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Two players choose hawkish or dovish actions in a conflict game with incomplete information. An "extremist," who can either be a hawk or a dove, attempts to manipulate decision making. If actions are strategic complements, a hawkish extremist increases the likelihood of conflict, and reduces welfare, by sending a public message which triggers hawkish behavior from both players. If actions are strategic substitutes, a dovish extremist instead sends a public message which causes one player to become more dovish and the other more hawkish. A hawkish (dovish) extremist is unable to manipulate decision making if actions are strategic substitutes (complements). (JEL D74, D82)

We re-examine the concept of 'democratic advantage' in sovereign debt ratings when optimal repayment policies are time-inconsistent. If democratically elected politicians are unable to make credible commitments, then default rates are inefficiently high, so democracy potentially confers a credit market disadvantage. Institutions that are shielded from political pressure may ameliorate the disadvantage by adopting a more farsighted perspective. Using a numerical measure of institutional farsightedness obtained from the Global Insight Business Risk and Conditions database, we find that the observed relationship between credit ratings and democratic status is strongly conditional on farsightedness. With myopic institutions, democracy is associated with worsened credit ratings on average by about three investment grades. With farsighted institutions there is, if anything, a democratic advantage.