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"Opposing Democracy in the Digital Age is about why ordinary people in a democratizing state oppose democracy and how they leverage both traditional and social media to do so. Aim Sinpeng focuses on the people behind popular, large-scale anti-democratic movements that helped bring down democracy in 2006 and 2014 in Thailand. The yellow shirts (PAD-People's Alliance for Democracy) that are the focus of the book are anti-democratic movements grown out of democratic periods in Thailand, but became the catalyst for the country's democratic breakdown. Why, when, and how supporters of these movements mobilize offline and online to bring down democracy are some of the key questions that Sinpeng answers. While the book primarily uses a qualitative methodological approach, it also uses several quantitative tools to analyze social media data in the later chapters. This is also one of the few studies in the field of regime transition that focuses on anti-democratic mobilization and takes the role of social media seriously"--

Opposing Democracy in the Digital Age is about why ordinary people in a democratizing state oppose democracy and how they leverage both traditional and social media to do so. Aim Sinpeng focuses on the people behind popular, large-scale antidemocratic movements that helped bring down democracy in 2006 and 2014 in Thailand. The yellow shirts (PAD—People's Alliance for Democracy) that are the focus of the book are antidemocratic movements grown out of democratic periods in Thailand, but became the catalyst for the country's democratic breakdown. Why, when, and how supporters of these movements mobilize offline and online to bring down democracy are some of the key questions that Sinpeng answers. While the book primarily uses a qualitative methodological approach, it also uses several quantitative tools to analyze social media data in the later chapters. This is one of few studies in the field of regime transition that focuses on antidemocratic mobilization and takes the role of social media seriously.

This article argues that Thailand's 2023 parliamentary election was the first election in which social media played a decisive factor in the electoral outcomes. Prior to this election, social media was an important campaign tool, but it was unclear whether it made a difference in the
electoral results. Based on our original post-election survey data (n = 1,249), social media was the most important media in governing vote choice. Social media was a crucial space for activation and conversion—motivating the undecided to become partisans and converting partisan
voters to shift their allegiances. Thailand's 2023 election was also marked by a rise in the personalization of political campaigning, wherein citizens felt free to decide how and what their political participation looked like, and parties that encouraged inclusive and open engagement with
politics were best poised to win in the electoral arena. Drawing on social network analysis of social media data, this article demonstrates how the Move Forward Party's (MFP) loosely structured and inclusive social media campaigns allowed both their candidates and supporters to mobilize individualized
large-scale collective action, in contrast to their rivals who focused on traditional top-down style campaigning. Despite the MFP's winning social media campaigning that produced electoral victories, the party was unable to come to power due to an entrenched authoritarian political system
designed to maintain the power of the country's autocratic elites. The Thai case demonstrates powerfully how autocrats might lose an election due to social media, yet still manage to hang on to power through entrenched authoritarian institutions.

This article argues that Thailand's 2023 parliamentary election was the first election where social media played a decisive factor in the electoral outcomes. Prior to this election, social media was an important campaign tool, but it was unclear whether it made a difference in the electoral results. Based on our original post-election survey data (n = 1,249), social media was the most important media in governing vote choice. Social media was a crucial space for activation and conversion—motivating the undecided to become partisans and converting partisan voters to shift their allegiances. Thailand's 2023 election was also marked by rising personalization of political campaigning, wherein citizens felt free to decide how and what their political participation would look like, and parties that encouraged inclusive and open engagement with politics were best poised to win in the electoral arena. Drawing on social network analysis of social media data, this article demonstrates how the Move Forward Party's (MFP) loosely structured and inclusive social media campaigns allowed both their candidates and supporters to mobilize individualized large-scale collective action, in contrast to their rivals who focused on traditional top-down style campaigning. Despite the MFP's winning social media campaigning that produced electoral victories, the party was unable to come to power due to an entrenched authoritarian political system designed to maintain the power of the country's autocratic elites. The Thai case demonstrates powerfully how autocrats might lose an election due to social media, but still manage to hang on to power through entrenched authoritarian institutions. (Pac Aff/GIGA)

What explains popular support for military dictatorship? Existing literature on democratic breakdowns focuses on addressing support for democratic collapse but not subsequent authoritarian regime. This article explores pro-dictatorship sentiment before and during the military dictatorship in Thailand. It uses social media data to analyze support for the antidemocratic mobilization of the People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) and the subsequent military dictatorship, which lasted from 2014 to 2019. It argues that support for military dictatorship prior to and after regime installment was qualitatively different both in sentiment and type of support. Prior to the coup, pro-dictatorship support was unified by antigovernment sentiment, while following the coup pro-regime support was contingent upon policy preferences of different groups. These findings fill a gap in the literature on regime change, which tends to be focused on explaining support for democratic collapse and remains silent on this support in its aftermath. This study may present the first-ever evidence of pro-dictatorship support following a collapse of democracy.

Opposing Democracy in the Digital Age is about why ordinary people in a democratizing state oppose democracy and how they leverage both traditional and social media to do so. Aim Sinpeng focuses on the people behind popular, large-scale antidemocratic movements that helped bring down democracy in 2006 and 2014 in Thailand. The yellow shirts (PAD—People's Alliance for Democracy) that are the focus of the book are antidemocratic movements grown out of democratic periods in Thailand, but became the catalyst for the country's democratic breakdown. Why, when, and how supporters of these movements mobilize offline and online to bring down democracy are some of the key questions that Sinpeng answers. While the book primarily uses a qualitative methodological approach, it also uses several quantitative tools to analyze social media data in the later chapters. This is one of few studies in the field of regime transition that focuses on antidemocratic mobilization and takes the role of social media seriously.

