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Abtract. This article aims to pose the problem of the relationship between State and Sovereignty in Jean Bodin. In the second half of the Sixteenth Century and then in the Seventeenth Century, Sovereignty was understood as an external principle, presupposed to the existence of political association. Classical terminology then remains. Only when Sovereignty appears as an internal, constitutive element of the Political Body, will the term State permanently take the place of the conceptuality inherited from tradition. Only in this specific phase of its historical conceptual development does the State appear as a reality that exists in itself. Consequently, political science will become the Theory of the State. Certainly not therefore in Bodin's political thought. ; Abtract. This article aims to pose the problem of the relationship between State and Sovereignty in Jean Bodin. In the second half of the Sixteenth Century and then in the Seventeenth Century, Sovereignty was understood as an external principle, presupposed to the existence of political association. Classical terminology then remains. Only when Sovereignty appears as an internal, constitutive element of the Political Body, will the term State permanently take the place of the conceptuality inherited from tradition. Only in this specific phase of its historical conceptual development does the State appear as a reality that exists in itself. Consequently, political science will become the Theory of the State. Certainly not therefore in Bodin's political thought. ; Resumen. Este artículo tiene como objectivo plantear el problema de la relación entre el Estado y la soberanía en Jean Bodin. En la segunda mitad del Siglo Dieciséis y luego en el Siglo Diecisiete, la soberanía se entendió como un principio externo, que presupone la existencia de una asociación política. La terminología clásica queda entonces. Solo cuando la soberanía aparece como un elemento interno y constitutivo del cuerpo político, el término Estado tomará el lugar de la conceptualidad heredada de la tradición. Solo en esta fase específica de su desarrollo histórico-conceptual aparece el Estado como una realidad que existe en sí misma y, en consecuencia, la ciencia política se transforma en la teoría del Estado. Ciertamiente, por lo tanto, no en el pensamiento político de Jean Bodin.

This paper will examine the Agambenian thesis of 'naked life' in relation to sovereign power. In particular, the article aims to compare the central thesis of Agamben's "Homo sacer" project with the notions of Biopolitics and Biopower proposed by Michel Foucault. In "Homo sacer" (the project and the book of Agamben) the exclusion/inclusion of bare life in politics represents, according to Agamben, a "correction" of Foucault. However, its development goes in the direction of an Ontology.

The essay inquiries about the notion of law in Montesquieu's work considered in its relationship with the larger theme of regulation. For the full understanding of the notion of law, connected with the other fundamental concepts of Montesquieu's political thought (custom, institution, government), we have to start from the problem of regulation in society, taking in consideration the production process of an order and the experience of violation of the rule. In this way, even before being the expression of a legitimate command, the law shows an originally operational character.

By placing at the heart of our reading the idea that political society can only be conceived as the relations that are formed within it -but not only with itself- , it is possible to paint a portrait of Montesquieu in an old school style and, in the very same movement, also in a contemporary style -provided that we agree with the premise that our horizon is, by means of the tension inflicted into this initiative by modern political philosophy, the inclusion of the Social into the Law-. The very idea of justice, as the political community's aspirational drive, must be taken, in Montesquieu's work, as a general relation of the community with the whole. According Durkheim himself, Montesquieu founded the true social science. He just failed in giving it a name. Maybe he did not want to choose among the myriad of things that creates constitutional relations. Notwithstanding, he certainly founded the social science -it is enough just to notice the richness of his analysis-. The source of this knowledge is political society. ; Al colocar en el centro de nuestra lectura la idea de que la sociedad política solo puede ser concebida en las relaciones que se forman en su interior –pero no solamente consigo misma–, podemos elaborar un retrato de Montesquieu en estilo antiguo y, en el mismo movimiento, también contemporáneo, siempre que partamos de la premisa de que nuestro horizonte es, a través de la tensión inducida en esta empresa por la filosofía política moderna, la inscripción de la dimensión de lo social en el derecho. La propia idea de justicia, como pulsión aspiracional de la comunidad política, debe ser tomada, en Montesquieu, como una relación general de la comunidad con el todo. Al hacer de la comunidad el objeto de esta relación, Montesquieu ordenaba, cuando menos al legislador, a referirse a la ciencia de la historia que él pretendía constituir. Según el propio Durkheim, Montesquieu fundó la verdadera ciencia social. Solo le faltó dar un nombre a esta ciencia. Quizá no quiso escoger entre las innumerables cosas que crean las relaciones constitucionales. No obstante, él ciertamente fundó la ciencia social, pues basta tan solo con advertir la riqueza de sus análisis. La fuente de este saber es la sociedad política.

El artículo pretende mostrar cómo en la obra de Montesquieu la "natura umana", como parte de la naturaleza en general, nunca se separa del todo de la imagen del universo físico y sin embargo no se confunde con él: más bien se mantiene en un umbral de indeterminación constitutiva entre las causas físicas y las causas morales. Aun sin abandonar un marco relativamente estable, la naturaleza humana se halla implicada siempre en el análisis de las instituciones políticas y sociales, de las costumbres y de los usos adquiridos, esto es, de las formas de vida que asume, donde se mezcla con un ethos, con una segunda naturaleza que se le sobrepone. La naturaleza humana, así, pierde su carácter de presupuesto inmutable, sus leyes son al mismo tiempo las del mundo natural y otras leyes, vale decir, aquéllas que aluden al modo de vida, a las relaciones, a los hábitos y a los usos sociales incluidos en cada hecho humano en su fundamental dimensión histórica y concreta. Así pues, existe una reciprocidad compleja entre la naturaleza humana y su contexto, una influencia recíproca en la que ambos se modifican de continuo. ; In Montesquieu human nature is always seen as part of the bigger Nature on the whole, never entirely separated from the built image of physical universe and still never mixed up with it, but rather set in a sort of its own undetermined threshold between physical and moral causes. Even in its relatively steady position, human nature is always involved and plays a role in the close study of political social institutions, of common custom and established manners, that is in the forms of life that each time it takes on, becoming an ethos, a second nature. In such a process human nature loses its distinctive feature of immutable assumption, revealing itself subjected not only to the natural world laws, but to 'other' laws in which are represented the connections with ways of life, relationships, habits and social usage included in every single human fact considered in its historical practical dimension. The article actually focuses on such close reciprocity between human nature and the social and natural context, on this intercourse always affecting and changing the two of them.

The third major contribution of De l'esprit des lois was to the field of political sociology, which Montesquieu is often credited with more or less inventing. The bulk of the treatise, in fact, concerns how geography and climate interact with particular cultures to produce the Spirit of a people. This Spirit, in turn, inclines that people toward certain sorts of political and social Institutions, and away from others. Laws and Customs are Institutions that derive their normative nature from the relationships and the way of life established between humans within each Society.