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Démondialisation et démultilatéralisation : retour vers le pire ?
In: La revue internationale et stratégique: revue trimestrielle publiée par l'Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS), Band 132, Heft 4, S. 77-85
L'avenir des traités commerciaux
In: L' économie politique: revue trimestrielle, Band 87, Heft 3, S. 22
Les guerres commerciales de Trump : haro sur le multilatéralisme
In: Politique étrangère: revue trimestrielle publiée par l'Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Band Hiver, Heft 4, S. 87-101
ISSN: 1958-8992
Le multilatéralisme commercial établi après la Seconde Guerre mondiale avait pour objectif de prévenir les guerres commerciales. La création de l'Organisation mondiale du commerce en 1995 et la mise en place de son mécanisme de règlement des différends ont renforcé ce multilatéralisme. Aujourd'hui, Donald Trump multiplie les mesures protectionnistes et cherche à réduire l'OMC à l'impuissance. L'issue de la guerre commerciale actuelle est bien incertaine.
L'intérêt national dans les négociations internationales commerciales. La crise du « mercantilisme libéral »
In: La revue internationale et stratégique: revue trimestrielle publiée par l'Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS), Band 105, Heft 1, S. 99-109
Core labour standards and exports
Core labour standards defined by the ILO in 1998 are universal, but applied very differently across countries. Compliance is much higher in high income countries. However, the causality between improved labour standards and economic growth remains a controversial issue. Export-led growth strategies might encourage developing countries to curb the process of standards improvement. In this way, they can raise the volume of their unskilled labour endowments (child and/or forced labour) in order to strengthen their comparative advantage over compliant countries and pursue "social dumping" strategies, which aim more directly at increasing competitiveness. We use a gravity model to assess the trade impact of curbing the level of compliance with core labour standards, distinguishing the effects on bilateral trade (geographical specialization) from the multilateral effects on all exports and imports. We show that, other things being equal, countries that meet the labour standards tend to trade more with each other, while non-compliant countries tend to trade more with compliant countries. These effects are identified mainly with respect to child labour and freedom of association. All other things being equal, countries that meet the labour standards tend to be less open than non-compliant countries, but differently depending on the standards, with a non-linear relationship for some of them. Less compliant countries, frequently the poorest ones, may simultaneously step up their trade and labour standards. For median countries, mainly the emerging countries, the level of compliance with labour standards is "optimal" from a mercantilist point of view. For the most compliant countries, the developed ones, their strict compliance with labour standards implies a trade shortfall. ; Les normes de travail fondamentales définies par l'OIT en 1998 sont universelles, mais différemment appliquées dans les pays. Leur respect est beaucoup plus élevé dans les pays à haut revenu. Toutefois, la causalité entre l'amélioration des normes ...
BASE
Core labour standards and exports
Core labour standards defined by the ILO in 1998 are universal, but applied very differently across countries. Compliance is much higher in high income countries. However, the causality between improved labour standards and economic growth remains a controversial issue. Export-led growth strategies might encourage developing countries to curb the process of standards improvement. In this way, they can raise the volume of their unskilled labour endowments (child and/or forced labour) in order to strengthen their comparative advantage over compliant countries and pursue "social dumping" strategies, which aim more directly at increasing competitiveness. We use a gravity model to assess the trade impact of curbing the level of compliance with core labour standards, distinguishing the effects on bilateral trade (geographical specialization) from the multilateral effects on all exports and imports. We show that, other things being equal, countries that meet the labour standards tend to trade more with each other, while non-compliant countries tend to trade more with compliant countries. These effects are identified mainly with respect to child labour and freedom of association. All other things being equal, countries that meet the labour standards tend to be less open than non-compliant countries, but differently depending on the standards, with a non-linear relationship for some of them. Less compliant countries, frequently the poorest ones, may simultaneously step up their trade and labour standards. For median countries, mainly the emerging countries, the level of compliance with labour standards is "optimal" from a mercantilist point of view. For the most compliant countries, the developed ones, their strict compliance with labour standards implies a trade shortfall. ; Les normes de travail fondamentales définies par l'OIT en 1998 sont universelles, mais différemment appliquées dans les pays. Leur respect est beaucoup plus élevé dans les pays à haut revenu. Toutefois, la causalité entre l'amélioration des normes ...
