How Membership in the European Union can Undermine the Rule of Law in Emerging Democracies
In: APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper
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In: APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: New comparative politics
Jonathan B. Slapin traces the historical development of the veto privilege in the EU and how a veto— or veto threat— has been employed in treaty negotiations of the past two decades. As he explains, the importance of veto power in treaty negotiations is one of the features that distinguishes the EU from other international organizations in which exit and expulsion threats play a greater role. At the same time, the prominence of veto power means that bargaining in the EU looks more like bargaining in a federal system. Slapin's findings have significant ramifications for the study of international negotiations, the design of international organizations, and European integration.
In: West European politics, Band 38, Heft 3, S. 627-648
ISSN: 1743-9655
In: West European politics, Band 38, Heft 3, S. 627-648
ISSN: 0140-2382
World Affairs Online
In: European Union politics: EUP, Band 15, Heft 1, S. 24-42
ISSN: 1465-1165
In: European Union politics: EUP, Band 15, Heft 1, S. 24-42
ISSN: 1741-2757
Within the last several years, new data have become available to test the various theoretical models of EU decision-making, and, in doing so, to assess actor influence. This article examines the extent to which the recent DEU and DEUII datasets provide sufficient information to distinguish between competing theoretical models of legislative decision-making, and accurately assess the power of the different branches of EU government. It argues that insufficient attention has been paid to measurement error in these data. Once measurement error is accounted for, it becomes clear that these data do not provide sufficient information to distinguish between most models of legislative politics. Moreover, empirical models that fail to account for measurement error are likely to lead researchers to erroneous conclusions about actors' legislative influence. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]
In: European Union politics: EUP, Band 15, Heft 1, S. 24-42
ISSN: 1741-2757
Within the last several years, new data have become available to test the various theoretical models of EU decision-making, and, in doing so, to assess actor influence. This article examines the extent to which the recent DEU and DEUII datasets provide sufficient information to distinguish between competing theoretical models of legislative decision-making, and accurately assess the power of the different branches of EU government. It argues that insufficient attention has been paid to measurement error in these data. Once measurement error is accounted for, it becomes clear that these data do not provide sufficient information to distinguish between most models of legislative politics. Moreover, empirical models that fail to account for measurement error are likely to lead researchers to erroneous conclusions about actors' legislative influence.
In: European Union politics: EUP, Band 14, Heft 2, S. 338-341
ISSN: 1465-1165
In: European Union politics: EUP, Band 14, Heft 2, S. 338-341
ISSN: 1741-2757
Fabio Franchino provides an insightful and critical examination of the findings of my book Veto Power, as well as the volume by Finke et al., Reforming the European Union. Here I respond to some of the issues raised by Franchino. First, I discuss Franchino's replication of my main empirical results, and then I discuss my treatment of intergovernmentalism. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]
In: European Union politics: EUP, Band 14, Heft 2, S. 338-341
ISSN: 1741-2757
Fabio Franchino provides an insightful and critical examination of the findings of my book Veto Power, as well as the volume by Finke et al., Reforming the European Union. Here I respond to some of the issues raised by Franchino. First, I discuss Franchino's replication of my main empirical results, and then I discuss my treatment of intergovernmentalism.
Jonathan B. Slapin traces the historical development of the veto privilege in the EU and how a veto— or veto threat— has been employed in treaty negotiations of the past two decades. As he explains, the importance of veto power in treaty negotiations is one of the features that distinguishes the EU from other international organizations in which exit and expulsion threats play a greater role. At the same time, the prominence of veto power means that bargaining in the EU looks more like bargaining in a federal system. Slapin's findings have significant ramifications for the study of international negotiations, the design of international organizations, and European integration.
BASE
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 21, Heft 2, S. 187-211
ISSN: 1460-3667
Literature on international organizations points to several potential sources of bargaining power: voice, exit, and exclusion. In some circumstances, a member state may be able to effectively voice objections to a change to an organization's institutions. In others, it may threaten to leave the organization if its demands are not met. Finally, member states may be able to force a laggard member state to accept unwanted change by threatening to exclude the laggard from the organization. Under what circumstances do these strategies provide bargaining leverage? Are these options available simultaneously or if one is available does that mean that the others are not? What implications does this have for international cooperation, and more broadly, the possible creation of a federal state? This article seeks to answer these questions using a formal model to examine the interaction between voice, specifically veto rights, exit, and exclusion in international organizations and federal states. The model has implications for European integration and can also help explain the conditions under which independent states give up sovereignty to form a stable federal union. Implications of the model are tested through a case study of EU integration in the 1970s and 1980s.
In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, Band 21, Heft 2, S. 187-211
Literature on international organizations points to several potential sources of bargaining power: voice, exit, and exclusion. In some circumstances, a member state may be able to effectively voice objections to a change to an organization's institutions. In others, it may threaten to leave the organization if its demands are not met. Finally, member states may be able to force a laggard member state to accept unwanted change by threatening to exclude the laggard from the organization. Under what circumstances do these strategies provide bargaining leverage? Are these options available simultaneously or if one is available does that mean that the others are not? What implications does this have for international cooperation, and more broadly, the possible creation of a federal state? This article seeks to answer these questions using a formal model to examine the interaction between voice, specifically veto rights, exit, and exclusion in international organizations and federal states. The model has implications for European integration and can also help explain the conditions under which independent states give up sovereignty to form a stable federal union. Implications of the model are tested through a case study of EU integration in the 1970s and 1980s. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright.]
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 21, Heft 2, S. 187-212
ISSN: 0951-6298