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Introduction: The edge of a new era -- The origins and meaning of neoliberalism -- The neoliberal ideology -- The last days of neoliberalism -- After neoliberalism -- Toward a great democracy -- United democracy -- Economic democracy -- Political democracy -- Defending democracy -- Conclusion: the politics of achieving a great democracy.

Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Contents -- Introduction -- Part One. Understanding the Public Option -- 1. The Limits of Private Action -- 2. Why Public Options? -- 3. The Theory of the Public Option -- 4. Caveats and Counterarguments -- Part Two. The History of the Public Option -- 5. Public Libraries, Social Security, and Other Successes -- 6. Mixed Results in Education and Housing -- Part Three. The Public Option and Public Policy -- 7. Retirement -- 8. Higher Education -- 9. Banking -- 10. Child Care -- 11. Health Care -- 12. And More -- Notes -- Acknowledgments -- Index.

From Athens to America : the two traditions -- America's middle-class constitution -- The emergence of the plutocracy -- The search for solutions --How economic inequality threatens the Republic -- The future of the middle class constitution

When the U.S. military began its ""surge"" in Iraq in 2006, counterinsurgency effectively became its dominant approach for fighting wars. Yet many of the major controversies and debates surrounding counterinsurgency operations have turned not on military questions but on legal ones: Who can the U.S. military attack with drones? Is the occupation of Iraq legitimate? What tradeoffs should the military make between self-protection and civilian casualties? What is the right framework for negotiating with the Taliban? How can we build the rule of law in Afghanistan? The Counterinsurgent's Constitut

Since the 'surge' in Iraq in 2006, counterinsurgency effectively became America's dominant approach for fighting wars. Yet many of the major controversies and debates about counterinsurgency have turned on legal questions: Who can the military attack with drones? Is the occupation of Iraq legitimate? What trade-offs should the military make between self-protection and civilian casualties? What is the right framework for negotiating with the Taliban? How can we build the rule of law in Afghanistan? This book tackles these legal issues from the vantage point of counterinsurgency strategy.

In the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, financial institutions targeted communities of color with expensive and risky subprime mortgage products. Hundreds of thousands of Black and Hispanic families were charged more for mortgages than their white counterparts or steered into expensive subprime loans, even though they qualified for cheaper prime loans. Over time, financial institutions like Countrywide pushed these "toxic" loans on more and more homeowners and expanded subprime lending throughout the country. When the music finally stopped in 2008, millions of families lost their jobs and their homes, and nearly $ii trillion in household wealth was wiped out. Over the next two years, Congress would work to pass financial reform legislation that was designed to address a variety of risks and dangers in the financial markets. In 2007, then-Professor Elizabeth Warren proposed a federal agency to regulate consumer financial products. For years, Warren had criticized predatory "tricks and traps" in mortgages, credit cards, and other financial products. One-off, piecemeal reforms had failed, and Americans were drowning in debt. Increasingly, one bad medical diagnosis or the loss of a job would mean bankruptcy and a family's total economic devastation. Warren argued that other consumer products, like toasters, were regulated at the federal level. Financial products were not so different. By 2009, Congress and the President picked up Warren's proposal, and they made it one of the central parts of the coming financial reform package.

The challenge we face today is not one of authoritarianism, as so many seem inclined to believe, but of nationalist oligarchy. This form of government feeds populism to the people, delivers special privileges to the rich and well-connected, and rigs politics to sustain its regime. Nationalist oligarchy is an existential threat to American democracy. The countries already under its thrall steal technology and use economic power as political leverage. Some of them are actively trying to undermine democracy, through cyber attacks, hacking, and social media disinformation. And they spread bribery and corruption around the world—deepening inequality and threatening to turn our democracy into an oligarchy. American foreign policy needs to reorient itself to focus on this threat. In this new era, the central organizing principle for foreign policy should be to defend democracy by rebuilding political and economic democracy domestically, selectively disengaging from nationalist oligarchies in critical sectors, and deepening security and economic cooperation with other democracies.

I am very grateful to the Boston University Law Review for bringing together such a terrific group of scholars to engage with my book, The Crisis of the Middle-Class Constitution: Why Economic Inequality Threatens Our Republic. It is a testament to the work and excellence of the Boston University Law Review that they pulled together such an intellectually engaging group of commentators. My deepest thanks also to Professors Markovits, Rahman, Lyons, Epstein, and Somin for taking the time to read the book and comment on it.

A small number of firms hold significant market power in a wide variety of sectors of the economy, leading commentators across the political spectrum to call for a reinvigoration of antitrust enforcement. But the antitrust agencies have been surprisingly timid in response to this challenge, and when they have tried to assert themselves, they have often found that hostile courts block their ability to foster competitive markets. In other areas of law, Congress delegates power to agencies, agencies make regulations setting standards, and courts provide deferential review after the fact. Antitrust doesn't work this way. Courts – made up of non-expert, unaccountable judges – set much of antitrust policy. This report provides a set of recommendations to take antitrust away from the courts – to restructure the antitrust laws and agencies in order to enhance the government's ability to enforce antitrust laws more effectively and more transparently.