BASE
Core labour standards and exports
Core labour standards defined by the ILO in 1998 are universal, but applied very differently across countries. Compliance is much higher in high income countries. However, the causality between improved labour standards and economic growth remains a controversial issue. Export-led growth strategies might encourage developing countries to curb the process of standards improvement. In this way, they can raise the volume of their unskilled labour endowments (child and/or forced labour) in order to strengthen their comparative advantage over compliant countries and pursue "social dumping" strategies, which aim more directly at increasing competitiveness. We use a gravity model to assess the trade impact of curbing the level of compliance with core labour standards, distinguishing the effects on bilateral trade (geographical specialization) from the multilateral effects on all exports and imports. We show that, other things being equal, countries that meet the labour standards tend to trade more with each other, while non-compliant countries tend to trade more with compliant countries. These effects are identified mainly with respect to child labour and freedom of association. All other things being equal, countries that meet the labour standards tend to be less open than non-compliant countries, but differently depending on the standards, with a non-linear relationship for some of them. Less compliant countries, frequently the poorest ones, may simultaneously step up their trade and labour standards. For median countries, mainly the emerging countries, the level of compliance with labour standards is "optimal" from a mercantilist point of view. For the most compliant countries, the developed ones, their strict compliance with labour standards implies a trade shortfall. ; Les normes de travail fondamentales définies par l'OIT en 1998 sont universelles, mais différemment appliquées dans les pays. Leur respect est beaucoup plus élevé dans les pays à haut revenu. Toutefois, la causalité entre l'amélioration des normes ...
BASE
L'OMC face à la crise des négociations multilatérales
The latest WTO Round launched in Doha in 2001 has once again stalled. Even if an agreement were reached it is not certain it would be ratified by the US Congress. The latest delay is due in part to the changing economic context in which the negotiations are taking place, some of which changes are due to decisions made during the course of the negotiations. Governments and public opinion are increasingly in favor of bilateral negotiations in which it is possible to include new subjects rejected in the Doha multilateral negotiations. These include rules on labor and environmental standards, compe-tition policy, investment, and government procurement. The assertiveness of emerging economies has upset the co-leadership positions of the US and the EU and argues for a new, as yet-to-be determined, negotiating process. The latest economic crisis has raised question about the objectives of the agriculture negotiations and has revealed the difficulties faced by an organization that thinks long-term of adapting to changes in the short term. This paper's recommendations are aimed at improving the ability of the WTO to operate under current conditions and advocates the inclusion of new negotiating topics. If the principle of decision by consensus is not revised the rush to bilateralism is likely to continue, which is dangerous because of its discriminatory character. ; Le nouveau cycle de négociations multilatérales (« Round ») ouvert à Doha en 2001 s'est enlisé et n'a pu aboutir à un accord final, dont la ratification par les Etats-Unis ne serait d'ailleurs pas acquise. Ce retard s'explique notamment par l'évolution du contexte, qui est parfois la conséquence des choix de Doha. L'adhésion des gouvernements et des opinions publiques s'est émoussée, avec une préférence de plus en plus affirmée pour des accords bilatéraux permettant, notamment, d'intégrer de nouveaux sujets bloqués à l'OMC (normes de travail, concurrence, investissement, marchés publics, environne-ment). L'affirmation des pays émergents a déséquilibré le ...
