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Cover -- Half-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- 1 The theoretical foundations of constructivism and its treatment of law -- Introduction -- ONUF -- Introduction -- Rules -- Agency -- Conclusion -- KRATOCHWIL -- Introduction -- Intersubjectivity -- Change -- The causal power of norms -- Kratochwil and the law -- International law -- Conclusion -- 2 Challenging the common sense idea of law -- Introduction: setting the scene -- The common sense view of law -- Formalism -- Legal reasoning in the common sense idea of law -- Syllogism and deductive reasoning -- Reasoning by analogy -- Precedent -- Flexibility and legal Reasoning: how legal reasoning actually works -- Anti-formalism and the middle way -- Conclusion: how to understand law -- 3 Introducing critical jurisprudence -- Introduction -- The sociological movement -- From sociological to 8216;critical8217; approaches -- Marxism and the conflict model of society -- Re-imagining a Marxist theory of law -- Critical legal studies -- Legal indeterminacy -- Feminism: critical jurisprudence in action -- Conclusion -- 4 Brown, desegregation and racism in America: the myth and reality of law8217;s ability to solve complex social problems -- Introduction -- The 8216;story8217; of Brown -- The NAACP8217;s litigation strategy -- A direct attack on Plessy: beyond 8216;separate but equal8217; -- The case and the opinion -- Explaining Brown -- Brown and civil rights reform: a different reading of Brown -- The courts and social change -- Brown and the law -- Conclusion -- 5 Constructing rape: defining the problem and finding the solution -- Introduction -- The problem with rape -- The 1970s and 1980s: treatment of complainants -- New Labour reform: the preoccupation with conviction rates -- Reform -- Attrition rates -- Competing narratives of the rape problem -- Feminist interpretations -- Third phase feminism -- Conclusion -- 6 Law and normative backsliding: torture since 9/11 -- Introduction -- The evolution of constructivism -- Theories of norm evolution post-9/11 -- Norm evolution as a ratchet -- The role of law in normative backsliding -- Conclusion -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index.

This article identifies how three dominant ideas of international law (as a process, an institution and a practice) see its agency, concluding that all three share a reluctance to see international law as doing anything more than enabling the operation of other actors, forces or structures. This article argues that we should see international law as a structure because it possesses both the surface structure of rules, principles, processes, personnel and material elements of the international legal system and a deep structure of values that sits deep within our subconscious. As Shklar's idea of legalism shows us, legalism plays a powerful role in shaping all our understandings of ourselves and the world that surrounds us. Seeing international law as a structure enables us to see how it locates actors within a social hierarchy and how it behaves in similar ways to recognised structures like capitalism and racism.

This article identifies how three dominant ideas of international law (as a process, an institution and a practice) see its agency, concluding that all three share a reluctance to see international law as doing anything more than enabling the operation of other actors, forces or structures. This article argues that we should see international law as a structure because it possesses both the surface structure of rules, principles, processes, personnel and material elements of the international legal system and a deep structure of values that sits deep within our subconscious. As Shklar's idea of legalism shows us, legalism plays a powerful role in shaping all our understandings of ourselves and the world that surrounds us. Seeing international law as a structure enables us to see how it locates actors within a social hierarchy and how it behaves in similar ways to recognised structures like capitalism and racism.

The aim of this article is to provide International Relations (IR) theorists with a better understanding of law. This is important for all IR theorists, not just those who focus on international law, because the legalistic way of viewing the world colours all aspects of our world, from teaching us what justice is and providing the means to achieve it, to framing our understanding of human relations and giving us the language of rights with which to articulate it. This article has two main goals: first, to question our own assumptions about law; and second, to introduce IR theorists to the basics of legal methodology and demonstrate how law actually operates. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThe aim of this article is to provide International Relations (IR) theorists with a better understanding of law. This is important forallIR theorists, not just those who focus on international law, because the legalistic way of viewing the world colours all aspects of our world, from teaching us what justice is and providing the means to achieve it, to framing our understanding of human relations and giving us the language of rights with which to articulate it. This article has two main goals: first, to question our own assumptions about law; and second, to introduce IR theorists to the basics of legal methodology and demonstrate how law actually operates.

"This investigation of the ordinary and legal concepts of hate speech contrasts social media platform content policies with national and international laws. It clarifies how controversial grey areas, such as reverse hate speech, misgendering, gender denialism, blackface or identity appropriation, and righteous hate speech, should be approached"--

This article argues that constructivism in International Relations (IR) suffers from certain important shortcomings in its analysis of the idea of social context. Specifically it is argued that constructivists fail to adequately engage with 'social structural' forces in world politics. While constructivists have pitched themselves as theorists who aim to account for the role of social context in world political inquiry, their conceptual focus on ideational factors - rules, norms and inter-subjective beliefs - has resulted in an inadequate, or incomplete, conceptualisation of social structure. Constructivists, it is argued here, tend to leave the role of materially embodied social structures theoretically and empirically unexplored. The limitations of constructivist treatments of social context have significant consequences for their analysis of world politics, for example, for recent constructivist attempts to deal with international law. Constructivist interventions into analysis of law remain deficient in important senses because of their failure to conceive of international law in social structural terms and because of their inability to explore in depth law's relationship with other social structures, such as patriarchy or capitalism. This entails that the structured systems of inequality and hierarchy embodied in law fail to be adequately recognised. Recognising the 'incompleteness' of the constructivist accounts of social context, we argue, is important in highlighting the often un-noted limitations of constructivist scholarship and in potentially redirecting constructivist scholarship towards closer engagement with 'critical theory' investigations into IR and law. Adapted from the source document.

The term 'sovereignty' figures prominently in international affairs and academic analysis. But does 'sovereignty' mean the same thing in different countries and political cultures? In this article, we examine conceptions of sovereignty as they appear in the writings of US scholars of international law and those international relations scholars who deal with international law, in order to obtain a clearer picture of what 'sovereignty' means in American academic discourse. At first glance, the US literature is dominated by two distinct conceptions of sovereignty: (1) a statist conception that privileges the territorial integrity and political independence of governments regardless of their democratic or undemocratic character; (2) a popular conception that privileges the rights of peoples rather than governments, especially when widespread human rights violations are committed by a totalitarian regime. On closer examination, what seem to be two conceptions are in fact different manifestations of a single, uniquely American conception of sovereignty which elevates the United States above other countries and protects it against outside influences while concurrently maximising its ability to intervene overseas.