Suchergebnisse

In 2002 the Fifth Review Conference of the 1972 Biological & Toxin Weapons Convention concluded its resumed session after being suspended in Dec 2001. The parties agreed to hold three annual meetings before the Sixth Review Conference in 2006. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons' Director-General was dismissed & its financial situation was stabilized. The investigation of the anthrax-laden letters mailed to politicians & members of the news media in the US in 2001 continued. In Sept, US-led pressure in the UN Security Council resulted in the unanimous adoption of a new resolution on Iraq, & Iraq accepted UN Monitoring, Verification & Inspection Commission inspectors on its territory. Intensive political & technical discussions on the meaning of compliance occurred within the Security Council. Wide-ranging, interrelated evaluations & measures to assess & meet the perceived threat of chemical & biological weapon use by state & nonstate actors, as well as on disease surveillance & emergency preparedness & response, were undertaken. Adapted from the source document.

Events in 2003 included the first of a new form of annual meeting for states parties to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the first review conference of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), as well as the establishment of an ad hoc cooperative mechanism aimed at stopping the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological methods of warfare: the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The year also included the military occupation of Iraq and the renouncing of chemical and biological weapons by Libya. In Iraq, 2003 began with inspections by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), which continued until inspectors were withdrawn in March and the country was occupied by forces of the United States and the United Kingdom and their coalition partners. The coalition then carried out its own search efforts. By the end of the year no clear evidence that prohibited weapons existed at the time of the attack had been made public. Questions were raised about the reliability of intelligence assessments and the degree to which these might have been politicized. In December President Muammar Qadhafi made a commitment to dismantle Libya's WMD, including its chemical weapon stockpile, following several months of secret negotiations. This commitment includes the acceptance of international inspectors in Libya. The decision to demonstrate verifiably that Libya no longer possesses these weapons suggests that, in some cases, maintaining a policy of ambiguity as to whether a country possesses certain weapon programs is less tenable in the current security environment. The Libyan decision also suggests that ad hoc coalitions of like-minded states acting on specific issues of concern to meet perceived threats can be effective under certain circumstances. Conversely, the case of Iraq has raised doubts as to whether ad hoc coalitions can be sufficiently certain of the accuracy of their information. The actions of such coalitions should be seen to be justified by the existence of reliable information and not unduly influenced or driven by political considerations. Otherwise there is a risk that the international credibility of their actions will be fundamentally undermined. The first of the annual series of expert and political meetings of states parties to the BTWC was held in accordance with the decision of the reconvened Fifth BTWC Review Conference (held in 2002). These are scheduled to continue until the Sixth Review Conference in 2006. The focus of the meeting in 2003 was on national measures to implement the convention's prohibitions and the security and oversight of pathogenic organisms and toxins. There is no consensus among states parties on the extent to which efforts to strengthen the regime can or should be carried out within other forums (e.g., the Australia Group, the PSI and the World Health Organization) and the extent to which such efforts should be pursued within the BTWC regime itself. A special conference of the parties to the CWC, held during the review conference, took a final decision to implement a policy that limits the tenure of employees in the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to seven years. The OPCW also adopted a 'plan of action' to ensure that the parties have met their obligations to put in place effective national implementation measures. The parties to the CWC need to ensure that the OPCW's institutional memory and expertise are maintained as the new tenure policy is implemented. The parties should also continue to take into account relevant scientific and technological developments. If the OPCW does not formally consider the applicability of CWC provisions regarding non-lethal weapons or incapacitants and agree relevant policy decisions, there is a risk that this issue will be decided on the basis of implementation practice rather than deliberate policy. Adapted from the source document.

Implementation of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) reached the first treaty-specified milestones on the third anniversary of the CWC's entry into force. The four declared possessor states -- India, South Korea, Russia, & the US -- have begun to destroy their chemical weapon (CW) stockpiles. With the exception of Russia, which continued to suffer from dire economic & social conditions, they achieved the required destruction goal of 1% of their chemical munitions by 29 Apr 2000. The negotiation of the protocol to the 1972 Biological & Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) reached a critical state in 2000. Even if a document is agreed upon by the Fifth Review conference at the end of 2001, if the biochemical & pharmaceutical industries do not act in a more constructive manner & the US does not assume a leadership position, the prospects for strengthening the BTWC regime will remain bleak. Iraq refused to cooperate with the new UN Monitoring, Verification & Inspection Commission. CBW proliferation concerns persisted in 2000. Also of concern was the possible application of advancements in biotechnology to the development of biological weapons. Adapted from the source document.