UN peacekeeping operations, long expected to use force only in self-defence and to act impartially, are now being relied upon as a means to maintain and restore security. Through a close examination of 21st century peacekeeping operations the book shows that they are fundamentally ill-suited to the enforcement-type tasks being asked of them.
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In February 2014, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations produced a Strategic Review of the troubled United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in the Darfur region of Sudan (unamid). The Strategic Review faults many aspects of the operation; however, it finds that its mandate is the correct one, concludes that its staffing levels are sufficient and warmly welcomes what it sees as an improved relationship with the Sudanese government. This report may be contrasted with a Foreign Policy investigation published in April 2014, where journalist Colum Lynch provides an unvarnished analysis of the operation. Relying on documents leaked by Aicha Elbasri, former Spokesperson for unamid, the Foreign Policy investigation describes a troubled operation, failing in many of its tasks and mistrusted by parts of the populace. The Foreign Policy investigation portrays a force that routinely downplays or covers up its shortcomings and under-reports violence by the host state government against Darfuri civilians and unamid itself. It is argued that the functioning of unamid provides a vivid illustration of the difficulties associated with a militarised peacekeeping operation, especially when it is emplaced in a country that never wanted it there in the first place.
"Since the end of the last century, UN peacekeeping has undergone a fundamental and largely unexamined change. Peacekeeping operations, long expected to use force only in self-defence and to act impartially, are now increasingly relied upon by the Security Council as a means to maintain and restore security within a country. The operations are established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and some are empowered to use 'all necessary measures', language traditionally reserved for enforcement operations. Through a close examination of these twenty-first century peacekeeping operations--including operations in Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Haiti and the Darfur region of the Sudan--the book shows that they are, for the most part, fundamentally ill-suited to the enforcement-type tasks being asked of them. The operations, which are under-funded, under-equipped and whose troops are under-trained, frequently lurch from crisis to crisis. There is scant evidence, some 10 years on, that matters are likely to improve. The book argues that bestowing enforcement-type functions on a peacekeeping operation is misconceived. Such operations are likely to be unsuccessful in their enforcement-type tasks, thereby causing serious damage to the excellent reputation of UN peacekeeping, and the UN more broadly. In addition, because such operations are more likely to be perceived as partial, their ability to carry out traditional (non-forceful) peacekeeping tasks may be impeded. Finally, the Security Council's practice of charging peacekeeping operations with enforcement functions lessens the pressure on the Council to work to establish genuine enforcement operations - ie, operations that are considerably better suited to restoring peace and security"--Provided by publisher
Zugriffsoptionen:
Die folgenden Links führen aus den jeweiligen lokalen Bibliotheken zum Volltext:
"Since the end of the last century, UN peacekeeping has undergone a fundamental and largely unexamined change. Peacekeeping operations, long expected to use force only in self-defence and to act impartially, are now increasingly relied upon by the Security Council as a means to maintain and restore security within a country. The operations are established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and some are empowered to use 'all necessary measures', language traditionally reserved for enforcement operations. Through a close examination of these twenty-first century peacekeeping operations--including operations in Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti and the Darfur region of the Sudan--the book shows that they are, for the most part, fundamentally ill-suited to the enforcement-type tasks being asked of them. The operations, which are under-funded, under-equipped and whose troops are under-trained, frequently lurch from crisis to crisis. There is scant evidence, some 10 years on, that matters are likely to improve. The book argues that bestowing enforcement-type functions on a peacekeeping operation is misconceived. Such operations are likely to be unsuccessful in their enforcement-type tasks, thereby causing serious damage to the excellent reputation of UN peacekeeping, and the UN more broadly. In addition, because such operations are more likely to be perceived as partial, their ability to carry out traditional (non-forceful) peacekeeping tasks may be impeded. Finally, the Security Council's practice of charging peacekeeping operations with enforcement functions lessens the pressure on the Council to work to establish genuine enforcement operations - ie, operations that are considerably better suited to restoring peace and security"--Provided by publisher
In an address to the United Nations General Assembly on 7 November 1995, Antonio Cassese, then President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), highlighted the difficulty of enforcing international criminal justice in the absence of state cooperation. To emphasise his point, Cassese offered an apt — if somewhat inelegant — analogy: he likened the Tribunal to a limbless giant, dependent on the 'artificial limbs' of the enforcement agencies of UN Member States. First among the various areas cited by Cassese where the Tribunal depended upon state cooperation was the arrest of suspected criminals living within the borders of those states. Over nine years later the problem remained acute. In a 23 November 2004 address to the Security Council, the Prosecutor of the ICTY, Carla Del Ponte, highlighted failures on the part of the governments of Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina to arrest indictees and turn them over to the Tribunal. In particular, she mentioned the lack of cooperation by Belgrade as 'the single most important obstacle faced by the Tribunal' in the implementation of its strategy to complete its trials by the end of 2008.
