Suchergebnisse

Effectiveness in Processes of Science-Policy Interaction -- The Science-Policy Nexus -- Designing Institutions for Science-Policy Interaction -- The Development of an International Regime on a Human-Induced Climate Change -- Structure: The Institutional Design of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change -- Agent: Leadership Performance in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change -- Causal Relationship: Real or Spurious? -- Structure and Agent in the Scientific Diplomacy of Climate Change.

The role of think tanks in American politics has been increasingly subjected to systematic analysis over the last 10-15 years. In this article I review some of this literature, focusing mainly on the questions of what think tanks are, why this phenomenon is so strongly associated with the US, & what influence think tanks have on US policy-making. Think tanks comprise a wide range of organizations, from pure research institutions to the ideologically-based "advocacy think tanks" characterized by their combination of a strong political agenda & aggressive marketing techniques. The American political system has several features that allow think tanks access to the decision-making process, such as a fragmented structure with a weak party system, a central role for the mass media, & an issue-dominated political agenda. There is no good measure of the general influence of think tanks in US politics, but case studies indicate that the central role of the ideologically-based advocacy think tanks may serve to undermine the role of experts in American politics in the long term. References. Adapted from the source document.

Under what conditions should we expect the United States to support international enforcement of treaties? We hypothesize that U.S. support is most likely for treaties where international enforcement will cause considerable (desired) behavioral change by other countries but little (undesired) behavioral change by the United States. Similarly, U.S. support is least likely for treaties where international enforcement will generate the converse effects. In developing this hypothesis, we derive specific conditions under which we should expect U.S. benefits of international enforcement to outweigh U.S. costs (or vice versa). We also provide empirical examples. Finally, we consider three alternative explanations of U.S. views on international enforcement—concern for U.S. sovereignty, desire to prevent infringements on U.S. constitutional protection of individual rights, and the usefulness of international enforcement as a domestic commitment device. We discuss these alternative explanatory factors' relationship to our own hypothesis.

Under what conditions should we expect the United States to support international enforcement of treaties? We hypothesize that U.S. support is most likely for treaties where international enforcement will cause considerable (desired) behavioral change by other countries but little (undesired) behavioral change by the United States. Similarly, U.S. support is least likely for treaties where international enforcement will generate the converse effects. In developing this hypothesis, we derive specific conditions under which we should expect U.S. benefits of international enforcement to outweigh U.S. costs (or vice versa). We also provide empirical examples. Finally, we consider three alternative explanations of U.S. views on international enforcement—concern for U.S. sovereignty, desire to prevent infringements on U.S. constitutional protection of individual rights, and the usefulness of international enforcement as a domestic commitment device. We discuss these alternative explanatory factors' relationship to our own hypothesis.

This thematic issue of Politics and Governance serves as a Festschrift in honor of Professor Dr. Philos. Arild Underdal on his 70th birthday. In this editorial, the guest editors summarize a few of Professor Underdal's many academic merits and achievements. They also provide a synopsis of each of the ten contributions to the Festschrift, which focuses on climate governance in general and the 2015 Paris Agreement in particular.

This thematic issue of Politics and Governance serves as a Festschrift in honor of Professor Dr. Philos. Arild Underdal on his 70th birthday. In this editorial, the guest editors summarize a few of Professor Underdal's many academic merits and achievements. They also provide a synopsis of each of the ten contributions to the Festschrift, which focuses on climate governance in general and the 2015 Paris Agreement in particular.

AbstractSeveral scholars have suggested that the United States can be compelled to reengage in the Kyoto process by linking cooperation on climate change to cooperation on trade or technology research and development. We argue that such issue linkage would likely fail and suggest that a more promising road to U.S. cooperation is to develop an alternative climate agreement based on federal U.S. climate policy. However, the question then becomes whether the Kyoto countries might be prepared to abandon the Kyoto process in favor of such a U.S.‐based agreement. We argue that if a U.S.‐based agreement were to be built on President Bush's current climate policy, the Kyoto countries (especially the European Union) would likely be reluctant to go along. However, if a U.S.‐based agreement were to be built on the many Kyoto‐like initiatives now emerging at state and local levels, the Kyoto countries might well be more favorably inclined.