych działań uzupełniających. Celem artykułu jest oszacowanie jej wielkości i scharakteryzowanie poszczególnych projektów. Poruszana problematyka dotyczy również sposobu wdrażania środków pomocowych, w tym charakterystyki modeli funkcjonowania projektodawców i systemowego podejścia do poszczególnych grantów. Zakres pola badawczego obejmuje lata 2008–2018, a więc cezurę czasową, dla której zebrano materiał źródłowy. W artykule wykorzystano dwie metody badawcze: analizy statystycznej i analizy formalno-prawnej. Postawiono następujące pytania badawcze: jaki jest szczegółowy zakres wdrażania polskiej pomocy rozwojowej w Mołdawii? Jakie modele funkcjonowania projektodawców w zakresie ODA wykształtowały się w Republice? Jakie typy projektów finansowano w ramach ODA w Mołdawii po 2004 r.? Republika Mołdawii pod względem inwestycyjnym jest terenem specyficznym. Realizowane tu projekty odbiegają od wyobrażenia europejskiego, skoncentrowanego wokół przemysłu 4.0 zmierzającego do wdrażania w gospodarce procesów automatyzacji, robotyzacji i zaawansowanych technologii. Większość grantów wdrażanych na trenie Republiki dotyczy tymczasem podstawowych potrzeb o charakterze politycznym, społecznym i gospodarczym. Ich realizacja jest źródłem postępu we wskazanych trzech obszarach, bowiem w wielu przypadkach skoncentrowana jest na zapewnianiu podstawowych potrzeb życiowych. Jeśli nawet kwoty udzielanej przez Polskę pomocy nie są wysokie, to za decydujący należy uznać sam fakt zrealizowania określonej inwestycji.

Agriculture and development of rural areas are important sectors of Polish-Moldovan cooperation and development aid. Importantly, both of them constitute structural problems, similar to those which faced agriculture in Poland in the 1990s. Through Polish aid and development cooperation, various measures are initiated which increase the competitiveness of Moldovan agricultural production, improve sanitary and phytosanitary conditions, bring technological innovations in agricultural farms, ensure modernization of rural infrastructure, providing support to small and medium-sized entrepreneurs, cooperatives, and agricultural consultants, along with professional activation of the Republic's residents.

Agriculture and development of rural areas are important sectors of Polish-Moldovan cooperation and development aid. Importantly, both of them constitute structural problems, similar to those which faced agriculture in Poland in the 1990s. Through Polish aid and development cooperation, various measures are initiated which increase the competitiveness of Moldovan agricultural production, improve sanitary and phytosanitary conditions, bring technological innovations in agricultural farms, ensure modernization of rural infrastructure, providing support to small and medium-sized entrepreneurs, cooperatives, and agricultural consultants, along with professional activation of the Republic's residents.

Agriculture and development of rural areas are important sectors of Polish-Moldovan cooperation and development aid. Importantly, both of them constitute structural problems, similar to those which faced agriculture in Poland in the 1990s. Through Polish aid and development cooperation, various measures are initiated which increase the competitiveness of Moldovan agricultural production, improve sanitary and phytosanitary conditions, bring technological innovations in agricultural farms, ensure modernization of rural infrastructure, providing support to small and medium-sized entrepreneurs, cooperatives, and agricultural consultants, along with professional activation of the Republic's residents.

In 2009, the Republic of Moldova created an alternative to the communist leadership. In 2013, the Alliance for European Integration was replaced by the Alliance for Pro-European Governance, which secured two issues: the signing of the Association Agreement between the Republic of Moldova and the European Union, and the interests of local oligarchs. After the parliamentary elections in 2014, as an alternative to the increasingly powerful Igor Dodon's Party of Socialists, another coalition, the Political Alliance for European Moldova was created and 'sealed' by embezzling $ 1 billion from Moldovan banks (12.5% of GDP). The coalition formed in January 2015, was replaced by the re-launched Alliance for European Integration, and then by another coalition without a definite name in January 2016. This extremely expanded political activity is a backdrop for the façade of democracy and the subsequent parliamentary elections scheduled for 2018. The pro-European coalitions in the Republic of Moldova discredited themselves in front of the society as strongly as their predecessors (the communists), causing a state of general disintegration. ; W 2009 roku stworzono w Republice Mołdawii alternatywę dla komunistycznego przywództwa. W 2013 roku, w miejsce "Sojuszu na rzecz Integracji Europejskiej" powołano "Koalicję na rzecz Rządów Proeuropejskich", co zabezpieczyło dwie kwestie: podpisanie umowy stowarzyszeniowej między Republiką Mołdawii a Unią Europejską oraz interesy lokalnych oligarchów. Po wyborach parlamentarnych w 2014 roku alternatywą dla rosnącej w siłę Partii Socjalistów Igora Dodona stała się kolejna z koalicji "Sojusz polityczny na rzecz Europejskiej Mołdawii", "przypieczętowana" defraudacją 1 mld USD z mołdawskich banków (12,5% PKB). Powołana w styczniu 2015 roku koalicja już w lipcu tego samego roku została zastąpiona przez ponownie zainicjowany do życia "Sojusz na rzecz Integracji Europejskiej", a w styczniu 2016 roku przez kolejną z koalicji, bez bliżej określonej nazwy. Ta niezwykle rozbudowana działalność polityczna jest tłem dla fasadowej demokracji i kolejnych wyborów parlamentarnych zaplanowanych w 2018 roku. Koalicje proeuropejskie w Republice Mołdawii skompromitowały się przed społeczeństwem równie mocno jak poprzednicy (komuniści), wywołując stan ogólnej dezintegracji.

