Suchergebnisse

Public policy has multiple trade-offs between equity and efficiency, or liberty and security. This article discusses the emerging empirical evidence that in the case of effectiveness and efficiency, there is certain complementarity. The empirical evidence shows that multiple goals can be achieved simultaneously. In the public transit, there is also certain order to how the goals could be achieved, which requires prioritization of the goals.

The following study looks at both qualitative and quantitative data collected from surveys of transit agency managers during and after the Great Recession to see if managers report changes in service provision arrangements in response to fiscal pressure. We investigate whether contracting out services is used as a method of cutback management. We find that the majority of agencies are unable to respond to current economic situation by changing service arrangements because of various and sometimes costly constraints such as state law, the level of competition in the bidding process, and length of contracts.

Contracting is often discussed as a cutback mechanism for public managers. The empirical evidence indicates that there are little savings in contracting out due to transaction costs. Public transit agencies exhibit path-dependent behavior; there are tangible conversion costs that may preclude changing the provision of services. As such, public managers should consider the provision of services very carefully as it may set an agency on a long-term trajectory that will be difficult to change due to both conversion and transaction costs.

The following study looks at both qualitative and quantitative data collected from surveys of transit agency managers during and after the Great Recession to see if managers report changes in service provision arrangements in response to fiscal pressure. We investigate whether contracting out services is used as a method of cutback management. We find that the majority of agencies are unable to respond to current economic situation by changing service arrangements because of various and sometimes costly constraints such as state law, the level of competition in the bidding process, and length of contracts. Adapted from the source document.

1. Introduction -- 2. The marketing and sales of stolen data -- 3. The economic impact of stolen data markets -- 4. The social organizations of actors in stolen data markets -- 5. Visualizing the networks of economic transactions and ads in stolen data markets -- 6. Implications and conclusions