Why governments and parties manipulate elections: theory, practice, and implications
In: Political economy of institutions and decisions
32 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Political economy of institutions and decisions
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 82, Heft 4, S. 1373-1389
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: Journal of democracy, Band 30, Heft 1, S. 172-177
ISSN: 1086-3214
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 74, Heft 3, S. 782-795
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: Journal of Politics, Forthcoming
SSRN
Working paper
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 74, Heft 3, S. 782-796
ISSN: 0022-3816
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 6, Heft 2, S. 412-413
ISSN: 1541-0986
In: Perspectives on politics: a political science public sphere, Band 6, Heft 2, S. 412-413
ISSN: 1537-5927
In: Perspectives on politics: a political science public sphere, Band 6, Heft 2, S. 412
ISSN: 1537-5927
In: Comparative constitutional law and policy
Constitutions in authoritarian regimes are often denigrated as meaningless exercises in political theater. Yet the burgeoning literature on authoritarian regimes more broadly has produced a wealth of insights into particular institutions such as legislatures, courts and elections; into regime practices such as co-optation and repression; and into non-democratic sources of accountability. In this vein, this volume explores the form and function of constitutions in countries without the fully articulated institutions of limited government. The chapters utilize a wide range of methods and focus on a broad set of cases, representing many different types of authoritarian regimes. The book offers an exploration into the constitutions of authoritarian regimes, generating broader insights into the study of constitutions and their functions more generally
In: University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 817
SSRN
Working paper
In: American journal of political science, Band 59, Heft 1, S. 212-224
ISSN: 1540-5907
Bureaucratic compliance is often crucial for political survival, yet eliciting that compliance in weakly institutionalized environments requires that political principals convince agents that their hold on power is secure. We provide a formal model to show that electoral manipulation can help to solve this agency problem. By influencing beliefs about a ruler's hold on power, manipulation can encourage a bureaucrat to work on behalf of the ruler when he would not otherwise do so. This result holds under various common technologies of electoral manipulation. Manipulation is more likely when the bureaucrat is dependent on the ruler for his career and when the probability is high that even generally unsupportive citizens would reward bureaucratic effort. The relationship between the ruler's expected popularity and the likelihood of manipulation, in turn, depends on the technology of manipulation. Adapted from the source document.