In 2009, the Republic of Moldova created an alternative to the communist leadership. In 2013, the Alliance for European Integration was replaced by the Alliance for Pro-European Governance, which secured two issues: the signing of the Association Agreement between the Republic of Moldova and the European Union, and the interests of local oligarchs. After the parliamentary elections in 2014, as an alternative to the increasingly powerful Igor Dodon's Party of Socialists, another coalition, the Political Alliance for European Moldova was created and 'sealed' by embezzling $ 1 billion from Moldovan banks (12.5% of GDP). The coalition formed in January 2015, was replaced by the re-launched Alliance for European Integration, and then by another coalition without a definite name in January 2016. This extremely expanded political activity is a backdrop for the façade of democracy and the subsequent parliamentary elections scheduled for 2018. The pro-European coalitions in the Republic of Moldova discredited themselves in front of the society as strongly as their predecessors (the communists), causing a state of general disintegration.

Analyzing the questions of political leadership in the period between the year 1989 and 2009, it is essential to indicate the aims and stages of the series of changes and, expressed mainly by the level the political elites' development and parliamentary elections. After 1989, a total collapse of the Soviet ideological monopoly has taken place, not only in Moldova, but also in other socialist countries, therefore shaping a new set of rules governing the political life and leadership. Changes of the system that have taken place in the Republic of Moldova should be treated as a result of the following factors: the formation of the independence movement and the National Front, and the global and logistics support of the international institutions to strengthen the statehood and the social affirmation in the country. Since its independence, the Republic of Moldova, witnesses an ongoing struggle for shaping the state regime and the future model of political leadership. Years 1991-2009 have become a visible example of a leadership characterized as authoritarian and autocratic. Political elites were characterized as "disabled" in relation to the role of Russia in the region. This condition has still been observed , despite many reforms that have been introduced. The institution of political leadership in the Republic of Moldova in 1989-2009 was deprived of social authority, which in turn made the country's political system a non-consolidated one. More Info: M. Sikora-Gaca, Problematyka przywództwa politycznego w Republice Mołdawii w latach 1989-2009, [w:] Przywództwo polityczne w Polsce i na świecie, pod red. M. Hartlińskiego, seria wydawnicza "Forum Politologiczne", tom 15, Olsztyn 2013, s. 323-348.

The following article summarizes the investments made in the area of transport policy in Poland over the past 15 years. Within such a typology 3679 projects implemented in 2004- 2006 and 2007-2013 have been analyzed. Time periods were adopted according to the duration terms of the last two financial perspectives. In 2004-2006, 738 projects were completed with a total value of approx. 28.5 billion PLN, of which the amount of funding from the EU amounted to approx. 18 billion PLN. In 2007-2013 2945 projects were contracted for the implementation, of which 2549 that were due to September 2015 have already been completed. 396 projects are still in the implementation phase. In September 2015 the activities contracted for the transport policy were estimated at approx. 241.48 billion PLN value of total investment, including 136.86 billion from grants from the European Union. The total value of all the 3679 projects is approx. 270 billion PLN, of which the value of subsidies from the EU represents approx. 155 billion PLN, the value of subsidies from the state budget is approx. 27 billion PLN, and beneficiaries own contribution is approx. 88 billion PLN.

Corporate social responsibility in Georgia is a very disputable phenomenon, mostly because of the tribal character of the region's politi-cal transformation. Business elites do not cooperate with society, but place themselves above it. Exception from this general rule may be made of situations when they strive for political legitimacy (B. Iwaniszwili). Nowadays business in Georgia is not interested in developing corporate social responsibility. Georgian businessman perceive it more as a significant expense than an investment. Public authorities are deprived of sufficient control over private business sector to force the implementa-tion of riles of corporate responsibility. Georgia is devoid of an essential fundament for corporate respon-sibility – civil society. Economy is treated there as a system of inexhaust-ible resources [4: 343], which may be endlessly exploited, while giving at the same time nothing in return. The treatment of society and democracy by business elites is highly instrumental [8: 160]. Thus "the interests of the ruling elites constitute a point of reference to the already realized or still wanted paradigms of modernization, and not the other way" [8: 192]. Business elites and society function in the environment impressionable by tribalism and clan politics, which influences the effects of transformation processes, inter alia: non-market distribution of assets, quasi-militarization of economic relations and tendency to sustain monopolies at any cost [32: 4]. Business in Georgia is taking advantage of the regression caused by the economic transformation. It builds its own position against a background of such transformation. Thus the reduction of unemploy-ment, preventing further collapse of the agricultural sector and providing political stability are simply unprofitable. Such phenomenon as corrup-tion, clan structure or nepotism dominate corporate social responsibility in Georgia. Georgia faces strong tendencies to appropriation of power and putting group interests before the public good. In ...

