Suchergebnisse

Who does a personalist authoritarian ruler designate as their successor, and what makes the transition of presidency to them peaceful in the short term? This article argues that these questions can be fruitfully approached from the perspective of political legitimacy, thus contributing to the further conceptualization of legitimacy in autocracies. By analyzing the 2019 leadership succession in Kazakhstan, the article develops a model of multi-level legitimacy that differentiates between three interconnected levels of legitimacy enjoyed by political actors among the general population, the elite, and the international community. The article tracks the legitimation process and the estimated level of legitimacy of three key political actors (Nazarbaev, Tokaev, and Nazarbaeva) from the immediate pre-resignation period until the political crisis of January 2022, covering both phases of succession: Nazarbaev's exit from and Tokaev's entry to power. To estimate the actors' level of legitimacy on the three analytical levels of the model, the article draws from a diverse dataset consisting of public opinion polls, expert commentary, and international actors' statements. The article finds that in the initial transition process, the estimated level of legitimacy enjoyed by both Nazarbaev and Tokaev was relatively high in all three levels, in contrast to Nazarbaeva's. It argues that Nazarbaev's and Tokaev's legitimacy contributed to the transition's initial peaceful nature, but Nazarbaeva's legitimacy deficit resulted in her marginalization in the succession process. The political turmoil of January 2022 demonstrates that a succession that is peaceful in the short term can paradoxically contain the seeds of a succession conflict erupting later.

This article contributes to the debate about Russia's past and present-day imperialism by studying the portrayal of Central Asia in expert discourse mediated by the Russian state-affiliated tabloid newspaper Argumenty i fakty from a critical geopolitical perspective. It argues that there are two separate discourses on Central Asia: a foreign policy discourse on Central Asian states and a domestic policy discourse on the Central Asian region. While the former narrates Central Asian states as Russia's partners, the latter constructs Central Asia as an inherently problematic region for Russia. Moreover, the term "Middle Asia" (Sredniaia Aziia) functions as a marker of the xenophobic domestic policy discourse, which is why those sensitive to the current decolonization imperative are triggered by its application.

Kolme vuosikymmentä Neuvostoliiton romahtamisen jälkeen kommunismin perintöjä (legacies) koskevan tutkimuksen ohella on kasvanut keskustelu elpymisistä (revivals) ja elvyttämisestä (revivalism), millä tarkoitetaan menneen ajan yhteiskuntajärjestelmän erilaisten elementtien palaamista – ja palauttamista – nykyhetken kontekstissa. Tutkijoiden parissa ei kuitenkaan ole selvyyttä siitä, mikä yhdistää ja erottaa elpymiset perinnöistä, minkä lisäksi elpymistä koskevaa tutkimuskirjallisuutta on vielä vain vähän. Tämä artikkeli luo viitekehyksen kommunistisen aikakauden rakenteiden elpymisen analysoinnille ja käsittelee Valko-Venäjän valtiollisia nuorisojärjestöjä. Tutkimuksen aineisto koostuu arkistolähteistä, sanomalehtiartikkeleista, järjestöjen omista julkaisuista, Aljaksandr Lukašenkan julkilausumista, järjestöaktivistien haastatteluaineistosta sekä kirjoittajan etnografisista kenttäpäiväkirjamerkinnöistä, joita tarkastellaan laadullisen sisältöanalyysin menetelmin. Artikkelissa esitetään, että elpymisillä on kaksi erityispiirrettä: ne ovat riippuvaisia aktiivisesta elvyttävästä toimijasta ja nojaavat perintönarratiiviin olemassaolonsa oikeuttamiseksi. Vaikka elpymät ovat lähtökohtaisesti hauraita, niiden vaikutus yhteiskuntaan voi silti olla huomattava niiden laajuuden ja pitkäikäisyyden vuoksi.

In the 2010s Russia, government-organized local, regional and national youth forums have become major sites for state-youth interaction. These typically weeklong summer camps are organized across Russia, attracting up to one million participants annually. Although the forums have diverse foci, they are all formal platforms of youth participation, aimed at young people engaging in 'compliant' forms of activism. Drawing from qualitative content analysis of official reports and media accounts combined with participant observation and interview data, this article analyses the forums as a case of youth policy in an authoritarian political setting. It finds that the government treats youth as a 'problematic resource'. Moreover, while the forums' agenda is defined by the policymakers, young people acquire and apply agency to navigate and negotiate the official agenda and re-signify it to respond to their interests. This process, it is argued, has an empowering effect regardless of the constraining authoritarian setting.

In the 2010s Russia, government-organized local, regional and national youth forums have become major sites for state-youth interaction. These typically weeklong summer camps are organized across Russia, attracting up to one million participants annually. Although the forums have diverse foci, they are all formal platforms of youth participation, aimed at young people engaging in 'compliant' forms of activism. Drawing from qualitative content analysis of official reports and media accounts combined with participant observation and interview data, this article analyses the forums as a case of youth policy in an authoritarian political setting. It finds that the government treats youth as a 'problematic resource'. Moreover, while the forums' agenda is defined by the policymakers, young people acquire and apply agency to navigate and negotiate the official agenda and re-signify it to respond to their interests. This process, it is argued, has an empowering effect regardless of the constraining authoritarian setting. ; Peer reviewed

Based on extensive and diverse primary material, this article provides a detailed analysis of the development of Belarusian government-affiliated youth organisations from the late 1980s until 2002. Using a historical institutionalist approach, it examines the transformation of the Belarusian Komsomol into an independent association and the emergence of new, proactive pro-government youth organisations. The article demonstrates that, contrary to common assumptions, building a mass membership pro-presidential youth organisation in Belarus was a complex project that took years to complete. When the Belarusian Republican Youth Union finally emerged in 2002, it was a result of an interplay of many structural and agency-related factors. ; Peer reviewed

AbstractRussia's foreign policy concept, last updated in 2023, envisioned economic and political cooperation with countries of the Asia-Pacific as important for advancing Russia's agenda as a global power and emphasised the need to improve connectivity across Eurasia. This article applies a novel theoretical framework for analysing Russia's approach to connectivity in Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Drawing from policy documents and secondary sources, the article identifies three different geographical spaces targeted by Russian connectivity policy: East of the Russian Federation, post-Soviet Central Asia, and Greater Eurasia. It is argued that the attempts to improve the cooperative connectivity of the Russian Far East have been half-hearted. In contrast, the attempt to retain and rebuild connectivity within the post-Soviet space has followed the logics of competition, containment, and coercion. Moreover, by promoting the Greater Eurasian Partnership, Russia has sought to keep status equality with China against the backdrop of the latter's Belt and Road Initiative. The article maintains that Russia is a connectivity actor of its own right, even if there is a major gap between its connectivity strategy and its implementation. It further suggests that the war in Ukraine has accelerated the trend towards coercion and disconnectivity.