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Frontmatter -- Contents -- 1 Introduction -- 2 A Right to Injustice -- 3 Justice in the Long Run -- 4 Should Lawyers 0 bey the Law? -- 5 Legal Professionalism as Meaningful Work -- 6 Legal Ethics as Contextual Judgment -- 7 Is Criminal Defense Different? -- 8 Institutionalizing Ethics -- Notes -- Further Reading -- Acknowledgments -- Index

Intro -- Contents -- 1. Introduction -- 2. A Right to Injustice -- 3. Justice in the Long Run -- 4. Should Lawyers Obey the Law? -- 5. Legal Professionalism as Meaningful Work -- 6. Legal Ethics as Contextual Judgememt -- 7. Is Criminal Defense Different? -- 8. Institutionalizing Ethics -- Notes -- Further Reading -- Acknowledgments -- Index.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Background: The Turn to Community-Based Organizations in Social Policy -- 3. Three Logics of Community Action -- 4. The Community as Beneficiary of Economic Development -- 5. The Community as Agent of Economic Development -- 6. Constrained Property: Rights as Anchors -- 7. Induced Mobilization -- 8. Institutional Hybridization -- 9. The Limits of CED -- Index

A study of the evolution of the Community Economic Development movement, paying particular attention to the institutional and legal mechanisms it utilizes.

This article considers the relative advantages of alternative enterprise forms in finance from the point of view of public accountability. The business corporation is compared to the state agency or authority, the cooperative, the state corporation, and the charitable nonprofit. These forms can be distinguished according to whether they aspire to enhance general electoral democracy or stakeholder democracy and whether their democratic controls operate directly or indirectly. The article suggests that the indirect democratic forms may be more promising than the direct ones. It also argues that the project of democratizing finance depends on the development of practices of multifactor or "dialogic" performance assessment. Such practices must be institutionalized through public or private organizations that extend across firms.

This article considers the relative advantages of alternative enterprise forms in finance from the point of view of public accountability. The business corporation is compared to the state agency or authority, the cooperative, the state corporation, and the charitable nonprofit. These forms can be distinguished according to whether they aspire to enhance general electoral democracy or stakeholder democracy and whether their democratic controls operate directly or indirectly. The article suggests that the indirect democratic forms may be more promising than the direct ones. It also argues that the project of democratizing finance depends on the development of practices of multifactor or "dialogic" performance assessment. Such practices must be institutionalized through public or private organizations that extend across firms.

This article examines the charge that activist judging is inconsistent with democracy in the light of two recent perspectives in legal scholarship. The perspectives – Democratic Constitutionalism and Democratic Experimentalism – suggest in convergent and complementary ways that the charge ignores or oversimplifies relevant features of both judging and democracy. In particular, the charge exaggerates the pre-emptive effect of activist judging, and it implausibly conflates democracy with electoral processes. In addition, it understands consensus as a basis for judicial legitimacy solely in terms of pre-existing agreement and ignores the contingent legitimacy that can arise from the potential for subsequent agreement.

This essay examines the charge that activist judging is inconsistent with democracy in the light of two recent perspectives in legal scholarship. The perspectives – Democratic Constitutionalism and Democratic Experimentalism – suggest in convergent and complementary ways that the charge ignores or oversimplifies relevant features of both judging and democracy. In particular, the charge exaggerates the pre-emptive effect of activist judging, and it implausibly conflates democracy with electoral processes. In addition, it understands consensus as a basis for judicial legitimacy solely in terms of pre-existing agreement and ignores the contingent legitimacy that can arise from the potential for subsequent agreement.

Discussion of prosecution reform is haunted by anachronistic conceptions of judgment and organization. These conceptions see professional judgment as inherently individual and ineffable and professional organization as inherently informal and opaque. The appeal of these conceptions is due in part to the assumption that the only alternative to the judgment and organization they prescribe is bureaucracy. In fact, post-bureaucratic forms of organization have become dominant in recent decades in several professions. They key elements of postbureaucratic organization are presumptive rules, root cause analysis, peer review, and performance measurement. Each of these elements can be found in recent reforms in prosecution, but the field, like the legal profession generally, lags other occupations. Although post-bureaucratic reforms are sometimes resisted as inconsistent with democracy, they are better understood as democracy-reinforcing.

The core doctrines of administrative law have not taken account of developments in the theory and practice of organization. The contours of these doctrines were set in the mid-twentieth century when the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was passed. Although these doctrines have evolved since then, administration itself has changed more. Many of the widely perceived deficiencies of the doctrines, including some associated with overregulation and others with underregulation, seem influenced by an anachronistic understanding of organization. Much administrative law continues to understand public administration as bureaucracy. In particular, doctrine is strongly influenced by three premises. First, the backward-looking conception of legitimacy sees organization as instrumental to previously chosen values and goals. Authority thus depends on prior authorization. Second, there is the balance between fixed rules and unreviewable discretion. In the bureaucratic view, the rule is the most important type of norm. However, because rules are relatively inflexible and difficult to change, residual pockets of unaccountable discretion must be tolerated. And, third, is the reactive approach to error detection. Errors are understood to arise from idiosyncratic circumstances; they are addressed primarily through complaints, and complaints are understood to raise primarily issues of individual accuracy or fairness. The model of organization these premises express is associated in the private sector with mass manufacturing of standardized products as it developed in the early and mid-twentieth centuries. The ideas developed in manufacturing influenced public administration, especially the Progressive and New Deal regulatory and social welfare programs. The designers of the APA were responding to these programs. This model was once the dominant paradigm of efficient large-scale organization, but it now competes with, and in some quarters has been displaced by, another one. This newer, postbureaucratic or performance-based approach has emerged in the private sector as industries have sought flexibility to adapt to more volatile economic circumstances and to the demand for more differentiated products. As reformers have recognized an analogous need for government to respond to fluidity and diversity, they have imported elements of the postbureaucratic view to the public sector.

Anxiety about surveillance and data mining has led many to embrace implausibly expansive and rigid conceptions of privacy. The premises of some current privacy arguments do not fit well with the broader political commitments of those who make them. In particular, liberals seem to have lost touch with the reservations about privacy expressed in the social criticism of some decades ago. They seem unable to imagine that preoccupation with privacy might amount to a "pursuit of loneliness" or how "eyes on the street" might have reassuring connotations. Without denying the importance of the effort to define and secure privacy values, I want to catalogue and push back against some key rhetorical tropes that distort current discussion and practice. One problem is that privacy defenses often imply a degree of pessimism about the state that is inconsistent with the strong general public regulatory and social-welfare role that many defenders favor. Another is a sentimental disposition toward past convention that obscures the potential contributions of new technologies to both order and justice. And a third is a narrow conception of personality that exalts extreme individual control over information at the expense of sharing and sociability.