Suchergebnisse

In the modern world of exponentially increasing threats from advanced technologies, many institutions recognise the need for establishing cyber security programs to meet the growing demand for cyber security professionals in industry, government and defence organisations. However, cyber security, cyber defence and cyber war education is still ill represented in Australia. Some directions to overcome the problem is given by the Australian Government (Australia's Cyber Security Strategy)[1] but not yet fully developed. To address this issue, the Australian Centre for Cyber Security (ACCS) at the University of New South Wales (UNSW) Canberra at ADFA has been developing a suite of three postgraduate cyber security programs for the steadily increasing numbers of students from diverse backgrounds interested in studying cyber security and acquiring cyber warfare skills. The Centre is the only one in the world that offers a university degree specialising in cyber war and peace. This paper will describe the structured approach of developing the programs, highlight challenges by providing observations and lessons learned over the past two years, and propose some future directions on how to overcome these challenges

© 2018 Academic Conferences and Publishing International Limited. All Rights Reserved. A concentration of development in cyber-physical systems containing advanced sensors, sub-systems and machine-learning algorithms over the past decade is equipping unmanned aerial and road vehicles with autonomous decision-making capabilities. The level of autonomy depends upon the make-up and degree of sensor sophistication and the vehicle's operational application, which can range from extremely high cost military-based combat vehicles, to commercially available civilian motor vehicles and very low-cost sub $100 hobby drones. As a result, the risk of autonomous vehicles being compromised and used as an improvised threat has become more serious and therefore trust-based methods to mitigate them are needed. This paper reviews the relationship between cyber-physical systems, automated and autonomous vehicles and their trustworthiness. It examines the significant role cyber-physical systems play in building sub-system, system, and system-of-system layers found in contemporary vehicles as well as the level of human involvement in decision control loops, and the trustworthiness challenges this creates across levels of vehicle automation and autonomy. Further, the paper reviews material on methods to authenticate a vehicle's "world-view" and the veracity of information it may communicate and share with other vehicles and infrastructure. It finds that to be trustworthy, automated and autonomous vehicles will need to implement data verification frameworks and methods. It recommends that future research be conducted into the effectiveness of implementing a pervasive trustworthiness hub where information flowing between heterogeneous autonomous vehicles and infrastructure within their surrounding environment can be authenticated.

If Australia's Future Submarine Program is to deliver, it needs to rapidly develop a comprehensive Systems Security Engineering (SSE) and Cybersecurity Test and Evaluation (CT&E) Strategy that provisions Australian owned and operated infrastructure to design, build, demonstrate and sustain cyber-resilience in critical submarine systems. Failure to act swiftly creates significant program risk that can only be mitigated through costly design rework and in the near term will result incapability limitations. Submarine T&E Sites and Cyber Resiliency are interdependent and inter-related. The Program Director has committed to building land based test infrastructure, however a serious concern is that if there are any delays in the development of organic test capability, these will force the French designer and builder, Naval Group (formerly DCNS), to provision French sites solving the near term problem but adversely impacting Australia's ability to take long term ownership of Submarine cyber-resilience. Australia can exploit lessons learned from US DOD Cybersecurity initiatives to help mitigate Australia's Future Submarine Cybersecurity Risks.Cyber has become a supposedly cheap first-strike weapon of political choice by potential adversaries in a milieu placing insurgency, terrorism, international crime and state-based influences in close un-regulated proximity. The merging of electronic and cyber warfare means that no physical artefact such as a submarine, however unconnected or firewalled it may be, is immune to probing. The quantum attack surface (QAS) of the future submarine is as much in the past, as it is in its designs today and operations tomorrow. It must not only survive to be credible, but even before build is part of an offensive cyber capability forcontemporary deterrence. Cybersecurity craft in the U.S. has determined that critical Defence systems, like submarines, nuclear weapons and space surveillance, require robust security systems engineering and Cybersecurity T&E to build and sustain robust cyber-resilient systems. The future submarine, and every current and future Australian DoD capability has cyber-resilience as a requirement, and there is an opportunity to ensure these requirements flow down through to design, build and test by leveraging the approaches used by the U.S. DoD. Secondly, this paper outlines the security systems engineering and Cybersecurity T&E challenge could be addressed by adopting U.S. DoD best practices to engineer, test and sustain cyber-resilient systems.Lessons learned from the U.S. DoD can be used to inform and refine Australia's Future Submarine Cybersecurity program.

Technological edge on the battlespace has been one of Australia's military advantages within Southeast Asia. This is partly due to the relative larger size of the Australian economy and its ability to procure advanced defence systems compared to the region. However, by 2030, it is envisaged that Australia will slip to being the 23rd largest economy in the world, slightly smaller than Thailand's and similar in size to Malaysia's (Hawksworth and Chan, 2015). This will significantly erode Australia's financial advantage, as other regional nations will be able to afford advanced weapon systems, including cutting-edge cyber capabilities. As all nations continue to develop their offensive cyber capabilities, Australian defence systems will become increasingly vulnerable. Joiner (2017) has reviewed the options of the Australian Department of Defence (Defence) for cyber-security test and evaluation and has highlighted that there are significant difficulties in attributing and predicting the final effects of cyber threats that are currently manifesting, making it very difficult for Australia to rely on deterrence from an ally like the US. In an attempt to address these challenges, cyber security has become an increasing focus for Defence. The release of the 2016 Cyber Security Strategy (Commonwealth of Australia, 2016) and the 2016 Defence White Paper (Australian Government, 2016) shows that decision-makers at all levels have demonstrated an understanding of the importance of cyber security. However, this enthusiasm for protecting Defence capability from hostile cyber attacks has yet to translate into a comprehensive and coordinated set of policies at the working level (Joiner, 2017). This is not necessarily due to ignorance or indifference. Translating the aspirations of a cyber-hardened and cyber-resilient arsenal of military systems into a workable and robust set of policies is a difficult challenge. It is amplified by the large expenditure of public funds and the lengthy acquisition process typically associated with Defence's capability development, often cultivating a culture of risk aversion and an environment where a cyber-resiliency policy cannot simply be iteratively developed over a number of projects in any reasonable timeframe. If new Defence capability lifecycle policies are not implemented properly, cyber resiliency may be overlooked and a vulnerability may develop, or there may be significant wastage that does not materially contribute to the cyber resiliency of the capability being procured.This research article examines how Australian Defence acquisition policies can adapt, mainly using U.S. Defense experiences, to deal more effectively and systematically with cyber resilience.