Suchergebnisse

In 2010, California's voters responded to the state legislature's increasing delays in passing abudget by voting to shift the state budget requirement to a simple majority from a supermajority.For Republican voters, this risked the relevance of the state party in the legislature; nevertheless,in a sample drawn from before the election, many Republicans do not adopt the party line of opposingthe measure. Republican voters are more likely to engage in accountability through institutionalreform rather than accountability through punishing their party's candidate for governor;in this sample, more Republicans explicitly support their own candidate than oppose the measurereducing their legislative leverage.

In 2012, California first used a nonpartisan "top-two" primary. Early academic studies of the effects statewide have produced mixed results on the key question: does the new law make it possible for more moderate candidates to win? This study focuses on one particular California State Assembly race, District 5, from 2012 to assess the operation of the new law in detail in one same-party runoff. Republicans Frank Bigelow and Rico Oller competed against each other in both rounds; Bigelow, the more moderate Republican, won the general election. This study uses the internal Bigelow campaign polling data (three surveys of 400 voters each) to assess the dynamics of the race, revealing not just voter attitudes towards the candidates but the reasons for Bigelow campaign choices. The results suggest that although little strategic behavior took place in the first round, voters, including Democrats, tended to support the spatially logical candidate in the general election – with the advantage to Bigelow, the candidate closer to the median voter of the district.

"Over the years, observers of American politics have noted the deleterious effects of party polarization in both the national and state legislatures. Reformers have tried to address this problem by changing primary election laws. A theory underlies these legal changes: the reformers tend to believe that 'more open' primary laws will produce more centrist, moderate, or pragmatic candidates. The 'top-two' primary, implemented in California, represents the future of these antiparty efforts. Nonpartisan Primary Election Reform examines California's first use of the top-two primary system in 2012. R. Michael Alvarez and J. Andrew Sinclair evaluate the primary from a variety of perspectives and using several different methodologies. Although the first use of this primary system in California did not immediately reshape the state's politics, it also did not have many of the deleterious consequences that some observers had feared. This study provides the foundation for future studies of state primary systems"--Unedited summary from book cover

Governments face different incentives when they reorganize many administrative agencies at one time rather than making infrequent, case-by-case changes. This article develops a theory of mass administrative reorganizations, which posits that the politics of reorganization is focused on government accountability. Viewing mass reorganization as a structured decision, it argues that choices about independence, agency organization and functional disposition have different impacts on the political costs of administrative policy making. Analyzing novel data from a recent British reorganization with sequential logistic statistical models provides substantial support for these claims. The study challenges the focus on organizational survival in the existing literature. By eschewing more fundamental political questions of democratic accountability, the prevailing approach masks essential politics, and in the context of this study, all influence of conflict due to party and agency policy positions.

AbstractHow does media attention influence government decisions about whether to terminate independent administrative agencies? The authors argue that an agency's salience with partisan audiences has a direct effect, but a high media profile can disrupt normal government monitoring processes and obfuscate termination decisions. This argument is evaluated in the context of a recent mass administrative reorganization by the British coalition government using probit and heteroscedastic probit regression models. The evidence suggests that termination is less likely for agencies salient in newspapers popular with the government's core supporters but not those read by its minority coalition partner. We also find that agencies with greater overall newspaper salience as well as younger agencies have a higher error variance.

AbstractThis article examines recent proposals to "defund the police" using a perspective informed by literature on agency termination and political accountability. These concepts allow us to build a framework for categorizing such proposals based on the assignment of functions to organizations. These proposals operate in the context of a federal system which can shape the character of each category, make some choices more or less feasible, influence where functions may be assigned, and create political incentives out of the complex geography of conflict. We use examples from Minneapolis, New York, Los Angeles, and Seattle to illustrate our framework. We conclude by offering a preliminary analysis of why these cities tend towards adopting one of the alternatives we outline.