Suchergebnisse

I. Purpose of the inquiry -- One History of Asylum and Basis for Its Grant -- II. History of asylum -- III. Basis for the grant of asylum -- Two Asylum from the Viewpoint of the Individual -- IV. The Individual's position in international law with respect to asylum -- V. Asylum as a human right -- VI. The international political refugee -- Three Asylum from the Viewpoint of States -- Sub-Part A. Territorial Asylum -- VII. Rights and duties of states granting territorial asylum -- VIII. The political offense -- Sub-Part B. Non-Territorial Asylum -- IX. The forms of non-territorial asylum -- X. Diplomatic asylum -- XI. Consular asylum -- XII. Maritime asylum -- Four Conclusion -- XIII. Summary and conclusions.

The existing state of human beings, to which the present international movement for human rights addresses itself, is no reason for applause for the success of that movement. It is true that there are several reasons for the lack of success and not all blame is to be borne by the deficiencies in the present approach. True also is the fact that the struggle for protection of the human being from excesses of the state or powerful elements within society is a continuing saga of organized society with only the promise that the struggle and its causes have more of an enduring existence than the various efforts for seeking protection for the human being attempted in the history of mankind, of which human-rights is one instance. However, to the extent it is legitimate to explore if improvements in the present approach are possible, one might well be permitted to raise anew questions about the philosophical foundation for human rights and the pragmatic approach to their achievement.

The midwives of international law, Gentili, Grotius, Vitoria, Suarez, Pufendorf, and Wolff, found the principles of this law in the law of nature. This, in turn, was derived by some of them from the law of God and by others from the law of reason. But, as the law of nations grew and its content developed, its derivation was established, particularly with Vattel in the middle of the eighteenth century, from the will of states rather than from the law of nature. Today's international lawyer simply inherits the principle of identification whereby international-law rules of general application are created by international custom. (This custom is produced by that kind of practice of states relating to a matter of international relations which is concordant and general and is accompanied by the conviction of states that it is obligatory under international law.) The application of this principle of identification, however, is not so simple because of the appearance of three new situations.