Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1.1 A Roadmap -- 1.2 Hart and Dworkin on Communication in Law -- 1.3 The History of Linguistic Pragmatics -- 1.4 Some Remarks Concerning Current Interdisciplinary Approaches to Philosophy of Language, Law and Mind -- References -- Chapter 2: The Strategic Principle and the Maxim of Selectivity -- 2.1 Outline of the Classical Gricean Project -- 2.2 The Cooperative Principle and the Maxims -- 2.3 Conversational vs. Conventional Implicatures -- 2.4 Intention -- 2.5 Generalized and Particularized Conversational Implicatures -- 2.6 Some Features of Conversational Implicatures -- 2.7 Applying the Classical Gricean Project to the Legal Realm -- 2.7.1 The Cooperative Principle in Law -- 2.7.2 Strategic Speech -- 2.7.3 The Strategic Super-Maxim of Selectivity -- 2.7.4 The Clash of the Maxims -- 2.7.5 The Strength of Implicature -- 2.7.6 Why 'What Is Said' Is Not Always Said? -- References -- Chapter 3: Post-Gricean Implicature Theories and Their Relevance for the Legal Realm -- 3.1 Relevance Theory -- 3.2 Relevance Theory and the Legal Discourse -- 3.2.1 The Amendments to the Classical Gricean Picture -- 3.2.2 Why RT Cannot Be a Sufficient Theory of Legal Pragmatics -- 3.3 The Q and R Principles -- 3.4 The Q and R Principles in Legal Discourse -- 3.5 Q and I Heuristics -- 3.6 The Canons of Construction -- 3.7 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 4: Propositionalism and the Law -- 4.1 The Completeness of Legal Propositions -- 4.1.1 Why Is 'What Is Said' Not Said? -- 4.2 What Can a Theorist of Legal Language Learn from the 'Border Wars'? -- 4.2.1 The Separation of Powers Principle -- 4.2.2 The Consequences of Choosing a Stance in the Debate on Propositionalism for the Separation of Powers Principle -- 4.3 Some Famous Examples of Pragmatic Enrichment in the Law.

AbstractLegal and moral luck goes against the basic principle of criminal law that responsibility ascriptions are based on the mental state of the perpetrator, rather than merely the outcome of her action. If outcome should not play a decisive role in responsibility ascriptions, the attempt versus perpetration distinction becomes more difficult to justify. One potential justification is that we never know whether the attempter would not have resigned from pursuing her criminal intent even at the last moment. However, this paper argues that resigning from criminal intent and trying to stop the criminal outcome, which is called the renunciation defense, can be just as subject to outcome luck as the attempt versus perpetration distinction. And yet the availability of the renunciation defense in court is outcome dependent. I show with a series of experiments (N = 479) that outcome dependence for the renunciation defense is perceived as unjust and discuss the implications for the renunciation defense as well as attempt versus perpetration distinction.