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This paper explores the question of the deservingness of the rich, focussing on the factors that inform and influence public opinion. A growing body of literature notes that, while the question of the deservingness of the poor has been the subject of a long-standing academic and policy literature, there has been very little attention paid to similar questions in relation to the rich. This relative absence has been challenged recently in the public sphere by protest movements, such as the Occupy movement with its targeting of the privileged 1%, but it continues to obtain in the policy realm, within which wealth has consistently been constructed as a policy non-problem. This relative absence, moreover, is socially important. If societies are to develop policy settings that meaningfully address the socially damaging effects of current high levels of economic inequality then policy makers will need to contemplate policy settings that affect those at the top – as well as those at the bottom – of the economic distribution. Public opinion surveys consistently demonstrate a broad public presumption in favour of the deservingness of the rich to keep what they have earned "through their own efforts" in the market. The paper's argument is based on a critical discourse analysis of how the issue of the deservingness of the rich has been constructed in the public sphere by political, media and business elites as well as by dissenting voices. Drawing on this analysis, the paper identifies and analyses the key assumptions that inform and support this socially dominant (yet highly contestable) presumption. In this connection, the paper considers the constitutive power of elite discourse, and stresses the significance of the trope of "equality of opportunity" within Third Way political movements during the 1990s.

Recent years have seen an explosion of academic work exploring the increase in economic inequality in western, developed countries over the last thirty years. This work gives accounts of the extent of this increase (Atkinson & Leigh, 2005; OECD, 2011; Perry, 2013), its possible causes (Autor, Katz & Kearney, 2006; OECD, 2008) and its various consequences. Accounts of these consequences may be divided (somewhat arbitrarily) into those that focus on broadly-experienced social consequences (Wilkinson, 1996; Jencks, 2002; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005); political consequences (OECD, 2011; Bartels, 2008) and economic consequences (Persson & Tabellini, 1994; Piketty & Saez, 2003). Other work takes a more explicitly normative approach, or a focus on public attitudes towards rising inequality (Humpage, 2008; Bamfield and Horton 2009; Jost & Major, 2001). Academic work on inequality is thus a massive and massively complex field, even without mentioning work by such important authors as Bernd Wegener, Martin Gilens, Alberto Allesina, Peter Taylor-Gooby, Morton Deutsch, Christopher Jencks or David Miller). One might also note the increasing concern about inequality expressed by politicians and media sources. A non-exhaustive list would include figures hardly associated with the political left, such as David Cameron, the World Economic Forum, the Financial Times, and the Economist.

Economic inequality in developed western countries, including New Zealand, is a pressing social issue. Besides concerns of fairness, current high levels of inequality are associated with a range of socially damaging consequences. Drawing on new and existing data, this article presents a summary and an analysis of New Zealanders' beliefs about economic inequality and political redistribution. It explicates and explores some apparent puzzles and paradoxes within the data, including the divergence found between respondents' (declining, but still substantial) level of concern about economic inequality and their (much more limited) support for specific measures that would reduce that inequality. The article discusses some key factors that appear to influence opinion on inequality and redistribution, and it concludes with suggestions for future research to further explore some of the puzzles within the existing data.

Employment relations is shaping up as an important point of differentiation between the two major parties (National and Labour) at New Zealand's 2014 general election. Since the country adopted a proportional electoral system in 1996, however, no major party has had a majority in Parliament. Consequently, in order to effect its preferred policy programme, the dominant party has had to rely on the votes of other, smaller parties. Both Labour-led (1999-2008) and National-led governments (2008-current) have, with the aid of minor parties, changed the employment relations landscape when in power. In this paper we consider the important role of minor parties in determining likely changes to ER policy settings after the election. We argue that merely identifying the minor parties' policies is not sufficient to predict policy change or influence. It is necessary also to understand both (a) how minor parties are situated within a broader institutional setting and (b) how their policies fit within a broader political (and electoral) environment. Muller and Strom (1999) draw a distinction between three distinct motivations of minor political parties: their desire for official office; for policy wins, and for electoral votes. For minor parties, entering into a relationship with a larger party offers their best chance of achieving political voice. This does not guarantee, however, the advancement of its policy agenda, and it may come at the cost of its long-term electoral popularity. In this paper we draw on recent New Zealand experience to develop a model for understanding the likely influence of minor parties on ER policy change in New Zealand after the 2014 election. To be viable, such a model must take into account - at a minimum - relative party size, the centrality of ER policy to the parties' identities, the degree of similarity between the parties involved, and the personalities of party leaders.