The main purpose of this article is to determine the causes and scale of the phenomenon of terrorism in the 20th and the 21st century and the action of the international community to eliminate this phenomenon. The first part contains theoretical issues of terrorism. The history of the terrorism phenomenon will be presented, based on a thorough research of the literature. The second part describes several terrorist groups in the world. Al-Qaeda have been listed as examples of the most prevalent, but also the most dangerous groups of this type. The fragment contains the description of the internal structure, strategic objectives and major attacks of each terrorist group as a direct result of their activities. The final part of the thesis deals with the action taken by the international community against terrorism. The European Union and UNO have been taken into consideration as the most active organiza-tions when it comes to terrorism.

The idea of the Euro-regions in Europe appeared together with the development of the integration trend among the European states. In time, the economic benefits resulting from such cooperation were recognized, and an interaction was established as a bridge uniting the continent not only in terms of social issues, but also of economic or cultural bases. Euro-regions have not only become a specific form of the EU's regional policy, but they are also primarily an expression of the active operations of the cross-border structures functioning in the integrated Europe. Thus, the new Member States are required to carry out and implement the idea of the functioning of Euroregions in the Community.

Wojna izraelsko-arabska, rewolucja w Iranie czy wojna w Zatoce Perskiej pokazały, jak ważne dla gospodarki światowej i poszczególnych narodów jest bezpieczeństwo energetyczne. W kontekście geopolityki, na zagadnienie to składają się trzy główne kwestie: wystarczalność złóż własnych, infrastruktura magazynowa i najważniejsze – poziom uzależnienia od dostaw "trzecich", w tym ich dywersyfikacja. Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne nabiera również szczególnego znaczenia w konfrontacji z dynamizmem otoczenia politycznego, jako czynnik pozamilitarny. Przyjęte teorie geopolityki energetycznej uwypuklają sferę rywalizacji, a czynnikiem determinującym są bardzo często surowce naturalne. To stwierdzenie w sposób jednoznaczny określa rolę Rosji na europejskim rynku gazowym, a szczególnie jej wpływ na bezpieczeństwo energetyczne byłych republik radzieckich. Koncepcja "pieriemyczki", która między innymi została omówiona w niniejszym artykule, ma istotne znaczenie – szczególnie w kontekście aktualnych wydarzeń na Ukrainie. Jej realizacja może wywołać nieodwracalne konsekwencje polityczne dla pozostałych państw byłego ZSRR: Mołdawii czy państw Kaukazu, przyjmując formę "precedensu transformacyjnego". ; The Arab-Israeli War, the Revolution in Iran and the Gulf War demonstrated the importance of the energy security for the world's economy and individual economies of particular nations. In the context of geopolitics this issue is composed of three main issues: the sufficiency of their own resources, storage facilities , and most importantly - the level of dependence on the third-party supplies, including their diversification. Energy security, as a non-military factor, also takes on a special meaning in the confrontation with the dynamics of the political environment. The commonly accepted theories on energy geopolitics emphasize the sphere of rivalry, and the determining factor is often the issue of natural resources. This statement clearly defines the role of Russia in the European gas market, particularly its impact on the energy security of the former Soviet republics. The concept of "pieriemyczka" which, among other things, will be discussed in this article , is important - especially in the context of current events in the Ukraine. Its implementation can cause irreversible political consequences for the other countries of the former Soviet Union: Moldova and the Caucasus, by taking the form of an "unprecedented transformation". ; Małgorzata Sikora-Gaca

Internally polarized counter-elites, that are often involved in corporate interests, do not have enough power to oppose the negative manifestations of economic transformation. In the countries of the South Caucasus, there are two types of business elites, the internal and the external ones, which "grew up" from the economic transformation. The external elites result from the privatization process, in which primarily Russians and Kazakhs are engaged. Concerning their interests in the region, they are lobbying the decision-making processes, while the local elites create the aforementioned mentioned "representative system". The wealth factor is therefore the way to exercise power. The research on business elites remains a discursive issue, which seems to be an endless subject to develop. Its analysis opens a broad discussion on the methodology of the study of elites, both in terms of their mechanisms and characteristics, as well as the theory itself. ; Małgorzata Sikora-Gaca

Internally polarized counter-elites, that are often involved in corporate interests, do not have enough power to oppose the negative manifestations of economic transformation. In the countries of the South Caucasus, there are two types of business elites, the internal and the external ones, which "grew up" from the economic transformation. The external elites result from the privatization process, in which primarily Russians and Kazakhs are engaged. Concerning their interests in the region, they are lobbying the decision-making processes, while the local elites create the aforementioned mentioned "representative system." The wealth factor is therefore the way to exercise power. The research on business elites remains a discursive issue, which seems to be an endless subject to develop . its analysis opens a broad discussion on the methodology of the study of elites, both in terms of their mechanisms and characteristics, as well as the theory itself.