This article traces Canada's early interest in space, before turning to its late 1960s decision to focus on a domestic, commercial/civilian communications satellite system in geostationary orbit and the subsequent decline in Canada's military space efforts. It then highlights the wake-up call of the 1991 Gulf War, which demonstrated the critical importance of military communications satellites to future operations, and the steps Canada has taken to gain assured access to such satellites in the decades since. The final section outlines recent advances in low Earth orbit satellite communications (LEO satcom) and the ways in which these systems can address shortfalls in their geostationary cousins. Drawing reference to a new international security environment, it concludes that Canada should move expeditiously to incorporate LEO satcom into efforts to address the growing imperative of military satellite communications in the Canadian Arctic.
With so many trouble spots in the world, it can be difficult for Canadian businesses to know where to trade successfully and with some assurance of security. Canadian government organizations affiliated with Global Affairs Canada (GAC) need to take a broader view of international security, rather than assessing states in isolation, if businesses are to have the vital information they need. Multinational firms typically have their own risk-management strategies, but smaller enterprises need outside help to get information on the safety and viability of potential export markets. However, none of these GAC-affiliated organizations examines the security risks inherent in the interactions between countries. While GAC focuses mainly on economics, tariffs, language barriers and other factors, the Crown corporation Export Development Canada (EDC) does risk assessments of various countries to determine what level of political risk insurance it should offer to Canadian companies. The Business Development Bank, best known for its domestic work with Canadian businesses, has branched out into the foreign realm too, but only in terms of industry and market research on export assessments. Based on long-term GDP projections, some interesting forecasts have been made that will affect how and where Canadian businesses trade internationally. They will need accurate information on risk and security in order to do so. By 2030, the four largest world economies will be those of the U.S., China, India and Japan. For now, the best bets for Canadian businesses in the short to medium term include China, India and some Southeast Asian countries, although there are some accompanying dangers in these areas. Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt have the potential to be good markets for Canadian exports, but the current risk from terrorist activity precludes foreign commercial interests. The unstable relationships between countries in the world's hotspots need continuing assessment and watchfulness. For example, having modernized its navy, China is flexing its military muscles in the South China Sea, building artificial islands there and bullying the Philippines and Vietnam over their competing claims in the region. If the United States were drawn into a larger conflict there, Canadian business interests would be severely compromised. The perennial tensions between the two nuclear powers Pakistan and India pose a threat to commercial activities in that part of the globe, along with terrorist activity within Pakistan and neighbouring Afghanistan. The terrorism risk is also high domestically in the Philippines, while Canada's NAFTA partner, Mexico, can be a dangerous place to do business, due to organized crime. And while sub-Saharan Africa would appear to offer great potential for trade, those opportunities must be weighed against the spread of Islamic State supporters, other terrorists and corrupt regimes throughout that continent. Canada cannot even count on stability among its traditional trading partners, with Eastern Europe keeping a wary eye on Russia's moves and Japan under threat from missiles launched by the volatile North Korean regime. What all this means is that the Canadian organizations doing business assessments must expand their scope. So far, they have limited themselves to looking at individual states and providing information about what is going on inside those states' borders. However, countries do not exist in bubbles. Canadian entrepreneurs need the bigger picture of risk assessment as seen through a broader international lens. When they understand fully the security dimensions of global commerce, they will be in a much better position to make the right decisions about their business ventures.
This paper examines the impact of the US pivot to the Asia-Pacific on Canada's strategic thinking and maritime posture. It highlights elements of the US rebalance before examining Canada's recent past, present, and future strategic and military engagement. Canada wants to be able to contribute to crisis de-escalation if regional tensions lead to conflict, yet the Royal Canadian Navy has less deployment capacity today than it has had in 25 years. To contribute to mediatory influence, and provide warfighting capability, a recapitalized navy should increase deployments to the region, forward deploy some naval assets, and ensure interoperability with its US counterpart. In the event of a crisis, a choice might have to be made between a neutral, honest-broker stance and a more likely decision to contribute forces to a US-led coalition. The first step in either case is to be in the Asia-Pacific region with capable and credible naval forces.
Recent waves of political controversy over military procurement programs, most notably the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter project, are symptoms of an ongoing and increasingly strategic choice Canada is making in the way it equips its military. From the failure to settle on a design for the Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship (which had an originally planned delivery date of 2013), to the un-awarded contracts for new fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft (initially anticipated nearly a decade ago) and the incomplete Integrated Soldier-System Project (once expected to be active by this year); to the delay in cutting the steel for the Joint Support Ship (initial delivery planned for 2012) needed to replace vessels that are now being decommissioned, Canadians are witnessing the results of a new philosophy behind the government's procurement process. Canadian governments have always insisted on industrial and regional benefits for Canada when buying military equipment. But the massive defence spending promised under the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy exacerbated this approach. The emphasis has now formally been placed on favouring industrial benefits for Canada in defence acquisitions, while heightened political cautiousness has placed a higher priority on ensuring maximum value for taxpayer money with a zero tolerance for mistakes environment.A relatively small Canadian defence budget has put pressure on military officials to be creative about ordering new equipment — in some cases, perhaps too creative. Officials have taken to commissioning vehicles and equipment that are more versatile and are capable of carrying out more than their traditional functions. In certain instances, this has meant wish lists that cannot be fulfilled in the expected time frame, or even at all. This is the case, for example, with the Joint Support Ship, which went from a plan for new refuelling and replenishment ships to one for vessels that could also provide a command and control centre for forces ashore and sealift for ground forces, including space for helicopters on deck, making this ship unique. Another example of where fiscal prudence has resulted in procurement complications is in the Canadian Surface Combatant project: here, the Navy is trying to use a common hull for both frigates and destroyers to generate savings in crewing, training, maintenance and logistics. Often, the demand for more versatility and the need to stretch spending have led to plans for equipment that do not yet exist and are so technologically ambitious that industry cannot deliver what the Canadian government requires, as has happened with the highly problematic Maritime Helicopter Project.
For years, successive Canadian governments have been overpromising and under-delivering on defence procurement. Timetables have slipped even as repair and maintenance costs for aging equipment have soared, while elaborate rules have obscured the acquisition process in a bureaucratic fog. This paper assembles information from a wide range of official sources and cuts through the confusion. It surveys 15 Canadian defence acquisitions and initiatives, each anticipated to cost more than $100 million, to account for the delays. Final replacements for the ancient Sea King helicopters are no closer to arriving — after almost 30 years — because the DND failed to recognize that it asked for technology that is still in development. The Joint Support Ship project is years behind schedule because, as originally conceived, it sought to integrate so many capabilities that it was unbuildable. The Integrated Soldier System Project is almost as far behind because Ottawa's procurement rules are so complex and niggling that no bidder could fulfill every single one. Canada faces evolving threats, but efforts to equip the Canadian Forces to meet them have been marked by a long litany of failures — failures of communication, of organization and of vision. This paper sets out the military procurement process, and concisely explains the most egregious flaws, making it essential reading for anyone interested in the future of Canada's military.
