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"This book develops a new contractualist foundation for just war theory, which defends the traditional view of the moral equality of combatants and associated egalitarian moral norms. Traditionally it has been viewed that combatants on both sides of a war have the same right to fight, irrespective of the justice of their cause, and both sides must observe the same restrictions on the use of force, especially prohibitions on targeting non-combatants. Revisionist philosophers have argued that combatants on the unjust side of a war have no right to fight; that pro-war civilians on the unjust side might be targetable; and that lawful combatants on the unjust side might in principle be liable to prosecution for their participation on the unjust side. This book seeks to undercut the revisionist project and defend the traditional view of the moral equality of combatants. It does so by showing how revisionist philosophers fail to build a strong foundation for their arguments and misunderstand that there is a moral difference between collective military violence and a collection of individually unjustified violent actions. Finally, the book develops a theory defending the traditional view of military ethics based on a universal duty of all people to support just institutions. This book will be of much interest to students of just war theory, ethics philosophy, and war studies"--

"This book develops a new contractualist foundation for just war theory, which defends the traditional view of the moral equality of combatants and associated egalitarian moral norms. Traditionally it has been viewed that combatants on both sides of a war have the same right to fight, irrespective of the justice of their cause, and both sides must observe the same restrictions on the use of force, especially prohibitions on targeting non-combatants. Revisionist philosophers have argued that combatants on the unjust side of a war have no right to fight; that pro-war civilians on the unjust side might be targetable; and that lawful combatants on the unjust side might in principle be liable to prosecution for their participation on the unjust side. This book seeks to undercut the revisionist project and defend the traditional view of the moral equality of combatants. It does so by showing how revisionist philosophers fail to build a strong foundation for their arguments and misunderstand that there is a moral difference between collective military violence and a collection of individually unjustified violent actions. Finally, the book develops a theory defending the traditional view of military ethics based on a universal duty of all people to support just institutions. This book will be of much interest to students of just war theory, ethics philosophy, and war studies"--

This volume explores moral and legal issues relating to sovereignty by addressing foundational questions about its nature, examining state sovereignty between states, and dealing with post 9/11 developments in the U.S., questioning the legitimacy of executive power in this arena.

This volume explores moral and legal issues relating to the concept of sovereignty across four areas. The essays in Part I address foundational questions about the nature of sovereignty and seek to trace the ways in which the traditional concept of sovereignty laid the foundation for the modern conception of executive authority. The essays in Part II examine the tension between the executive's duty to act expeditiously for the public interest and the executive's duty to gain citizens' consent for his or her actions.

"At a minimum, military professionals need to have a clear and working knowledge of the ethical decisions that underpin their profession in order to evaluate situations quickly. In the search for such clarity, this volume identifies 14 key virtues of the military professional and through opening commentaries and real world examples of those virtues in practice, it provides guidance for service personnel at every stage of their career."

Abstract
The proportionality principle is an international humanitarian law requirement intended to constrain the use of military force in order to protect civilians in armed conflicts. This research experimentally assesses the reliability of its application by legal and moral experts (in 11 countries), by military officers (in two countries) and by laypeople. Reliability was evaluated according to three criteria: inter-expert convergence; sensitivity to relevant factors; and robustness – relative (lack of) susceptibility to biases. Unlike laypeople, experts and military officers performed well on the sensitivity criterion and manifested an appropriate understanding of the principle at the abstract level. However, both groups of experts failed to reach reasonable judgment convergence. These findings cast doubt on the reliability of the protection provided to civilians during warfare, even when warring parties attempt to abide by the proportionality principle.