Suchergebnisse

Some observers, including many "doomsday" futurists, have contended that a pre dominant characteristic of future society will be extreme scarcity. Viewing this as sumption of extreme scarcity as plausible (though not necessarily most probable), this conjectural essay considers some of the possible effects of sustained scarcity, particu larly sharp declines in public spending and public employment, on public organization behavior. The focus is on the effects of scarcity on four types of strategic choices in public organizations: domain selection, development and deployment of technology, organization structure, and organization process. Arguments are developed that public organizations facing sustained scarcity could be expected to: constram their domain definition, allow domarn selection to dictate technology, seek clientele suited to existing technologies, and, m general, take actions that will ensure that existing technologies are employed at capacity. Further, we argue that narrow efficiency criteria will become paramount and will give rise to more formal, centralized, and rigid organization structures and a habituation of organizational responses to environ mental change.

A 2 (committed or uncommitted) × 2 (high power or low power) × 3 (structure: Prisoner's Dilemma or Chicken or No Conflict) factorial design was used to examine the effects of commitment to future interaction, relative power, and the structure of interdependence. The dependent variable was the proportion of cooperative choices on a series of single-play game matrices. Data were collected from 120 undergraduate students in a laboratory situation. The task consisted of responding either cooperatively or competitively to 18 game matrices. Each matrix was presented individually and without feedback concerning previous outcomes. As hypothesized, the results showed an interaction between commitment and power. Low reward power subjects were more cooperative when uncommitted than when committed in Chicken and the No Conflict game. High power subjects were more cooperative when committed than when uncommitted in the Prisoner's Dilemma. These results suggest caution when generalizing from the prevalent propositions that low power and commitment to future interaction have a cooperative effect.

ABSTRACTThree studies of labor‐management negotiations were conducted within the context of a business simulation game. Face‐to‐face bargaining lasted approximately two hours and resulted in settlements that were incorporated into the simulation game parameters. A total of 56 simulated companies, each comprised of five MBA students, were studied. Results from the first study showed that extending low initial offers, extracting large first concessions, and making a high number of concessions were management bargaining tactics associated with obtaining a low wage rate. These findings were supported by study two. The third study found that an intrateam power mode of orientation was positively correlated with bargaining success and was negatively correlated with overall game success. The results support the use of a simulation game for teaching and research in bargaining.