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L'OMC face à la crise des négociations multilatérales
The latest WTO Round launched in Doha in 2001 has once again stalled. Even if an agreement were reached it is not certain it would be ratified by the US Congress. The latest delay is due in part to the changing economic context in which the negotiations are taking place, some of which changes are due to decisions made during the course of the negotiations. Governments and public opinion are increasingly in favor of bilateral negotiations in which it is possible to include new subjects rejected in the Doha multilateral negotiations. These include rules on labor and environmental standards, compe-tition policy, investment, and government procurement. The assertiveness of emerging economies has upset the co-leadership positions of the US and the EU and argues for a new, as yet-to-be determined, negotiating process. The latest economic crisis has raised question about the objectives of the agriculture negotiations and has revealed the difficulties faced by an organization that thinks long-term of adapting to changes in the short term. This paper's recommendations are aimed at improving the ability of the WTO to operate under current conditions and advocates the inclusion of new negotiating topics. If the principle of decision by consensus is not revised the rush to bilateralism is likely to continue, which is dangerous because of its discriminatory character. ; Le nouveau cycle de négociations multilatérales (« Round ») ouvert à Doha en 2001 s'est enlisé et n'a pu aboutir à un accord final, dont la ratification par les Etats-Unis ne serait d'ailleurs pas acquise. Ce retard s'explique notamment par l'évolution du contexte, qui est parfois la conséquence des choix de Doha. L'adhésion des gouvernements et des opinions publiques s'est émoussée, avec une préférence de plus en plus affirmée pour des accords bilatéraux permettant, notamment, d'intégrer de nouveaux sujets bloqués à l'OMC (normes de travail, concurrence, investissement, marchés publics, environne-ment). L'affirmation des pays émergents a déséquilibré le ...
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Le travail dans les accords de préférence commerciale: état des lieux et perspectives
In: Revue internationale du travail, Band 152, Heft 1, S. 93-115
ISSN: 1564-9121
Résumé.Alors même que l'Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC) et le Cycle de développement de Doha laissent à l'OIT le soin de traiter les questions relatives au travail, cet article montre que les pays les plus actifs dans la conclusion d'accords de préférence commerciale incluent des dispositions sociales plus ou moins contraignantes. Les sanctions sont peu utilisées et le caractère protectionniste des «clauses sociales» n'est pas avéré. Ces clauses répondent à des objectifs divers et parfois contradictoires qui appellent différentes mesures qui s'orientent vers la promotion du renforcement des pratiques et la promotion du travail décent. L'auteur émet un certain nombre de suggestions à cet égard.
Disposiciones laborales en los tratados de libre comercio: balance y perspectivas
In: Revista internacional del trabajo, Band 132, Heft 1, S. 99-122
ISSN: 1564-9148
Resumen.La Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC) y la Ronda de Doha han decidido dejar en manos de la OIT las cuestiones laborales. Sin embargo, como muestra este artículo, los países más activos en la conclusión de acuerdos comerciales preferenciales incluyen disposiciones sobre trabajo, más o menos exigentes, cuyo presunto carácter proteccionista no ha podido demostrarse. Estas cláusulas responden a objetivos diversos y a veces contradictorios, recurren poco a las sanciones y exigen en general medidas orientadas a la mejora de la legislación y las prácticas y a la promoción del trabajo decente. El autor ofrece varias sugerencias al respecto.
Labour provisions in preferential trade agreements: Current practice and outlook
In: International labour review, Band 152, Heft 1, S. 85-106
ISSN: 1564-913X
Abstract.While the WTO and Doha Development Round do not deal with labour issues – they leave this to the ILO – the main countries that conclude free trade agreements incorporate labour provisions, which vary in terms of stringency. Sanctions are rarely used, and fears that "social clauses" would serve protectionist purposes have proved to be unfounded. Labour provisions are designed to meet a variety of sometimes conflicting goals, by means of different mechanisms aimed at improving labour practices and promoting Decent Work; the author makes a number of suggestions in this regard.
Crise économique, globalisation et protectionnisme
In: Politique étrangère: revue trimestrielle publiée par l'Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Band Hiver, Heft 4, S. 803-817
ISSN: 1958-8992
Le « patriotisme économique », les craintes d'un retour au protectionnisme semblent paradoxaux alors que la division internationale du travail est fondée sur les tâches plus que sur les produits, avec des interdépendances entre firmes et pays rendant souvent contre-productives les mesures destinées à soutenir l'emploi national. La crise n'a pas remis en cause la libéralisation du commerce et, sauf à dénouer les réseaux internationaux, le retour au protectionnisme paraît peu vraisemblable. politique étrangère
Négociations commerciales multilatérales et cycle de Doha : les leçons d'un échec annoncé
In: Négociations, Band 16, Heft 2, S. 9
ISSN: 1782-1452