Tanesini on truth and epistemic vice
In: Inquiry: an interdisciplinary journal of philosophy and the social sciences, Band 67, Heft 2, S. 762-768
ISSN: 1502-3923
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In: Inquiry: an interdisciplinary journal of philosophy and the social sciences, Band 67, Heft 2, S. 762-768
ISSN: 1502-3923
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 199, Heft 3-4, S. 10371-10388
ISSN: 1573-0964
AbstractThis paper develops a novel, functionalist, unified account of the epistemic normativity of reasoning. On this view, epistemic norms drop out of epistemic functions. I argue that practical reasoning serves a prudential function of generating prudentially permissible action, and the epistemic function of generating knowledge of what one ought to do. This picture, if right, goes a long way towards normatively divorcing action and practical reasoning. At the same time, it unifies reasoning epistemically: practical and theoretical reasoning will turn out to be governed by the same epistemic norm—knowledge—in virtue of serving the same epistemic function: generating knowledge of the conclusion.
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 199, Heft 3-4, S. 7595-7614
ISSN: 1573-0964
AbstractThis paper develops a novel account of the nature of blame: on this account, blame is a species of performance with a constitutive aim. The argument for the claim that blame is an action is speech-act theoretic: it relies on the nature of performatives and the parallelism between mental and spoken blame. I argue that the view scores well on prior plausibility and theoretical fruitfulness, in that: it rests on claims that are widely accepted across sub-disciplines, it explains the normativity of blaming and it accounts for associated psychological phenomena.
In: Inquiry: an interdisciplinary journal of philosophy and the social sciences, S. 1-17
ISSN: 1502-3923
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 196, Heft 11, S. 4679-4689
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Inquiry: an interdisciplinary journal of philosophy and the social sciences, Band 61, Heft 8, S. 914-928
ISSN: 1502-3923
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 193, Heft 10, S. 3041-3056
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Inquiry: an interdisciplinary journal of philosophy and the social sciences, S. 1-21
ISSN: 1502-3923
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 197, Heft 1, S. 125-137
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 197, Heft 7, S. 2849-2866
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 194, Heft 5, S. 1487-1502
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 199, Heft 5-6, S. 14641-14665
ISSN: 1573-0964
AbstractThis paper proposes a methodological turn for the epistemology of disagreement, away from focusing on highly idealized cases of peer disagreement and towards an increased focus on disagreementsimpliciter. We propose and develop a normative framework for evaluating all cases of disagreement as to whether something is the case independently of their composition—i.e., independently of whether they are between peers or not. The upshot will be a norm of disagreement on which what one should do when faced with a disagreeing party is to improve the epistemic properties of one's doxastic attitude or, alternatively, hold steadfast.
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 198, Heft S15, S. 3553-3564
ISSN: 1573-0964
AbstractRecent views in hinge epistemology rely on doxastic normativism to argue that our attitudes towards hinge propositions are not beliefs. This paper has two aims; the first is positive: it discusses the general normative credentials of this move. The second is negative: it delivers two negative results for No-Belief hinge epistemology such construed. The first concerns the motivation for the view: if we're right, doxastic normativism offers little in the way of theoretical support for the claim that our attitudes towards hinge propositions are anything but garden-variety beliefs. The second concerns theoretical fruitfulness: we show that embracing a No-Belief view will either get us in serious theoretical trouble, or loose all anti-sceptical appeal.
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 197, Heft 12, S. 5187-5202
ISSN: 1573-0964
AbstractThis paper critically assesses Sosa's normative framework for performances as well as its application to epistemology. We first develop a problem for one of Sosa's central theses in the general theory of performance normativity according to which performances attain fully desirable status if and only if they are fully apt. More specifically, we argue that given Sosa's account of full aptness according to which a performance is fully apt only if safe from failure, this thesis can't be true. We then embark on a rescue mission on behalf of Sosa and work towards a weakened account of full aptness. The key idea is to countenance a distinction between negligible and non-negligible types of risk and to develop an account of full aptness according to which even performances that are endangered by risk can be fully apt, so long as the risk is of a negligible type. While this alternative account of full aptness solves the problem we developed for Sosa earlier on, there is also bad news for Sosa. When applied to epistemology, the envisaged treatment of barn façade cases as cases in which the agent falls short of fully apt belief will no longer work. We show that, as a result, Sosa faces a new version of a familiar dilemma for virtue epistemology. Either he construes full aptness as strong enough to get barn façade cases right in which case his view will run right into the problem we develop. Or else he construes full aptness as weak enough to avoid this problem but then he will not be able to deal with barn façade cases in the way envisaged.