A sharp rise in the use of digital media in Southeast Asia in recent years has raised questions about the impact of these digitally networked technologies on the prospect for democratization in a region known for its authoritarian resilience. In the absence of a regional uprising as witnessed in the Middle East through the Arab Spring, Southeast Asian authoritarian states have maintained their durability despite a massive surge in online political activities and in some cases, digitally mediated large-scale mobilization of opposition groups. What explains authoritarian resilience in Southeast Asia in the face of rising opportunities for online political opposition? This article argues that while digital media has emerged as an important repertoire of activism, particularly for political opposition groups, a deft combination of political authoritarianism and increasing Internet controls have stunted democratic pressure in society and hampered future prospect for democratization. It also offers a comparative analysis of how the Internet more generally and digital media in particular has affected state-society relations in Southeast Asia in recent years. In order for digitally mediated political opposition to meaningfully challenge the existing authoritarian incumbents, sufficient opening in the political system is needed. This means, authoritarian states with competitive, routinized elections which have recently experienced large-scale or sustained mobilization by opposition groups are most likely to be susceptible to breakdown than closed regimes.

Does social media reinforce or transcend socioeconomic divides in political participation? The mobilization thesis suggests that social media use can bring previously disengaged or under-represented groups into politics. The reinforcement thesis, in contrast, posits that social media has little impact on existing patterns of political participation and can, in fact, exacerbate them. I test these two hypotheses in the context of street protests in Thailand which occurred from November 2013 through March 2014. I contrast data from the Asia Foundation's socioeconomic survey of over 300 street demonstrators with unique socio-demographic profile data drawn from 600 Facebook users affiliated with either the anti-government People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) or the pro-government United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD). I find that overall, political participants on Facebook were of lower socioeconomic status and a younger demographic profile than offline participants for both sides of the political divide. These findings support the mobilization claim by demonstrating that there is less participatory inequality among online participants. The key implications of this study are two-fold. First, data from Thailand permits an examination of socioeconomic stratification of political participation both online and offline in a country outside the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and with profound digital inequality. Second, the similarities in the socioeconomic backgrounds of the UDD and PDRC online supporters, in stark contrast to their offline counterparts, suggest that social media engagement has a mitigating effect on participatory inequalities. Facebook thus provides a new avenue for those not engaged in offline political activities. (Pac Aff/GIGA)

The practice of political party banning and dissolution seems at odds with democratic ideals. Since 2006, however, Thailand has witnessed the dissolution of seven parties and the banning of hundreds of politicians. This article seeks to address the causes of party banning in Thailand and its effects on party institutionalization between 2006 to 2008. Its findings show that party banning not only affected the banned parties, but also the rest of the parties in the political system. Party banning and dissolution - a factor largely overlooked in the existing literature - unevenly impacts different dimensions of party institutionalization. As such, the Thai case shows that party banning greatly weakens the "autonomy" of party institutionalization, while it has differential effects on the party system's "legitimacy". While the bans reveal that many political actors view the electoral process as illegitimate, the findings show little effect on voter's attitudes towards the legitimacy of the party system. Moreover, this article breaks new ground in the study of party institutionalization in new democracies by relying on context-based, qualitative measures of party institutionalization, not electoral volatility which is used in most studies. (Contemp Southeast Asia/GIGA)

The practice of political party banning and dissolution seems at odds with democratic ideals. Since 2006, however, Thailand has witnessed the dissolution of seven parties and the banning of hundreds of politicians. This article seeks to address the causes of party banning in Thailand and its effects on party institutionalization between 2006 to 2008. Its findings show that party banning not only affected the banned parties, but also the rest of the parties in the political system. Party banning and dissolution - a factor largely overlooked in the existing literature - unevenly impacts different dimensions of party institutionalization. As such, the Thai case shows that party banning greatly weakens the 'autonomy' of party institutionalization, while it has differential effects on the party system's 'legitimacy'. While the bans reveal that many political actors view the electoral process as illegitimate, the findings show little effect on voter's attitudes towards the legitimacy of the party system. Moreover, this article breaks new ground in the study of party institutionalization in new democracies by relying on context-based, qualitative measures of party institutionalization, not electoral volatility which is used in most studies. Adapted from the source document.

Corruption has been the single most cited reason for the seizure of power from governments in Thailand. Yet few studies on corruption in Thailand have problematized the term "corruption" despite it being repeatedly used to legitimize the overthrow of government. This article examines the discourse on corruption of the reform movements between the two coup d'états in Thailand in 1991 and 2006. I focus on the reform efforts that culminated in the 1997 constitution and those that culminated in establishment of the opposition movement, the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD). I argue that the PAD's conception of corruption was intertwined with the notions of morality, nationalism, and royalism, which differed from what was envisioned in the 1997 constitution. They were thus not satisfied with the outcomes of reforms and resorted to overthrowing the democratic system altogether.graphic

Does the Internet facilitate democratization or democratic entrenchment? The body of literature on the Internet and democracy points to scholarly divergence on this issue. This article seeks to contribute to this debate by analyzing Thailand's Internet regime as a crucial test case in the larger debate over the Internet and democracy. First, it argues that the extent to which the Internet can be a force for democracy is contingent upon the state coercive capacity in cyberspace. State coercion online—measured in terms of regulatory, institutional, infrastructural, and ideational dimensions—can thwart the democratic potential the Internet may bring. Second, using a rationalist analytical framework, this article argues that the Thai state will continue to employ repression online as long as the benefits outweigh the costs for political elites. As such, any improvement in the country's overall democratic qualities may not affect the degree of state digital coercion.